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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
There are two basic theoretical views of how advertising effects 
competition. One school of thought suggests that advertising decreases 
competition. Kaldor (1950) argued that through advertising economies of 
scale, advertising increases market concentration. Also, Bain (1956) 
suggested that advertising causes strong product differentiation and 
brand loyalty, which are barriers to entry and will lead to higher 
concentration. 
The opposite school of thought believes that advertising increases 
competition. Most noted here is Nelson (1970, 1974), who argues in his 
first paper that advertising increases information to the consumer, which 
makes demand curves more elastic, putting downward pressure on prices. 
Also, he argues advertising allows for easier entry by new firms. In his 
second paper, Nelson concludes that advertising provides direct 
information on relative product quality. With this extra information, 
the consumer is a more careful shopper, making the markets more 
competitive. 
Hence, there are plausible economic arguments on both sides of the 
issue: does advertising increase or decrease competition? Comanor and 
Wilson (1979, p. 457) state, "While these theoretical models are 
important for their explanations of how advertising might work, it is 
evident that no consensus has developed." 
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Retail and National Advertising 
It is true that there is no consensus on advertising's effects on 
competition. However, this is in large part due to treating all 
advertising homogeneously. It is helpful to separate advertising into 
two different types, retail and national. Retail advertising consists of 
advertising that contains a high degree of information. Examples include 
the classified ads in newspapers, the yellow pages, some mail-order 
catalogs, and some retail store ads. This increase of information to the 
consumer tends to make the markets more efficient and competitive. Going 
back to Nelson's arguments, more information will make market demand 
curves more elastic, putting downward pressure on prices. Also, this 
information could help new entrants to overcome loyalty and familiarity 
with established products. Therefore, retail advertising in most cases 
is likely to be procompetitive. 
In contrast, national advertising consists largely of advertising 
run by manufacturers. As will be shown below, it tends to rely more on 
persuasion than information to sell products. Also, it is dominated by 
television advertising which gives larger firms many advantages. (These 
will be covered in detail in Chapter III.) And, it is concentrated. 
While retail advertising is done by many millions of businesses, national 
advertising is dominated by relatively few. Currently, the top 100 
manufacturers account for roughly one-half of all national advertising 
(Morris, 1984, p. 49). Therefore, national advertising in most cases is 
likely to be anticompetitive. Norris (1984, p. 47) writes that: 
Retail and national advertising are so different if not 
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contradictory in function that it is unfortunate the same word 
applies to both. But, since it does, distinguishing one from the 
other is of utmost importance. With surprising frequency, writers 
fail to do so, generalizing from one to the other. 
At least two types of studies have confirmed that national 
advertising has more persuasion than information content. The first type 
is content analysis of commercials. At least three of these studies 
analyzed TV commercials; Resnik and Stern (1977), Reid and Rotfeld 
(1981), and Pollay et al. (1980). All three studies generated similar 
results, that television commercials have little if any information 
content. I will give the Resnik and Stern (1977) results in more detail. 
Three hundred seventy-eight television commercials broadcasted by the 
three major networks were reviewed during all periods of a week in April 
1975. The information content of the commercials was tested by looking 
for 14 different information clues (price or value, quality, performance, 
components or contents, availability, special offers, taste, packaging or 
shape, guarantees or warranties, safety, nutrition, independent research, 
company-sponsored research, and new ideas). However, no information clue 
was challenged for truthfulness, credibility, or soundness of evidence 
presented. Despite the lenient evaluation criteria, only 49 percent of 
the commercials had at least one information clue, while 16 percent had 
two clues, and only 1 percent had three clues. 
The second type of study that implies that national advertising 
contains more persuasion than information is the request that producers 
substantiate claims made by their advertising. One example is a study by 
Woodside (1977), who requested substantiation from 27 television and 27 
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magazine advertisers. Only 22.2 percent responded satisfactorily. The 
others either did not respond or their responses were viewed as 
nonsatisfactory. A similar result was obtained by Nader and Cowan 
(1973). Hence, available evidence tells us that national advertising has 
little information content. 
It appears that national advertising works instead by persuasion and 
product image building. National advertising (through product 
differentiation) elevates prices and decreases competition best when it 
is difficult for consumers to determine whether one product is in fact 
superior to another. A good example is ReaLemon lemon juice, which in 
1973 had 80 percent of the market but charged a price 35 percent higher 
than its identical rival products (Scherer, 1980, p. 382). Other 
examples are provided by the "double-blind experiments which have 
repeatedly demonstrated that consumers cannot consistently distinguish 
premium from popular-priced beer brands, but exhibit definite preferences 
for the premium brands when labels are affixed—correctly or not" 
(Scherer, 1980, p. 382). Still other examples include dentifrices, 
soaps, and drugs (Scheier, 1980, p. 382). 
In summary, in order to look at the effects of advertising on 
competition, advertising must be categorized as national or retail. 
Nevertheless, some writers still confuse these two. Norris (1984, p. 61) 
states that 
Despite all the evidence to the contrary, however, a handful of 
economists maintain that advertising is information that enables 
consumers to make more rational choices, leading to improved 
functioning of markets, lower prices, and so forth. They appear to 
believe that of national as well as retail advertising; in fact, as 
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mentioned earlier, there is often no indication they are aware of 
any difference between the two (Morris, 1984, pp. 60-61). 
Case Studies of Retail and National Advertising 
To further illustrate the difference between retail and national 
advertising, below are presented one case of retail advertising that is 
procompetitive and two cases of national advertising that are 
anticompetitive. 
One case where retail advertising has been shown to be 
procompetitive is for eyeglasses. Benham (1972) used a subsample of 634 
individuals from a survey on expenditures for medical services in 1963. 
He ran a regression equation with the price of a pair of glasses as the 
dependent variable. The most important independent variable was a dummy 
variable which is equal to one if the individual purchased eyeglasses in 
a state with complete prohibition of eyeglasses advertising and equal to 
zero otherwise. The results showed that glasses cost on average $6.70 
(or 25 percent) more in states that restrict all types of advertising by 
the practitioner. Hence, when the optometrists' code of ethics prohibits 
advertising, the practitioners benefit and consumers lose by higher 
eyeglass prices. 
Cases where national advertising is anticompetitive are plentiful. 
One case is Folger's coffee. Folger operated primarily west of the 
Mississippi River before it was acquired by Proctor and Gamble (P&G) in 
1963. After the FTC freed P&G of its consent agreement (from a 1967 
case), it began to expand Folger eastward by heavy advertising-—financed 
from its other products (P&G produces over 60 well-known grocery 
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products) (Connor et al., 1985, p. 259). In 1972, Folger entered 
Cleveland and advertised heavily. In early 1973, Folger entered 
Philadelphia with a very strong advertising blitz—use of daytime and 
nighttime television on 14 stations. 
General Foods (GF), another large grocery product conglomerate, owns 
Maxwell coffee, the coffee market leader of the East. In response to 
Folger's entry, GF unleashed a counterattack. GF lost $4 million in this 
counterattack, but expected this loss to be more than offset by future 
profits if it could maintain or increase its market share (Connor et al., 
1985, p. 262). 
Both P&G and GF were quite successful in increasing their market 
shares by costly cross-subsidization promotion and advertising. This 
meant that some small single-line coffee companies lost market shares. 
In fact, many were forced out of business shortly after 1973, including 
Breakfast Cheer Coffee of Pittsburgh, Paul de Lima Coffee Co. of 
Syracuse, and the Indian Coffee Co. of Cleveland (Connor et al., 1985, p. 
264). As a result, the combined share of the coffee market for P&G and 
GF rose from 47 percent in 1968 to 63 percent in 1981 (Wall Street 
Journal, 1981)= The same Wall Street Journal article also stated that 
because of the decrease in competition, the coffee roasters "have been 
reluctant to lower their prices in line with the prices of raw coffee" 
(Wall Street Journal, 1981, p. 25). Thus, today the coffee industry is 
more concentrated and less competitive than before the P&G-Folgers 
merger. 
Another case where national advertising has been anticompetitive is 
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in the Philip Morris-Miller Brewing Company merger of 1969-1970. Philip 
Morris is a large multinational conglomerate. Among other products it 
produces, it sells over 160 brands of cigarettes in over 170 countries 
(Connor et al., 1985, p. 250). And, it already had experience at gaining 
market share in the cigarette industry through successful advertising of 
Marlboro cigarettes. In 1955, Philip Morris changed Marlboro to a 
filtered tip and began advertising it with the burly Marlboro cowboy. 
Between 1955 and i960, the sales of Marlboro had increased from less than 
a half billion dollars to over $22 billion (Telser, 1962, p. 476). 
Hence, Philip Morris had both the financial resources and advertising 
expertise to cause a major structural change in most any industry in 
which it bought a subsidiary company. 
On the other hand, the Miller Brewing Company was a relatively small 
single-line company (4.5 percent of total beer sales in 1969) (Connor et 
al., 1985, p. 251). During 1971-1973, Philip Morris-Miller began 
experimenting and exploring to find what advertising strategy would best 
gain a large share of the beer market. In 1972, it bought the Meister 
Br au, Lite, and Buckeye brands of Meister Brau, Inc. of Chicago, and 
began advertising each. Lite was the most successful, so Lite's 
advertising was increased and Meister Brau's and Buckeye's were 
decreased. Overall, Philip Morris-Miller increased its advertising 
budget from $9.4 million in 1970 to $140 million in 1982 (Connor et al., 
1985, p. 255). This advertising increase helped Philip Morris-Miller to 
increase Lite's sales by over 4,000 percent between 1974 and 1982 (Connor 
et al., 1985, p. 256). This is a good example of gaining market shares 
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by identifying a market segment (a low-calorie beer endorsed by big-time 
athletes to nullify the "sissy" image of a low-calorie beer) and then 
advertising heavily. 
It should be noted that only a big conglomerate such as Philip 
Morris could finance such a promotion. Miller was profitable in 1970 but 
lost money every year from 1971-1975, and earned modest profits in 1976 
and 1977. Even in 1981, Miller earned a 4 percent profit—compared to 17 
percent on Philip Morris' cigarette operations (Connor et al., 1985, p. 
258). Hence, Philip Morris was willing to face deep and sustained losses 
and low profits in order to earn expected higher profits in the future 
due to its increased market power. In contrast, a single-line firm could 
never have afforded these advertising costs and consequent losses. 
As in the coffee industry case, the leading beer maker, Anheuser-
Busch, responded by its own aggressive advertising campaign. As a 
result, the larger brewers became bigger and the smaller brewers became 
smaller, sold out, or went out of business. The number of brewers fell 
from 126 in 1971 to about 25 in 1982 while the four-firm concentration 
rose from 50.8 percent in 1972 to 78.5 percent in 1982 (Connor et al., 
1985. pp. 246-247). Of course, other factors, such as increasing 
economies of scale, could be a factor for this increased concentration. 
But, undoubtedly, increased advertising intensity was the key factor as 
it is unlikely for economies of scale to increase a great deal over just 
a ten-year period. Mueller (1978, pp. 102-103) states that, "I think 
this is one of the most dramatic examples that I have ever seen of the 
restructuring of an industry in less than a decade." 
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Dissertation Overview 
These above cases concerning the effects of retail and national 
advertising on competition are interesting. However, in order to test 
the anticompetitive effects of national advertising for a broad segment 
of American industries, I will run a regression model with concentration 
change as the dependent variable and advertising intensity (levels and 
changes) as the main independent variable. (Advertising intensity is 
advertising expenditures divided by value-of-shipments.) 
Although past empirical studies (via various static models) have 
supported both procompetitive and anticompetitive views of advertising, 
only the studies using a dynamic model (concentration change as the 
dependent variable) have found consistent results. As Rogers (1982, p. 
203) pointed out, "It is important to note that no study found 
advertising to exert a significant negative effect on concentration 
change." All advertising intensity coefficients in those studies have 
been positive and often significant or negative and insignificant. 
Rogers (1982, p. 203) further explains that these insignificant 
coefficients are probably a function of poor data. 
Use of concentration ratios 
Market concentration ratios are defined as the percent of total 
industry sales (or capacity, or employment, or value added, or physical 
output) contributed by the largest few firms. For the U.S., the Census 
Bureau publishes the concentration ratios for markets at the four-digit 
(industry) level or the five-digit (product class) level, as defined by 
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the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system for the top four, 
eight, twenty, or fifty firms. The four-digit industry market 
classifications are more broad than the five-digit product class market 
classifications. For example, industry 2844, toilet preparations, can be 
further classified at the five-digit level to 28441, shaving 
preparations, 28442, perfume, 28443, hair preparations, 28444, 
dentifrices, and 28445, other cosmetics and toilet preparations. Since 
more data (other than concentration ratios) are available at the four-
digit level, I will use four-digit concentration ratios in this study. 
Concentration ratios are generally viewed as a reasonable measure of 
market power. As with any data, the SIC concentration ratios have some 
measurement problems. Since the SIC concentration ratios assume national 
markets for all industries, the market power indicated by concentration 
ratios tends to be overstated when an industry has considerable import 
competition, as in the automobile, shoe, or television industries. On 
the other hand; they tend to be understated when an industry ships its 
products only in a local or regional market, as in the cement and 
newspaper industries. Also, industries should be defined so that 
reasonably close substitute goods are classified in the same industry. 
The SIC classification system also has some problems here, where some 
industries are defined too broadly or narrowly. Probably the best 
example of an industry too broadly defined is industry 2834, 
pharmaceutical preparations, which lumps together dozens of drugs which 
are not adequate substitutes. Examples of an industry too narrowly 
defined from the use point of view (close substitutes classified in 
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different industries) are 3221, glass containers, and 3411, metal cans. 
The problem of an industry defined too narrowly or broadly is 
present at both the four-digit and five-digit levels. In general, 
Scherer (1980, p. 64) states that the four-digit industries err on the 
side of understating concentration because they tend to be defined too 
broadly on average, while the five-digit product markets error on the 
side of overstating concentration because they tend to be defined too 
narrowly on average. Therefore, studies at either the 4-digit or 5-digit 
level will have this definition problem, although the bias appears to be 
greater at the four-digit level (Scherer, 1980, p. 64). In sum, 
concentration ratios tend to understate market power when industry 
markets are defined to include nonsubstitutes or the meaningful market is 
local or regional. And, concentration ratios tend to overstate market 
power when industry markets are defined to exclude substitutes or import 
competition is significant. 
Despite these problems, the SIC concentration ratios are one of the 
two types of market power data available covering the manufacturing 
industries. Some of the problems with concentration ratios are not as 
important in this dissertation because the dependent variable is 
concentration change. Even if the concentration ratio measures have some 
problems, the change in concentration over a period of years shows 
consistent results. As Shepherd (1979, p. 200) states, "It 
(concentration ratios) can show changes in structure pretty accurately. 
Thus, the market power indicated by a ratio of 53 or 63 may be a matter 
of debate, but a rise of the ratio from 53 to 63 strongly suggests that 
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been a rise in market power." 
The other common market power data source for manufacturing industry 
studies is profit rates. Most empirical evidence (as well as economic 
reasoning) indicates thai: concentration levels and profit rates are 
highly correlated. Weiss (1974, p. 202) did a survey on the 
concentration-profit rate literature and concluded that; 
The bulk of the studies shows a significant positive effect of 
concentration on profits or margins. While there is a good deal of 
overlap in the data (almost half depends on profit rates for 
American manufacturing in the 1950s), all the studies together 
reflect a wide range of experience—from 1936 to 1970, and covering 
Britain, Canada, and Japan as well as the United States. 
This adds support to using concentration as a measure of market power and 
concentration change as a measure of change in market power. 
Use of advertising intensity 
As indicated above, the main independent variable in this 
concentration change model is advertising intensity (changes and levels). 
While most other studies using concentration change models have used 
general advertising intensity, I will also focus on, among others, 
network television advertising intensity for at least two reasons. 
First, my advertising data set is disaggregated into six different media, 
including spot and network television advertising. The majority of past 
studies using a concentration change model and advertising intensity had 
an advertising data set consisting of only total media expenditures. 
Second, as described above, national advertising tends to be 
anticompetitive because it is more persuasive than informative in nature. 
And, television advertising (especially network) in recent years is 
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clearly the most important component of national advertising. Television 
advertising expenditures grew from near zero in 1947 to 69 percent of all 
measured media advertising in 1972 (Mueller and Rogers, 1980, p. 91). As 
discussed earlier, this advertising is heavily dosxinated by a relatively 
few large corporations. In addition, there exist with TV advertising 
numerous advantages for the larger firms (presented in Chapter III). 
Therefore, this study will analyze the effects of network television (and 
other) advertising intensity on concentration change from 1963 to 1982 
and various subperiods. The data set will include 269 (out of 450 
possible) four-digit SIC industries whose definitions are comparable over 
this period. 
An overview of the rest of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 
II is a literature review of all past concentration change models that 
use some type of advertising or advertising intensity measure as an 
independent variable. Chapter III gives the economic rationale for the 
inclusion of each independent variable and the expected sign of each 
coefficient. Chapter IV discusses the data source of each variable. 
Chapter V covers the empirical results, and Chapter VI is a general 
summary and conclusion. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
My dissertation has one basic model—a single equation concentration 
change model with advertising intensity as the main independent variable. 
There have been ten relevant prior studies that have been done on this 
relationship, each of which will be categorized and discussed according 
to its source of advertising intensity data. A summary of the variables 
used and results obtained is presented in Table II.1 at the end of 
Chapter II. 
Before reviewing these studies, it should be pointed out that the 
forerunner in using both concentration change and advertising intensity 
data was Mueller (1967). Instead of a model, he used descriptive 
statistics. He suggested that a stable, average concentration trend of 
all manufacturing industries concealed a divergent trend in 
concentration. He used Parker's (1967) data set that classified four-
digit SIC industries into producer goods or consumer goods with low, 
mediuE and high levels of product differentiation (based on advertising 
intensity). The results were interesting; for the period 1947-1963, 
producer good industries experienced a decline in average four-firm 
concentration while consumer good industries experienced increases in 
average four-firm concentration, with larger increases in concentration 
industries with a higher degree of product differentiation (e.g., higher 
advertising intensity). Mueller concluded that "monopoly capitalism" is 
not inevitable because of technical economies—as supported by the 
evidence for the producer good industries. However, the evidence from 
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the consumer good industries showed that advertising (through large-scale 
promotion, especially in TV) did lead to an increase in concentration. 
The First Generation of Concentration Change Models 
The first generation of concentration change models to use 
advertising intensity as an independent variable were Marcus (1969a), 
Mueller and Hamm (1974), and Wright (1978). All used Robert Parker's 
(1967) advertising data set, compiled at the FTC for the years 1947, 
1954, 1958 and 1963. Parker used a discrete advertising variable: four-
digit SIC industries were classified into either producer good industries 
or consumer good industries with low, medium and high degrees of product 
differentiation. (The degree of product differentiation was based on 
advertising intensity.) 
Marcus (1969a) was the first to use a concentration change model 
with advertising intensity as an independent variable. The purpose of 
his paper was to "employ newer data and a more comprehensive test 
procedure in a réévaluation of this hypothesis"—that advertising will 
result in increasing industry concentration. At that time, previous 
tests of this proposition by Telser (1964) and Mann et al. (1967) had 
(both using a concentration level model) yielded conflicting results. 
Marcus examined 78 four-digit SIC consumer good industries for the 
years 1947-1963, 1954-1963 and 1958-1963. The dependent variable was the 
change in eight-firm concentration ratio (ACR8). The independent 
variables were initial concentration ratio (ICR), growth (G), and the 
degree of product differentiation, medium (M) and high (H). As noted 
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before, the degree of product differentiation for Parker's data set was 
determined by advertising intensity. If an industry spent more than 10 
percent of its sales on advertising, it was classified as highly 
differentiated and if advertising was less than 1 percent of its sales, 
it was classified as being low differentiated (Marcus, 1969a, p, 119)» 
Marcus hypothesized that G and ICR would have negative effects on 
ACR8 while M and H would have positive effects on ACR8. He thought G 
would have a negative coefficient since dominant firms in growth 
industries may find it difficult to expand as fast as the entire industry 
(because large firms may lack the flexibility of small firms to expand 
output as rapidly). ICR was thought to also have a negative coefficient 
for two reasons: 1) A spurious reason, because ICR has an upper and 
lower bound and hence the likelihood of a negative association with ACR8 
is enhanced. 2) An economic reason, because a smaller firm can expand 
its market share more via a given percentage reduction in price (since 
smaller firms have more elastic demand curves) while larger firms avoid 
price competition for fear of retaliation. And he believed M and H would 
have positive coefficients for two reasons. First, as suggested by 
Kaldor (1950), increasing returns to advertising would favor the larger 
firms in each industry. Second, as suggested by Bain (1956), the 
necessity to advertise in these industries will raise the required amount 
of capital for a successful operation, thus constituting a barrier to 
entry for new firms. 
The regression analysis resulted in all coefficients with the same 
sign as predicted, though not all were significant. In particular, H was 
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positive, larger than M, and significant in all three periods. M was 
positive and significant in all periods but 1958-1963, when it was 
positive but not significant. 
Marcus concluded that the "performance of the advertising variables 
appears to confirm the Kalder-Bain hypothesis" (Marcus, 1969a, p. 120). 
Hence, advertising can be expected to lead to a substantial rise in 
industry concentration. 
Mueller and Hamm (1974) expanded and updated the Marcus study. They 
began by examining average four-firm concentration change (ACR4) for 166 
four-digit SIC industries for the period 1947-1970. On the surface, as 
summarized in the Mueller (1967) testimony, industry concentration 
appeared relatively stable: average ACR4 (weighted by sales) increased 
only 2.1 from 1947 to 1970 for all 166 industries. However, the average 
weighted ÂCR4 was very different when industries were categorized by 
Parker's producer goods and consumer goods. From 1947 to 1970, the 
average weighted ACR4 decreased 2.7 for the producer goods, while it 
increased 6.9 for the consumer goods. Among consumer good industries, 
the average weighted ACR4 decreased 7.0 for the low product 
differentiation industries and increased 6.5 and 11.0, respectively, for 
the medium and high product differentiation industries. 
To further explore the above, Mueller and Hamm did a regression 
analysis to identify and quantify the significance of these concentration 
changes. They examined 166 four-digit SIC consumer good industries for 
the years 1947-1970 and 292 industries for the years 1958-1970. The 
dependent variable was either ACR4 or ACR8. The independent variables 
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were the same as the Marcus study (G, ICR, M, H) plus industry size (S), 
net entry of firms (ANF), and low product differentiation (L). 
Mueller and Hamm hypothesized a negative coefficient for G because 
slow growing (or declining) industries create a displacement problem for 
new entrants. S was expected to have a negative coefficient because all 
else equal, the larger the absolute size of an industry, the lower its 
entry barriers. ICR was also expected to have a negative coefficient 
because, ceteris paribus, leading firms in concentrated industries are 
likely to lose market share over time. ANF was also expected to have a 
negative coefficient because it is a truism that net entry in an industry 
results in a decline in the market share of existing competitors. But 
they pointed out that ANF should be appropriately viewed more as a 
symptom than a cause because it reflects the more fundamental cause of a 
structural change measured by other independent variables. Thus, i.VlC> 
tested equations with and without ANF. Lastly, the signs of the M and H 
coefficients were expected to be positive. This is because of real or 
pecuniary economies of scale in advertising (to achieve product 
differentiation). They also noted that these economies of scale have 
risen in recent years due to the emergence of network TV as a preferred 
method of advertising for many products. [They did not predict the sign 
of the low product differentiation variable.] 
The regression results were similar to those of the Marcus study. 
ICR was negative and significant in all equations. G was negative and 
significant when ANF was excluded for 1947-1970. S was negative in all 
equations and usually significant. ANF was discounted as a true 
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independent variable. H and M were both positive and significant in all 
periods, with the H coefficient being larger. L was mixed, but often 
positive and significant during the period 1958-1970. 
Mueller and Hamm concluded that the increase in consumer good 
concentration is largely due to extensive network TV advertising. For 
the producer goods, they state that the evidence showed that 
technological economies do not necessitate increasing concentration. Yet 
they warned that 
The "natural" erosive forces are not sufficiently strong or 
pervasive so that we may predict any substantial overall decline in 
concentration in producer good industries in the decade ahead.... 
This possible reversal in trend may reflect the growing 
conglomeration of American industry with its potential for 
rigidifying existing industrial structure, or, worse still, 
promoting greater market concentration (Mueller and Hamm, 1974, p. 
519). 
Wright (1978) used a model similar to both Marcus (1969a) and 
Mueller and Hamm (1974). In addition, he addressed the possible problem 
of specification bias in concentration change models. This possible bias 
results because any change in a concentration ratio measure is bounded by 
zero from below and by one from above. Hence, highly concentrated 
industries are limited in terms of the increase in the value of the 
dependent variables. Wright's transformed dependent variable was SC = 
CR4/U50 - I 50 - ICR|)1/^ • (50 - 1 50 - FCRj)^''^] where FCR is the 
concentration ratio in the ending period of analysis. This form has a 
better specification because it adjusts changes in concentration into 
proportional terms. For example, a change in CR4 from 4 to 5 is 
equivalent to a change from 40 to 50 or 95 to 96. 
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Wright regressed equations with CR4 or SC as the dependent variable 
for 206 four-digit SIC industries from 1947 to 1963. Wright reported 
that "both the initial concentration and product differentiation remain 
significant (though slightly less so) under the new specification. This 
is important as now we can have confidence in the role of these variables 
apart from the specification bias in the equation" (Wright, 1978, p. 
629). 
Nest, Wright used a proxy variable for plant and non-plant economies 
of scale to see if product differentiation (determined by advertising 
intensity) remained significant. The proxy variable "is the change in 
market share from 1947 to 1963 of the fifth through the eighth largest 
firms relative to the market share of all but the four largest firms" 
(Wright, 1978, p. 629). The product differentiation coefficients 
remained significant Implying that product differentiation has an Impact 
on concentration change apart from economies of scale. 
Lastly, Wright used two interaction terms: concentration multiplied 
by product differentiation and concentration multiplied by economies of 
scale. The former coefficient was positive and significant In both ACR4 
and SC equations. The latter coefficient was positive in both equations 
but significant only in the ACR4 equation. Hence, it appears that 
product differentiation is the more important barrier to entry. 
The Second Generation of Concentration Change Models 
The second generation of concentration change models to use 
advertising intensity as an independent variable were Ornstein and 
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Lustgarten (1978), Scherer (1979), Asch (1979), and Levy (1985). Their 
measure of advertising intensity was a continuous measure from the U.S. 
Commerce Department's Input-Output (10) tables. Though not a perfect 
match, the SIC four-digit industries and 10 industries are defined 
similarly. The 10 advertising data set is an improvement over the Parker 
data set since it is continuous and appears to classify advertising 
expenditures closer to the SIC four-digit industries. But, it also has 
some serious aggregation problems, which will be covered in detail in 
Chapter IV. 
Ornstein and Lustgarten (1978) ran regression models with both 
concentration level and concentration change as the dependent variables. 
I will review their concentration change models since these are relevant 
to my topic. 
They ran one basic model for two different time periods; 120 four-
digit SIC industries covering 1947-1967 and 317 four-digit SIC industries 
covering 1963-1967. ACR4 was the dependent variable. The independent 
variables were initial year advertising intensity (I A/S), change in 
advertising intensity [A(A/S)], IRC, change on average firm size (AAFS) 
and G. This was the first time 10 advertising data were used. The lA/S 
and A(A/S) expected coefficient signs were positive because of economies 
of scale in advertising. The ICR coefficient was expected to be negative 
because low initial concentration is more likely to rise than fall and 
high initial concentration is more likely to fall than rise, since 
concentration ratios are bounded between zero and one. AAFS was 
predicted to have a positive effect since an increase in average firm 
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size is a proxy for an increase in optimum firm size, which increases 
concentration because one determinant of concentration is optimum firm 
size. Lastly, G was hypothesized to have a negative effect because G is 
a "proxy for changes in demand over long periods" (Ornstein and 
Lustgarten, 1978, p. 225), which allows net entry of firms. In addition, 
some equations replaced A(A/S) with percentage change on total industry 
advertising A(ADV) because "the absolute amount of advertising 
expenditures will be a better indicator of economies of scale or capital 
barriers due to advertising" (Ornstein and Lustgarten, 1978, p. 227). 
Likewise, the expected sign of the AADV coefficient was positive. 
Ornstein and Lustgarten began the empirical analysis by showing that 
A(A/S) and AADV are not significantly correlated, indicating that they 
are not good substitutes. And, since it has been reasoned that 
advertising increases concentration due to economies of scale in 
advertising, they preferred AADV to A(A/S). For 1947-1967, the ICR, G, 
and AAFS coefficients had their expected signs and were significant» The 
results were mixed for the advertising coefficients. lA/S and AADV were 
mostly insignificant while A(A/S) was positive and significant in all 
periods. 
Ornstein and Lustgarten concluded that "although this study found a 
positive relationship between advertising and concentration, the nature 
and significance of this finding is unclear" (Ornstein and Lustgarten, 
1978, p. 250). They claimed that too many different hypotheses fit the 
results and more research is needed. However, Comanor (1978), in an 
accompanying comment, thought they were too cautious and wondered "what 
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evidence would have convinced them" (Comanor, 1978, p. 278). 
Scherer (1979) was responding to an article by Professor Peltzman 
dealing with increases in concentration bringing unit cost reductions 
that outweigh the price-raising effect associated with this increase in 
monopoly power. However, in the beginning of this article, Scherer does 
present a concentration change model. He states that in his sample of 
154 four-digit SIC industries for the period 1947 to 1970, concentration 
rose by 6.4 points in the consumer goods and fell by 1.7 points in the 
producer goods. This "leads one to suspect that there must be some 
difference in structural change dynamics associated with the type of 
buyer" (Scherer, 1979, p. 192). 
Scherer's concentration change model was similar to past models. 
His data set consisted of 154 four-digit SIC industries between 1947 and 
1972. ACR4 was the dependent variable and ICR, G, S, dummy variables for 
consumer, producer or mixed goods, and A/S were the independent 
variables. The results; IRC and S were both negative and significant, 
consumer and mixed dummies and A/S were positive and significant, and G 
was insignificant. However, in a footnote, Scherer reports the finding 
of a similar model with a larger data set (n=323) for the years 1963 to 
1972. The only coefficient that significantly changed was A/S (which 
became insignificant). 
Asch (1979) presented a model similar to Scherer (1979) for 1963-
1972 and two sub-periods. He expected the ICR and G coefficients to be 
negative for reasons stated above by Marcus (1969a) and Mueller and Hamm 
(1974). Rather than hypothesizing a sign for the A/S coefficient, he 
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instead states that "this paper presents new evidence on the contribution 
of advertising intensity to changes in concentration" (Asch, 1979, p. 
288). 
For his sample of 212 four-digit SIC industries, the ICR coefficient 
was negative and usually significant, while G had very mixed results. 
And the A/S coefficient was often negative and usually insignificant. 
Asch offered three reasons why the true relationship between A/S and ACR4 
may not have been observed; (1) measurement error in the data; (2) A/S 
might be more significant if other factors influencing ACR4 were 
included; and (3) the five and ten year periods may be too short for the 
effects of A/S on ACR4 to appear. 
Levy (1985) also used 10 advertising data in his sample of 197 four-
digit SIC industries for concentration change from 1963 to 1972. His 
model and results are similar to that of the three previous studies 
(Ornstein and Lustgarten, 1978; Scherer, 1979; and Asch, 1979). The main 
difference comes from his interpretation of the independent variables 
coefficients. This is because his model 
addresses the issue of incomplete adjustments of industry 
concentration» The empirical model distinguishes long-term from 
short-term effects and estimates the rate of adjustment when 
concentration deviates from its long-term equilibrium level. In 
developing the model tested in this paper, the dynamic structure 
inherent in previous analyses is made explicit (Levy, 1985, p. 56). 
Levy (p. 57) begins with two long-run equilibrium models, 
in the sense that all adjustments to unexpected changes in market 
conditions have taken place. In level forms, the long-run level of 
concentration is assumed to have completely adjusted to any 
unexpected change, be it far in the past or recent. In difference 
form, the equilibrium assumption translates into complete adjustment 
of industry concentration during the time period examined. 
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The level model is: 
CR4 = Sg + B^MES + g^CAPR + B^A/S + g^G (1) 
where CR4 is four-firm concentration ratio, MES is minimum efficient 
plant size relative to market size, CAPR is value of fixed assets of MES 
plants, A/S is advertising intensity, and G is industry growth. MES is a 
measure of production scale economies, CAPR is a measure of capital 
requirements and economies of scale in raising capital, and A/S is a 
measure of product differentiation. The expected coefficients of MES, 
CAPR, and A/S are positive according to both scale economy and entry 
barrier explanations. But the G coefficient is uncertain because a 
negative effect results if growth enables entrants to take advantage of 
scale economics while a positive effect results if large forms in the 
industry are able to more quickly expand in reaction to anticipated 
demand growth. 
The difference form (change model) is the level model with each 
variable differenced. Hence, 
ACR = gq + AMES + ^ 2 ACAPR +• g' A(A/S) +S^AG . (2) 
According to Levy, the corresponding coefficients of each equation have 
the same interpretation as long as the error term is not autocorrelated. 
However, Levy (p. 58) points out that "adjustments in concentration 
to changing market conditions may be quite slow due to costs of 
adjustment for firms within the industry and for potential entrants." In 
addition, Brozen (1970, 1971) argues that the above-average concentration 
is a disequilibrium phenomenon which is eliminated by competition. And, 
Gaskins (1971) presents a model where the dominant firm's pricing (e.g., 
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pricing above or below the entry deterring price) affects the rate of 
entry of firms into the industry. Hence, 
the analyses by Brozen and Gaskins both suggest that concentration 
will change over time when initial concentration deviates from its 
expected long-run equilibrium level. A dynamic model is presented 
here which allows incomplete adjustment to deviations of 
concentration from its expected long-run equilibrium value. The 
manner in which expected long-run concentration is specified in this 
model is crucial and receives special attention (Levy, 1985, p. 58). 
Levy adopts a partial adjustment model to allow for these incomplete 
adjustments. Formally, it is; 
CR4^ - CR4^_^ = X(CR4* - CR4^_^) (3) 
where CR4^ is the actual concentration level in period t and CR4* ^ is 
the long-run level of concentration in period t expected by entrants and 
established firms in period t-1. And, 
The coefficient, X, represents the rate of adjustment to deviations 
of the initial level of concentration from its long-run equilibrium 
level. According to arguments by Brozen and Gaskins, concentration 
will partially adjust when its expected long-run future level 
differs from its initial level implying a positive value of X. For 
stability, A must be greater than zero and less than one (Levy, 
1985, p. 59). 
Levy next formulates three different proxies for CR4* (which is an 
expectation and is unobservable). The first formulation assumes that 
firms in period t-1 expect equilibrium concentration in period t to be 
determined by the level variables in period t-1. Hence, equation 1 is 
lagged one period and substituted into CR4* in equation 3 to obtain: 
ACR4^ = Oq + cx,CR4^_, -
+ ci^A/S^_^ + + e (4) 
Here, the CR4^_^ (or ICR) coefficient estimates X, the rate of adjustment 
in equation 3. And, the other independent variable coefficients 
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represent their short-run effect, which equals X times their long-run 
effect (their g coefficient in equation 1). This 
specification is similar to that adopted in previous studies 
explaining changes in concentration by variables measured in level 
form. However, the dynamic adjustment model is not explicitly 
stated in those studies and adjustment effects are not distinguished 
from long-run effects (Levy, 1985, p. 59). 
The second formulation adds the difference form variables to 
equation 1 to provide for the effect of firms also accounting for changes 
in the long-run level of industry concentration between period t-1 and 
period t. Thus, CR4* becomes 
CR4^* = + gg CAPR^_^ 
+ S ^t-l + h 
+ 6^ ACAPR + By A(A/S) + gg AG + e (5) 
Substituting equation 5 into equation 3 yields: 
ACR4 = + a. CR4 , + MES. . 
U i t—i z t—1 
+ CAPR^_^ + 
+ a, AMES + a, ACAPR + a„ A(A/S) + AG + e (6) 
o / o y 
Again, the coefficient of ICR (Q|) estimates the rate of adjustment in 
equation 3. And, the other Independent variable coefficients represent 
their short-run effect times their long-run effects (e.g., ct^ = XS^). 
The last formulation is a 
case where firms in period t-1, on average, correctly anticipate and 
fully react to the values of the explanatory variables in period t. 
In terms of equation 5, changes in the determinants of concentration 
will then have the same effects on expected long-run concentration 
as the corresponding initial levels of the determinants (have on the 
level of long-run concentration) and thus g! = B', S' = g', g* = 
and g^ = gg. Since g'x^_^ + g'Ax = g'x^, for any determinant x wiuh 
effect g' In equation 5, equation 5 can be rewritten as equation 1 
(Levy, 1985, pp. 60-61). 
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Hence, equation 7 is: 
ACR4 = + a,CR4 , + a MES + a CAPR 
t 0 1 t-1 2 t 3 t 
+ a^A/S^ + oiG^ + £ (7) 
Again, estimates X and 
Using nonlinear estimation techniques (because = X3^), Levy 
estimated equations 4, 6 and 7. He used Wright's (1978) nonlinear 
transformation of concentration change to correct for any bias resulting 
from concentration ratios being bounded between zero and one. In 
addition, to the full sample of 197 industries, equations were also 
reported separately for low and high concentrated industries, where an 
industry was classified low if CR4 ^  .45. 
The results are basically consistent with past concentration change 
studies, except for the interpretation of the coefficients. The 
coefficient of CR4^_^(A) is usually significant and ranges from 0.12 to 
1.00. The high concentrated industries have a smaller coefficient, 
implying slower adjustment» The level and difference MES coefficients 
were all positive and usually significant, while the level and difference 
CAPR coefficients were both positive and negative but never significant. 
Lastly, the level and difference coefficients for A/S and G were also 
both positive and negative and never significant. 
The Third Generation of Concentration Change Models 
The third generation of concentration change models to use 
advertising intensity as an independent variable were Mueller and Rogers 
(1980, 1984) and Rogers (1982). They used similar concentration change 
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models as used before, but had a new advertising data source. Leading 
National Advertisers, Inc. (LNA). LNA advertising data, like 10 data, 
are a continuous measure. But the LNA data offer two important 
advantages over the 10 data. First, the LNA data better reflect 
advertising expenditures for each industry (covered in detail in Chapter 
IV). Second, the LNA data give not only total advertising expenditures, 
but also break down the expenditures into TV, radio, outdoor, newspaper 
supplements and magazine advertising. Having the advertising 
expenditures broken down into different media is important since many 
(Blair, 1972; Mueller and Hamm, 1974; Porter, 1976; Mueller and Rogers, 
1980; 1984; Rogers, 1982) have hypothesized that the mix of media in 
advertising is important in determining how advertising intensity affects 
market structure and performance. TV advertising intensity is expected 
to have a larger positive effect on concentration change than other (and 
thus total) advertising because TV advertising is more persuasive in 
nature and offers greater advantages to larger users than other types of 
advertising, 
Mueller and Rogers (1980) were the first to use LNA advertising 
data. They had access to a 1967 LNA advertising data set compiled by 
Robert Bailey at the FTC. (The major problem of using LNA advertising 
data is that it is a long, tedious job to compile it. More on how a LNA 
data set is compiled will be covered in Chapter IV. ) 
Mueller and Rogers' model is similar to previous ones. Their sample 
consisted of 167 four-digit SIC industries from 1947 to 1972 and sub-
periods of 1947 to 1958 and 1958 to 1972. ACR4 is the dependent variable 
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while ICR, S, G and A/S are the independent variables. In addition, A/S 
is disaggregated into TV plus radio (TVR) advertising intensity and 
newspaper plus outdoor and magazine (NOM) advertising intensity. ICR, G 
and S were all expected (for reasons listed in above articles) to have a 
negative effect on ACR4. And, A/S and especially TVR were expected to 
have positive coefficients, while the NOM expected sign was ambiguous. 
They cited many possible reasons for TVR having a positive effect. There 
have been volume discounts for both spot and network TV and economies of 
scale in national over local TV advertising. Also, there was case study 
evidence that conglomerates may subsidize advertising and promotion 
outlays to increase their market shares in particular markets. Lastly, 
while advertising that contains a high proportion of informational 
content (e.g., price advertising by local newspapers) may encourage 
competitive market structures, advertising aimed at creating product 
differentiation through image-building, as is typical for most TV 
advertising, may lead to increase barriers to entry and concentration. 
Their empirical results were as expected. The ICR, G, and S 
coefficients all had their expected signs, with only G being 
insignificant= A/S and TVR were positive and significant in all periods, 
with TVR having a larger coefficient and being more significant. NOM was 
negative and insignificant. Thus, these results, especially the A/S, 
TVR, NOM coefficients, support Mueller and Rogers' basic hypothesis, that 
"television advertising has played an especially potent role in 
increasing concentration of consumer goods industries. Studies that 
combine television advertising with all other forms of advertising have 
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obscured this unique role of television advertising" (Mueller and Rogers, 
1980, p. 95). 
In his dissertation, Rogers (1982) examined concentration change for 
the food and tobacco industries at the SIC five-digit product class level 
for the period 1954-1972, using LNA advertising data. He chose the five-
digit level because on balance, it represents a true market better than 
the four-digit industry class level. And, he chose the food and tobacco 
industries for two reasons. First, there are advantages to limiting a 
study to only a subset of manufacturing, because 
a cross-section study of the manufacturing sector may find it 
necessary to include many more variables because different 
influences may be at work within different subsets of the 
manufacturing sector. For example, the factors affecting 
concentration in heavy industrial product classes may differ from 
those affecting concentration in light industrial product classes 
(Rogers, 1982, p. 94). 
Secondly, the food product classes are heavy users of TV advertising. 
They spent 82 percent of their total advertising expenditures on TV in 
1978 (Rogers, 1980, p. 119), which is important since the focus of 
Rogers' dissertation is on advertising intensity (especially TV) 
affecting concentration change. 
Rogers worked with four basic data sets: Food and tobacco products 
for 1954-1972, 1958-1972 and 1963-1972, and grocery store products (GSP) 
for 1958-1972. The GSP sample was derived by eliminating from the food 
and tobacco sample the product classes that are primarily producer goods 
and adding the non-food and non-tobacco product classes that have 
significant sales in grocery stores. Because the longer periods have 
fewer comparable product classes (due to changing SIC product class 
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définitions), the 1954-1972, 1958-1972, 1963-1972 and 1958-1972 GSP 
periods had 59, 84, 100 and 79 product classes, respectively. 
Rogers first analyzed the 1958-72 period as a compromise between 
having a longer period or a larger sample size. The independent 
variables and expected signs of the coefficients are similar to those of 
Mueller and Rogers (1980). The ICR coefficient was negative and 
significant, while the G coefficient was positive and significant for 
1958-1972, but positive and insignificant for 1954-1972. The S 
coefficient was negative but insignificant. Advertising intensity was 
the most important independent variable. The A/S or TVR coefficients, 
whether from 1954, 1967, 1972, an average of the three or the last two, 
were all positive and significant. Also, the TVR coefficients were 
typically stronger and more significant than their A/S counterparts. 
This meant that "industries that were the heaviest users of advertising 
to create and maintain product differentiation experienced the largest 
increases in concentration over the period 1958 to 1972. This conclusion 
is not dependent on advertising data for any particular year" (Rogers, 
1982, p. 132). 
Rogers also used A(A/S) and ATVR variables» He states that A(A,/S) 
is more important than A/S on explaining ACR4 if "the advertising-
concentration relationship is in equilibrium in both the initial and 
terminal years of the study. Since an equilibrium is unlikely, the 
hypothesis should be modified to include the level of advertising 
intensity as well as any changes that have occurred" (Rogers, 1982, p. 
135). When used separately, the A/S, A(A/S), TVR, and ATVR coefficients 
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were all positive and significant. When A/S and AA/S were used together 
in an equation, the A/S coefficient was positive and significant while 
the 6(A/S) coefficient was positive and insignificant. The TVR and ATVR 
coefficients used together had just the opposite results (ATVR positive 
and significant with TVR positive and insignificant). Rogers stated that 
there might be collinearity problems between these pairs of level and 
change variables (as indicated by their simple correlation coefficients), 
suggesting that the heavy users of the 1967 level variables were also 
product classes that most increased their advertising intensity between 
1958 and 1972. He concluded that both advertising intensity (especially 
TV and radio) and changes in advertising intensity are strongly related 
to increased concentration. 
Next, Rogers analyzed the 1954-72 period. Though 25 product classes 
were lost (due to changed SIC product class definitions), the longer time 
span increased the chance for any structural change to occur and brought 
stronger results. The results were similar to the 1958-1972 period, but 
had stronger and more significant coefficients. The one exception was G, 
whose coefficient became insignificant. Rogers suggests that this is 
probably due to multicollinearity between A/S or TVR and G in the longer 
period. Likewise, the 1963-1972 period and five year sub-periods 
analyzed had similar results, especially for the A/S and TVR 
coefficients. 
The grocery store product (GSP) data sample yielded results similar 
to the previous results, but the advertising intensity coefficients were 
weaker and statistically less significant. Rogers stated two possible 
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reasons why the GSP coefficients were less significant. First, there was 
the removal of 20 producer good product classes that fit the model well. 
These product classes did not use TV advertising and had decreases in 
concentration. Second, the non-food and non-tobacco GSP product classes 
had large advertising intensity. For example, the 1967 average A/S was 
2.9 percent for the 64 food and tobacco GSP product classes and 9.2 
percent for the 15 non-food and non-tobacco product classes. 
Thus, although the non-food and non-tobacco GSP product classes fit 
the model's hypothesized relationships, the very large A/S that many 
of these product classes have were not associated with change in 
concentration values as large as would be predicted given the 
estimated coefficients from the food and tobacco analysis. A 
nonlinear specification of A/S would seem to be called for in future 
work that uses both a food and non-food GSP sample (Rogers, 1982, p. 
169). 
The following can be summarized from Rogers' dissertation. ICR has 
earned its place in concentration change models as its coefficients have 
been consistently negative and significant. And, ICR should continue to 
have a deconcentrating effect as long as average concentration is well 
below 100 (average 4GR was around 46 in 1972)=, If concentration becomes 
so highly skewed towards high concentration, then ICR may become a 
statistical artifact. 
The size coefficient was usually negative but never significant for 
1954-1972 or 1958-1972, suggesting that an equilibrium between S and ACR 
was reached. 
Growth effects concentration (1) by affecting net entry of firms 
into an industry (which tends to decrease concentration) or (2) through 
differences in growth rates between small and large firms in an industry 
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(which probably increases concentration, due to large firm advantages in 
growth, as in capital markets). However, since 1954, there has been 
little net entry in the food and tobacco industries. Thus, a positive G 
coefficient might be expected. The results showed the effect of G on 
ACR4 to be positive but generally insignificant, implying that other 
factors must explain concentration change in these product classes during 
the 1954-1972 period. 
Lastly, the advertising intensity variables (A/S, A(A/S), TVR, ATVR) 
all showed that media advertising, especially electronic, has contributed 
to increased concentration, and that this effect has not stopped or 
slowed much since 1963. 
Mueller and Rogers (1984) basically updated their earlier study 
(Mueller and Rogers, 1980). They considered an update to 1977 important 
since "some economists have speculated that the positive relationship 
between advertising and concentration change ceased, or even reversed, 
sometime in the 1960s, as industries reached a new equilibrium" (Mueller 
and Rogers, 1984, p. 1). As noted above, both Scherer (1979) and Asch 
(1979) found A/S mostly insignificant in concentration change models for 
1963 to 1972. Asch stated that "the major effect of advertising on 
concentration may have occurred prior to the periods examined" (Asch, 
1979, p. 295). Mueller and Rogers' data set consisted of 165 four-digit 
SIC industries from 1947-1977. However, the majority of their analysis 
dealt with sub-period analysis in order to check if the effect of 
advertising intensity, especially for TV, on concentration change for 
periods before and after the mid-1960s was increasing, decreasing or 
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remaining stable. 
The independent variables were ICR, S, G, and A/S (or TVR and NOM), 
same as in Mueller and Rogers (1980). The expected signs and economic 
reasons for the coefficient signs are similar to those of their 1980 
article. For the period 1947-1977, the ICR, G and S coefficients were 
all negative and significant while A/S and TVR coefficients were positive 
and significant (with TVR coefficient larger and more significant than 
A/S). Thus, it appears TV advertising is more important than other forms 
of advertising for increasing concentration. The NOM coefficient was 
negative but insignificant. Thus, the model performed as expected for 
the longer period, 1947-1977. 
When the data were separated into sub-periods, the model also 
performed as expected. First, the data were separated into three sub-
periods, 1947 to 1958, 1958 to 1967, and 1967 to 1977. For all three 
periods, the estimated coefficients on A/S and TVR displayed remarkable 
similarity across the three sub-periods, with the TVR coefficient being 
larger and more significant. This strong positive finding for 1967-1977 
is evidence that electronic advertising (TV plus radio) has not lost its 
ability to further increase concentration since the mid-1960s. Next, the 
data were separated into two sub-periods, 1947-1963 and 1963-1977. Here, 
the A/S and TVR coefficients were positive and significant in both 
periods, though both A/S and TVR had smaller coefficients in the latter 
period. But, Mueller and Rogers stated that these smaller coefficients 
for 1963-77 "stops short of supporting the hypothesis that the 
concentrating effect of television advertising had been played out by the 
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1960s" (Mueller and Rogers, 1984, p. 8). Also, they pointed out in a 
footnote that the 1963 concentration ratio for one industry had to be 
estimated by the FTC since the Census Bureau's concentration ratio was 
not reported for disclosure reasons. When the 1947-1963 and 1963-1977 
sub-periods were re-estimated using a concentration ratio from a linear 
trend (between 1958-1967) instead of the FTC's estimate for SIC 3942, the 
differences between the A/S and TVR coefficients were much less. 
Finally, though possibly for too short of periods to show structural 
change, they examined five sub-periods of five year intervals, from 1954-
1977. Again, the model performed as expected. The most interesting 
result involved TVR. TVR reached its maximum effect and significance in 
1958-1963. After falling to roughly half of its effect in 1963-1967 from 
1958-1963, the TVR coefficient continued to gain in size and significance 
in 1967-1972 and 1972-1977, "suggesting that a new equilibrium between 
television advertising and concentration change had not been reached by 
the mid-1960s" (Mueller and Rogers, 1984, p. 10). 
Mueller and Rogers stated that there are probably three reasons why 
both Scherer (1979) and Asch (1979) found the effect of A/S on 
concentration change to be insignificant from 1963 to 1972. First, they 
used 10 advertising data which fail to separate out TV advertising—the 
most powerful advertising medium for increasing concentration. Second, 
the 10 data are very broadly defined and include advertising directed at 
intermediate buyers. Third, the 10 data have serious aggregation 
problems (which are discussed in detail in Chapter IV). 
Mueller and Rogers also present a lagged regression model in 
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response to Caves and Porter (1980), who stated in reference to 
concentration change models that "we strongly suspect that those robust-
looking unlagged results may in fact reveal little about fundamental 
causal relations" (Caves and Porter, 1980, p. 14). All independent 
variables (except advertising intensity since they had only 1967 
advertising data) were lagged one sub-period. For all periods tested, 
the lagged results were similar to the unlagged results. Hence, Mueller 
and Rogers concluded that lagged models provided little, if any, added 
insight to the causes of concentration change. Also, they stated that 
there is no way of knowing the appropriate lag and, even if they did, 
researchers are constrained to lag lengths that correspond to census 
years. 
In sum, all concentration change models that use an advertising 
intensity variable as an independent variable had fairly consistent 
results; the advertising intensity coefficient was usually positive and 
significant and in a few cases insignificant. But it was never negative 
and significant. And the studies that found an advertising intensity 
coefficient insignificant used Input-Output advertising data which are 
plagued by compilation problems that are discussed in Chapter IV» These 
consistent results are in contrast to the conflicting results of both 
concentration level and profit rate models that use advertising intensity 
as an independent variable. (The signs of advertising intensity 
coefficients in past profit rate models have varied, often depending only 
on how fast advertising is depreciated.) 
39 
Reasons for this Study 
This study will add evidence to the question of whether advertising 
intensity levels and changes, increase manufacturing concentration at the 
SIC four-digit industry level. 
First, additional knowledge can be obtained by updating this study 
to include changes in concentration ratios to 1982. TV advertising was 
new in the late 1940s, but quickly grew to the dominant medium for 
advertising by the early 1960s in terms of dollars spent. Some have 
hypothesized that when TV advertising was new, it initially caused a 
disequilibrium in many consumer industries which caused an increase in 
concentration. But since around 1963, this may have been played out 
(i.e., concentration change may no longer be affected by advertising 
intensity). Scherer (1980, p. 116) points out, "The concentration 
increasing impact of intense advertising appears to have ceased and 
perhaps reversed by the early to mid 1960s, perhaps coinciding with both 
consumers' and advertisers' increased maturity in relating to television 
as a medium of information and persuasion." However, Mueller and Rogers 
(1984) found evidence that advertising intensity's effect on 
concentration change has not stopped since the mid—1960s. Obviously at 
some point, as concentration increases and because it is bounded on top 
by a maximum ratio of 100 percent, the effect of advertising on 
concentration has an upper limit. But, currently the average four-digit 
SIC four-firm concentration ratio is under 50 percent. Updating the 
changes in a concentration model to 1982 will help to determine if 
advertising intensity has continued to have a positive effect on 
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concentration change. The coefficients in the 1977-1982 period should be 
of special interest when compared to those for 1963-1967, 1967-1972, and 
1972-1977. 
Also, this study will use a better estimation of advertising 
intensity between 1963 and 1982 by taking an average of the 1967 LNA 
advertising data (compiled by Mr. Robert Bailey of the FTC) and 1982 LNA 
advertising data (compiled by myself). All previous studies using LNA 
advertising data at the four-digit SIC industry level (Mueller and 
Rogers, 1980; 1984) were confined to using only 1967 data. (Rogers 
(1982) used 1954, 1967, and 1972 LNA data, but limited his study to the 
food and tobacco industries.) However, Rogers (1982, p. 118) points out 
that "an isolated year's data may not accurately represent the 
advertising intensity throughout the period." Also, Ornstein and 
Lustgarten (1978, p. 230) make this same criticism. An example of how 
advertising intensity can vary by year for certain industries follows. 
Stanley Ornstein (1977, pp. 74-85) published Input-Output advertising 
data for the years 1947, 1963 and 1967. For industry SIC 2013 (sausage 
and other prepared meat products), the advertising to sales ratio fell 
from .61 in 1963 to .33 in 1967. 
Further, having use of both 1967 and 1982 LNA data should yield a 
good measurement of both total and TV advertising intensity change. This 
will be the first time a change in TV advertising intensity variable will 
be used at the four-digit SIC industry level for manufacturing. Ornstein 
and Lustgarten (1978) were the only authors before to use a change in 
advertising intensity variable (which came from the Input-Output tables) 
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in a concentration change model. For both periods they studied, the 
advertising intensity coefficient was insignificant while the change in 
advertising intensity coefficient was positive and significant. Also, 
Caves and Porter (1980, p. 2) argue that theoretically a change in 
concentration model should also have change variables as the independent 
variables. Thus, an advertising intensity change variable may be more 
important than an advertising Intensity level variable in a concentration 
change model. 
Also, it appears from Rogers (1982) that the relationship between 
concentration change and advertising intensity may be of a nonlinear 
form. This may occur because in some Industries (In particular, tight 
oligopolies), firms advertise beyond the optimal amount. Hence, a 
quadratic function of advertising intensity as an independent variable 
will be tested. 
In addition, this will be the first concentration change model to 
use a convenience good dummy variable as an independent variable, where 
the dummy variable equals one for convenience good industries and zero 
otherwise. Porter (1974) found this distinction useful for testing his 
profit-rate model» Convenience good industries are characterized by 
goods that have a relative small unit price and are sold in stores with 
little sales assistance. Advertising intensity is expected to be more 
effective for convenience good industries for two basic reasons; (1) due 
to the relative small unit price, gains from gathering information from 
other sources are small; and (2) due to little sales assistance, other 
information on the products Is more costly to obtain. Hence, it is 
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expected that in the absence of other information, advertising intensity, 
especially through image building (national advertising) will be more 
effective at influencing concentration change for convenience good 
industries. 
Finally, since the last major revision of the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes took place in 1963, fewer four-digit SIC 
industries will have to be omitted from this analysis due to changing 
industry definitions than were excluded from previous studies. Thus, out 
of the 450 four-digit SIC industries in 1977, 269 will be able to be used 
in this study. In comparison, Mueller and Rogers (1980) could use only 
165 four-digit SIC industries for their study covering the years 1947-
1977. 
Table II.1. Summary of the literature review (key to abbreviations can be found in Table II.2) 
Author, period 
studied, and 
sample size 
Dependent varia­
ble and level of 
analysis 
Independent variables used 
and brief results Comments 
I. First Generation studies 
Marcus (1969a) 
1947-1963 
1954-1963 
1958-1963 
N=78 
ACR8 
Consumer 
goods only 
4-digit SIC 
G: 
M; 
H: 
ICR: 
1947-63 
—*-k 
+** 
+** 
— * *  
1954-63 
-* 
+** 
+** 
_** 
1958-63 
+ 
+* 
_ * *  
First ACR model to use ad­
vertising intensity as an 
independent variable. 
Mueller and 
Hamm (1974) 
1947-1970 N=166 
1958-1970 N=292 
ACR4, ACR8 
4-digit SIC 
Wright (1978) 
1947-1963 
N=206 
ACR4 
and 
SC (empha­
sized) 
4-digit SIC 
ICR; -** both periods 
G: -*•' when ANF excluded for 47-70 
S ! — to — 
ANF: - to -**, but discounted as 
a true independent variable 
H: +* to +** both periods 
M: +* to +** both periods 
L: mixed, yet 58-70 + and often * 
ICR: -** H: +** 
G: - to -* M: +** 
S: - L: - for ACR4 and 
+ for SC 
With an economies of scale proxy 
(ST), the product differentiation 
coefficients remained significant 
They concluded that the 
Increase in consumer good 
concentration is largely 
due to extensive network 
TV advertising. 
Wright addresses the prob­
lem of possible specifica­
tion bias in concentration 
change models by using SC 
in place of ACR. H and M 
remain significant under 
the new specification. 
Table II.1. (Continued) 
Author, period 
studied, and 
sample size 
Dependent varia­
ble and level of 
analysis 
Independent variables used 
and brief results Comment 
Ornsteln and 
Lustgarten 
(1978) 
1947-1967 N=120 
1963-1967 N=317 
Scherer (1979) 
1947-1972 
N=154 
Asch (1979) 
1963-1972 and 
sub-periods 
N=212 
II. Second Generation studies 
ACR4 ICR: -* to -** both periods 
4-diglt SIC lA/S; highly insignificant both 
periods 
A(A/S): +* to +** both periods 
AADV: highly insignificant both 
periods 
AAFS: +** both periods 
G: —* to —47—67, — to —* 63—67 
ACR4 ICR: -** 
4-diglt SIC G; -
S; 
C: +* 
Mixed: +* 
A/S: +A 
First ACR model to use U.S. 
Input-Output tables for 
continuous advertising data. 
TCR4/ICR4 ICR: -**, except in subsets involv-
and ACR4 ing only durable goods (then it 
4-digit SIC was insignificant) 
G: very mixed results, - and + and 
sometimes significant 
IA/S;+and -, but all highly insig­
nificant 
CPD: +** (for all industries in 
sample) 
DUR: +* (for all industries in sample) 
1. Scherer reports in a foot­
note that for 1963-1972 
(N=323), the only coeffi­
cient that significantly 
changed was A/S, which 
became insignificant. 
2. 10 advertising data are 
from 1963. 
1. Asch's basic conclusion is 
that the role of advertis­
ing was insignificant in 
determining concentration 
change. 
2. Also used subsamples of 
durable/nondurable goods 
and producer/consumer 
goods. 
Table II.1, (Continued) 
Author, period 
studied, and 
sample size 
Dependent varia­
ble and level of 
analysis 
Independent variables used 
and brief results Comment 
Levy (1985) 
1963-1972 
N=197 and 
2 sub-samples, 
high and low 
concentration 
Industries 
SC 
[Used by 
Wright] 
High Low 
concentra- concentra-
All in­
dustries 
ICR: 
MES; + 
CAPR: 
A/S; 
G; 
AMES: 
ACARP; 
A(A/S): 
AG; 
+** 
to +** 
+ 
+** 
+ 
+ 
tion in­
dustries 
+ to +* 
+ 
+ and -
+ 
+ 
tion In­
dustrie 
+** 
+** 
+ 
+ and -
+ and -
+** 
Note; MES, CAPR, A/S and G are 
summarized for 1963 and 1972 
levels. 
1. Levy uses a partial ad­
justment model to dis­
tinguish between short-
term and long-term ef­
fects of the determinants 
of concentration change. 
His regression results 
are similar to the other 
concentration change 
models using 10 advertis­
ing data, except the co­
efficients are interpret­
ed as the short-term 
effects times the long-
term effects. 
2. 10 advertising data are 
from 1963 and 1972. 
III. Third Generation studies 
Mueller and 
Rogers (1980) 
1947-1972 and sub-
periods N=167 
ACR4 
4-digit SIC 
ICR: -** 
G; -
S: -* to -** 
except 47-58 
TVR: +** 
A/S: +* to +** 
H: +** 
M: +** 
L: -
NOM: -
1. This was the first ACR 
model to use electronic 
(TVR) advertising in­
tensity as an independ­
ent variable. A stronger 
positive relationship was 
found with TVR than A/S. 
2. LNA advertising data are 
from 1967. 
Table II.1. (Continued) 
Author, period 
studied, and 
sample size 
Dependent varia­
ble and level of 
analysis 
Independent variables 
used and brief 
results 
Comment s 
Rogers (1982) 
Food and tobacco 
1954-1972 N=59 
1958-1972 N=84 
1963-1972 N=100 
Grocery store 
products 
1958-1972 N=79 
Mueller and 
Rogers (1984) 
1947-1977 and 
sub-periods 
N=165 
ACR4 ICR; In most periods 
5-digit SIC S; - but rarely significant 
G; + and often significant for 58-72 
TVR, A/S: both +* to +** when not 
used with ATVR, A(A/S). Also, TVR 
is usually stronger 
NOM: - but never significant 
ATVR, A(A/S): both +* to +** when not 
used with TVR, A/S 
When ATVR and TVR or A(A/S) and A/S 
were used together, always one was 
significant, but seldom both. 
Rogers suggested this might be due 
to colllnearlty 
ACR4 ICR: (-* for some 5-year periods) 
4-digit SIC S : - and often significant 
G: - and often significant 
A/S: +* to +** 
TVR; +** (+* for some 5-year periods) 
NOM: - but never significant 
1. Only ACR model at 5-digit 
SIC level, which probably 
represents a true market 
better than at the 4-diglt 
level. 
2. Used only food and tobacco 
product markets because 
they are more homogeneous 
and are heavy users of TV 
advertising. 
3. LNA advertising data are 
from 1954, 1967 and 1972. 
1. Mueller and Rogers basi­
cally updated their earli­
er article to 1977 to see 
if A/S and TVR were still 
affecting ACR. 
2. They also presented a 
lagged regression model 
and obtained similar 
results. 
3. LNA advertising data are 
from 1967. 
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Table II.2. Key to Table II.1 
Symbol Meaning 
SIC Standard Industrial Classification System 
A Change in 
CRi A concentration ratio based on the i largest firms 
N Number of observations 
ICR Initial concentration ratio 
TCR Terminal concentration ratio 
G Growth 
S Size 
NF Number of firms 
H High degree of product differentiation 
M Medium degree of product differentiation 
L Low degree of product differentiation 
lA/S Initial advertising-to-sales ratio 
A/S Advertising-to-sales ratio 
ADV Advertising expenditures 
AFS Average firm size 
SC Wright's transformed concentration ratio variable (to remove 
any specification bias) 
ST Wright's transformed proxy for economies of scale 
TVR Television (radio) advertising-to-sales ratio 
NOM Newspaper, outdoor, and magazine advertising-to-sales ratio 
C Consumer goods industry dummy variable 
Mixed Between consumer and producer goods industry 
Dur Durable-nondurable dummy variable 
CPD Consumer-producer dummy variable 
MES Minimum efficient plant size relative to market size 
CAPR Value of fixed assets of MES plants 
- Negative sign on the coefficient but statistically 
insignificant 
-* Negative sign on the coefficient and statistically significant 
at 5% 
-** Negative sign on the coefficient and statistically significant 
at 1% 
+,+*,+*** Similar to the above, but the coefficient is positive 
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CHAPTER III. RATIONALE FOR THE INCLUSION 
OF EACH INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The reason for using industry concentration change as the dependent 
variable was given in Chapter I. Basically, a change in concentration is 
a change in market structure and implies a change in the degree of 
competition. Chapter II contained a literature review of all 
concentration change studies that included advertising intensity as one 
of the independent variables. This review also indicated how other 
independent variables might change concentration. This chapter will go 
into more detail on the economic hypotheses of the seven independent 
variables in this concentration change model. 
The seven independent variables are: initial concentration ratio, 
industry size, industry growth rate, a research and development dummy 
variable, a convenience good dummy variable, a consumer good industry 
dummy variable, and advertising intensity (especially for electronic and 
network TV)» 
Chapter IV discusses the variable construction, and Chapter V gives 
the empirical results. 
Initial Concentration Ratio 
Initial concentration ratio (IRC) is an often included independent 
variable in concentration change models. Curry and George (1983, p. 224) 
did a survey article on industry concentration. In their review of 
concentration change models, they stated that; 
Taken as a whole the studies suggest that the most important 
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explanatory variable is the initial level of concentration, which is 
included in most of the studies listed in Table III, and is 
significant in all but one of them. It appears that the higher the 
initial level, the smaller the likelihood that concentration will 
increase further and the greater the chances of a decline. 
Hence, a negative relationship is expected for how ICR affects 
concentration change. The relationship can be justified for two general 
reasons. One reason is statistical. Concentration ratios are bounded 
between zero and 100 percent, so an initial concentration ratio of 95 
percent can only increase 5 percent at most, whereas the opportunities 
for a decline are much greater. Conversely, an initial concentration 
ratio of 5 percent has greater opportunities to increase. While this 
"statistical artifact" exists, it appears not to be a very important 
reason for ICR negatively influencing concentration change. First, in 
1967 the average industry concentration was around 39. Only at extreme 
values should this statistical artifact reason dominate the economic 
reasons. Second, a number of concentration change studies have accounted 
for this statistical artifact phenomenon, and concluded that it is not 
very important. In the Mueller and Hamm (1974) paper, a referee 
suggested that their negative coefficient for ICR might be a statistical 
artifact because industries with very high concentration ratios could 
thereafter experience decreases but not increases in concentration, thus 
violating the assumption of homoscedasticity. In response, they ran 
three different tests (explained in their footnote 24) to see if ICR was 
a biased estimator due to the potential statistical artifact problem. In 
all three tests, ICR showed to be unbiased. 
Wright (1978) used another solution to account for this possible 
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regression bias by transforming his dependent variable to be nonlinear 
and unbounded (see Chapter II). Both the transformed and conventional 
concentration change models yielded very similar results for the ICR 
coefficient. Hence, a significant regression bias does not appear to 
exist for using ICR as an independent variable in a concentration change 
model. 
Furthermore, a number of economic reasons do exist to explain why 
the expected coefficient of ICR would be negative in a concentration 
change model. These include reasons explaining why industries with a 
high ICR would tend to lose concentration over time and/or industries 
with a low ICR would tend to increase concentration over time. 
One reason, as Marcus (1969a, p. 117) pointed out, is that large 
firms usually will not attempt to increase their market shares by 
decreasing price because of fear of retaliation from competing large 
firms which are intent on maintaining their market shares. In contrast, 
small firms might try to increase their market shares by a price 
reduction because they are less menacing and less likely to invoke 
retaliatory pressure. 
A second reason comes from highly concentrated industries that are 
making an above normal profit. Assuming that the firms can successfully 
collude, they then have a continuum of trade-offs between current profits 
and future market shares. In option one, they can collude to set price 
to maximize short-run profits but lose market share over time because of 
new firms entering due to the high profits. For further explanation, see 
Stigler (1952, p. 232). Instead, they can choose option two where the 
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firms collude to set price to deter entry and give up some short-run 
profits in expectation of higher long-run profits. This is often 
referred to as "limit pricing." Relevant factors in the selection 
between these two alternatives include the discount rate of future 
profits, how long the firms can keep the high short-run profits under 
option one, and the difference between the short-run profits under option 
one and the short-run profits under limit pricing. Past case studies 
show that the steel, corn products and copper industries are examples of 
pricing under option one, and that Alcoa in the aluminum industry and 
U.S. Shoe Machinery in the shoe machinery industry are examples of 
pricing under limit pricing. Therefore, firms in a highly concentrated 
industry sometimes will choose to maximize their short-run profits at the 
expense of future market share. 
A third reason comes from the possible cross-subsidization by a 
conglomerate. A conglomerate often diversifies by acquiring a relatively 
small single-line company. Then it can use earnings from other products 
or geographical markets to cross-subsidize this newly acquired firm. 
This cross-subsidization (which can take on many forms, though 
advertising is a good example) helps to expand the market share of the 
acquired firm while the market leaders often have the means to fight back 
and preserve their market share. However, the other small single-line 
firms are often forced to merge or to go out of business. Consequently, 
concentration rises. Two examples of this (Proctor & Gamble-Folgers 
Coffee and Phillip Morris-Miller Brewing Company) were given in Chapter 
I. Conglomerates look for this type of diversification in less 
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concentrated industries because there is more room to gain market shares 
and typically government antitrust agencies have shown little disapproval 
of diversification by merging with smaller firms. 
Fourth, as pointed out by Rogers (1982, p. 54), horizontal mergers 
in low concentration industries are not often challenged by the antitrust 
authorities as such mergers might be in higher concentrated industries. 
As long as one of the firms involved in the merger is included in 
computing the concentration ratio (i.e., one of the top four firms for a 
four-firm concentration ratio), then the concentration ratio will rise. 
Finally, industries with a low ICR may increase in concentration 
because some firms will grow faster than others by chance and luck. This 
is called the "law of proportionate effect." Scherer (1980, p. 146) 
reports a computer simulation designed to conform to this law of 
proportional effect. In this experiment, the industry starts with 50 
firms who each have a 2 percent market share. In each succeeding time 
period, each firm randomly grows, but with a mean growth rate equal to 6 
percent with a standard deviation of 16 percent. The results showed that 
patterns resembling the concentrated structures of much American 
manufacturing industry emerged within a few decades» Concentration 
increased more rapidly for earlier time periods (when ICR is lower) and 
more slowly later on (when ICR is higher). Therefore, concentration is 
expected to increase more rapidly when ICR is lower by chance alone. 
Also, Scherer (1980, p. 148) reports that even if growth rates are not 
independent from year to year or if larger firms have a smaller deviation 
for growth, other simulation studies accounting for these properties 
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still obtained similar results. As a result of all the above hypotheses, 
a negative coefficient is expected for ICR. 
Size 
Ceteris paribus, the larger the size of an industry, the greater is 
the number of optimal-sized firms that can exist and thus the lower the 
level of concentration. Hence, a negative coefficient is expected for 
industry size. 
Other past studies have included size as an independent variable. 
Scherer (1980, p. 100), in a review of the determinants of concentration, 
states that, "It seems clear that large market size, absolute or 
(especially) relative, is a significant inhibitor of high concentration." 
Also, Mueller and Hamm (1974, p. 514) state that, "Other things being the 
same, the larger the absolute size of an industry, the lower its entry 
barrier." 
Industry Growth Rate 
Growth (G) is also an often included independent variable in past 
concentration change models. Unlike ICR, the growth coefficients as well 
as the economic reasoning have not been consistently negative or 
positive. However, these mixed results can be, for the most part, 
reconciled. I expect that using growth as an independent variable will 
add to our understanding how growth affects concentration change. 
Most economic reasoning suggests that growth will have a negative 
effect on concentration change, though some suggest the opposite. Before 
covering these in further detail, it should be mentioned that growth 
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could lead to a decrease in concentration for a technical reason. With a 
fixed number of industry classifications in the Census of Manufacturers 
and if the economy grows by creating new products, then concentration 
could decrease because new products are improperly classified with 
existing products (Nelson, 1963). However, this effect should be only a 
minor influence on concentration change since the census will start a new 
industry classification whenever the volume of the product becomes large 
enough that the census staff considers it significant. Also, often these 
new products will be classified in one of the not-elsewhere-classified 
(NEC) industries, which are "catch-all" industries for miscellaneous 
products and are excluded from my sample of industries (see Chapter IV). 
When looking at the economic reasons for growth influencing 
concentration change, it is best to begin by noting that growth can 
effect concentration change in two general ways: (1) by influencing the 
number of firms, and/or (2) by differential growth rates between large 
and small firms in the industry. It is widely thought (Mueller and Hamm, 
1974; Caves and Porter, 1980) that if growth affects concentration change 
through influencing the number of firms (i.e., net entry), it will have a 
deconcentrating effect* Mueller and Hamm (1974, p. 514) pointed out that 
"industries that are growing slowly, or worse still, declining are likely 
to create a particularly difficult displacement problem for new 
entrants." But more rapid growth will encourage new entry of firms and 
ceteris paribus, decrease concentration. 
Also, dominant firms in oligopolistic industries may adopt a long 
run profit maximization strategy which involves their yielding an 
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increasing part of their market share (mainly due to new entry) in order 
to earn short-run profits. Thus, in faster growth industries, leading 
firms would lose their market shares faster and this would speed 
déconcentration. 
There are conflicting arguments about whether growth increases or 
decreases concentration change because of differential growth rates 
between small and large firms. On the one hand, large firms may choose 
to grow by diversifying into other industries at the expense of growth in 
their primary industry, while smaller firms grow in their primary 
industry. This would result in a decrease in concentration. There are a 
number of reasons for this diversification. Nelson (1960) lists four: 
(1) diversification helps to stabilize overall sales; (2) large firms 
prefer to enter more profitable and/or faster growing industries; (3) 
large firms may be trying to avoid anti-trust action; and (4) large firms 
may eventually experience diseconomies of scale. Shepherd (1964, 
footnote 16) further suggests that larger firms may wish to diversify as 
an outlet for entrepreneurial talent. 
On the other hand. Sawyer and Rogers suggest that the dominant firms 
may have an advantage over smaller firms for growth. Sawyer (1971) 
hypothesized that growth would have a positive effect on concentration 
change when the number of firms is held constant. He reasoned that 
larger firms grow at a faster rate in a particular industry than smaller 
firms because of diversification, which allows for a transferring of 
resources as needed among different industries. In contrast, smaller 
firms are more dependent upon capital markets for the necessary funds for 
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expansion. Rogers (1982, p. 64) adds that large firms may outgrow 
smaller firm rivals due to conglomerate advantages as: (1) deep pocket, 
(2) reciprocity, and (3) cross-subsidization. In addition, Rogers (1982, 
p. 63) points out that sometimes larger firms build plants with known 
excess capacity, and can expand output very rapidly by only adding 
variable inputs if industry growth takes place. 
The empirical evidence for the U.S. on firm size and growth is very 
mixed, though Scherer (1980, p. 148) states that these studies "suggest 
that assuming growth rates uncorrelated with initial firm size is not a 
bad first approximation of the real-world facts." One study in 
particular (Marcus, 1969b) found that for the sample of industries, the 
observed growth rates were independent of size. 
In sum, the effect of growth on concentration change through the 
change in the number of firms is expected to be negative while the effect 
of growth on concentration through differential growth rates of small and 
large firms is uncertain, both theoretically and empirically. 
The results of the growth coefficient in past concentration change 
models appear to show a consistent pattern. Growth has usually been 
negative and significant for concentration change models when net entry 
of firms is not also included as an independent variable. But when both 
growth and net entry are included, growth is often positive and 
significant while net entry of firms is often negative and significant. 
For example, see Kamerschen (1968), Sawyer (1971) and Mueller and Hamm 
(1974). Apparently, net entry of firms has a deconcentrating effect of 
growth on concentration and differential growth rates between large and 
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small firms in the same industry tend to have a concentrating effect of 
growth on concentration. Of these two, net entry of firms seems to 
dominate since the growth coefficient is usually positive when net entry 
of firms is also included as an independent variable and negative when 
net entry of firms is not included as an independent variable. This is 
consistent with the results of Rogers (1982). His growth coefficient 
tended to be positive and significant but also little entry had taken 
place in his sample of food and tobacco industries 1954-72. Conse­
quently, I expect a negative growth coefficient unless there is little 
net entry in my sample of 4-digit SIC industries from 1963 to 1982. 
It should be noted that industry growth and net entry of firms are 
highly correlated (because net entry of firms is one way that growth can 
affect concentration change) and thus both should not be included as 
independent variables in the same concentration change model. However, 
growth is the preferred independent variable of the two for a couple of 
reasons. First, Shepherd (1964, p. 208) points out that through the 
association between growth and net entry of firms is definite, "the 
influence of growth on the number of firms is probably more important 
than the reverse causation." Second, net entry of firms is a partial 
element of industry concentration. "This is precisely why some authors 
expressed reservations about its inclusion as an independent variable in 
a change in concentration model" (Rogers, 1982, p. 60). 
It is interesting to note that Farris (1973) adds another hypothesis 
for growth in a concentration model. For low initial concentration 
ratios, he expected growth to have a positive effect on concentration 
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change since large firms can grow without resistance from competition and 
not worry about anti-trust action. But when ICR is high, Farris expected 
growth to have a negative effect on concentration change. This is 
because both competition and the government anti-trust enforcers would be 
more sensitive and resistant to market share expansion. 
Farris' hypothesis was supported as the growth coefficients were 
significant with the expected signs. In the Rogers (1982) study, growth 
was positive and significant only when ICR was low. 
Research and Development Dummy Variable 
Nelson and Winter (1982) ran simulation experiments to test if 
research and development (R&D) activity increased concentration. In 
their model, all firms spent the same fraction of their capital on R&D. 
Consequently, the larger firms spent a larger absolute amount on R&D 
which gives them a better chance to succeed in their innovation and 
imitation efforts, plus their successful R&D will apply to a larger 
capacity without further costs. Assuming these scale advantages of R&D 
to large firms and holding the number of firms constant, their results 
showed that R&D led to increased market concentration. 
However, when entry is allowed, then it is possible for R&D to 
facilitate entry if there is easy imitation (Mueller and Tilton, 1969). 
Also, some economists believe that smaller firms make more efficient use 
of their R&D funds. Hence, R&D could cause a decrease in concentration. 
Therefore, on economic grounds the expected effect of R&D on 
concentration change cannot be predicted. 
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Because of this, Mukhopadhyay (1985) states that the effect of R&D 
on concentration change remains an empirical question. He tested a R&D 
variable in a concentration change model. In his sample of 304 SIC 4-
digit industries from 1963 to 1977, the R&D dummy coefficients (repre­
senting technological progress) were consistently significantly negative. 
Thus, it appears R&D can have a negative effect on concentration, espe­
cially if R&D facilitates entry by easy imitation. Since Mukhopadhyay 
was the only study before to use a R&D dummy in a concentration change 
model, I will use it again in my model (with a different sample and 
period) to see if the R&D dummy coefficient remains negative and 
significant. 
Convenience Good Dummy Variable 
It appears to be useful to distinguish between two different types 
of consumer goods when examining how advertising intensity can affect 
market structure. These two types are convenience goods and shopping 
goods. Holton (1958) used this terminology although this basic idea goes 
back to Copeland (1923). Porter (1974) was the first to apply this 
classification to a cross-industry analysis (using a profit rate model). 
This will be the first time this idea has been used in a concentration 
change model, where the convenience good dummy (CONV) equals one for 
convenience good industries and zero otherwise. 
The expected CONV coefficient is positive because advertising is 
hypothesized as more effective at product differentiation and image 
building for convenience type consumer goods. Convenience goods have a 
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relatively small unit price, are repeatedly purchased and are sold in 
retail outlets where local density is high but sales assistance is very 
low. Examples of convenience outlets are supermarkets, gasoline stations 
(which in the last 10 years are increasingly combined with small 
"convenience" grocery stores), and liquor stores. 
Due to the relative low unit price and high frequency of purchase, 
the consumer considers the purchase relatively unimportant. However, the 
cost of obtaining information on competing products quality (and 
sometimes price) is high, especially relative to the unit price of the 
convenience good. Hence, the probable gains from searching out this 
information on quality and price is low, and the consumer tends to buy 
these convenience goals without shopping around much and collecting 
information. "Since the purchase is not perceived to be important, the 
consumer is willing to rely on less objective criteria (attributers) 
accordingly. Relatively more objective (in the sense that the consumer 
has some control over the information he receives) and costly information 
sources such as sales assistance by the retailer and direct shopping and 
comparison are not utilized" (Porter, 1974, page 423). One of the most 
important "less objective criteria" the consumer relies on is 
advertising. Therefore, it is hypothesized that In the absence of other 
information, advertising through image building and persuasion (which 
characterizes most national advertising) will be more effective at 
influencing concentration change for convenience good industries. 
In contrast, shopping goods have a relatively high unit price and 
the purchase can usually be delayed (the purchase is relatively infre­
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quent and can usually be delayed). Shopping goods are sold in retail 
outlets where outlets are selectively rather than densely located and 
sales assistance is very high. Examples of shopping goods outlets are 
shoe stores, appliance stores, small clothing shops and automobile 
dealers. 
Due to the relatively high unit price and the fact that purchases 
can usually be delayed, the consumer considers these purchasers more 
important. Here, probable gains from making quality and price 
comparisons are large relative to the consumers' expected search costs. 
Thus, the consumer will shop around (often several stores) to compare 
prices, styles, and quality. And, the retail sales person often can 
influence the sale of different products through the provision of (low 
cost) information (Porter, 1974, p. 421). 
This may occur through a selling presentation, through personal 
recommendation or advice solicited by the consumer and through the 
perceived expertise of the sales person with respect to the product 
(or any combination of all of these). The retailer conveys product 
information about the reliability, features and method of use that 
may be difficult to obtain from other sources. 
Also, especially for the higher priced shopping goods (appliances, 
TVs, stereos, and automobiles), consumers will turn to other sources of 
information. First, consumers acquire information from talking to each 
other (people tend to talk more about what kind of automobiles they drive 
than what kind of razor blades they use). Second, they read various 
types of consumer reports. The popularity of consumer reports (printed 
by government agencies, and both profit and nonprofit private 
organizations) has increased substantially the last twenty years. 
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Therefore, the consumers have other sources than advertising upon which 
to base their purchases of shopping goods and also have an incentive to 
use these other sources. So, it is expected that advertising intensity 
will not be as effective for influencing concentration change for 
shopping good industries as it is for convenience good industries. 
Consumer Good Dummy Variable 
Mueller and Hamm (1974), Scherer (1979), Caves and Porter (1980), 
Mueller and Rogers (1980; 1984), and Adams and Heimforth (1986) are among 
those studies that found concentration in consumer goods industries to 
have increased during periods when concentration in producer good 
industries has remained stable or decreased. This finding has been 
explained by the product differentiation barrier to entry of consumer 
good Industries. Advertising is an important component of product 
differentiation (maybe the most important). In fact, advertising 
intensity is often used as a proxy for product differentiation. But the 
consumer good dummy variable (CONS) may also capture some non-advertising 
created product differentiation effects on concentration change. 
However, due to moderate collinearity between CONS and the advertising 
intensity variables, when the two are used together, the level of 
significance will likely be reduced for both variables. Consequently, 
equations will be estimated with and without CONS. 
Advertising Intensity 
Advertising intensity is the major independent variable in this 
study. As noted in Chapter I, not all types of media advertising 
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intensity can be expected to affect concentration change the same way. 
By its nature, national advertising intensity (heavily represented by TV 
advertising intensity, especially network TV advertising intensity) is 
expected to have anti-competitive effects on market structure. This is 
because national advertising is more persuasive than informative. Also, 
TV advertising has more advantages for larger advertisers than other 
advertising media. These advantages of larger advertisers (for all 
advertising in general but especially with TV advertising) are presented 
in detail below. In addition, the importance of network TV advertising 
can be seen by comparing the relative prices of advertising media between 
1969 to 1976. Network TV advertising prices rose two to eight times 
higher than did prices for spot TV, spot radio, network radio, outdoor, 
newspapers and magazines (Levmore, 1978, p. 13). Therefore, because of 
the various large scale advantages for advertising in general and because 
of the further large scale advantages and strong national advertising 
characteristics of TV (especially network TV) advertising, the expected 
coefficients for total advertising intensity and network TV advertising 
intensity are positive, with the latter being stronger and more 
significant. 
Before going further, it should be noted that for a concentration 
change model, independent change variables (such as total advertising 
intensity change) are thought to be theoretically the correct form of the 
independent variables (Caves and Porter, 1980). However, independent 
level variables (such as total advertising intensity level) can affect 
concentration change through a lag effect (Caves and Porter, 1980). For 
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example, for a concentration change model from 1967 to 1982, a proper 
independent advertising intensity variable would be an advertising 
intensity change from 1967 to 1982. But the 1967 advertising intensity 
level, while affecting the 1967 concentration level, would also affect 
the concentration level in some years after 1967 (e.g., the concentration 
change period from 1967 to 1982) because of the lagged effect. While 
there is no theoretical way to determine how long this lag effect will 
last, clearly both the level and change of advertising intensity 
variables can be expected to affect concentration change. Hence, both 
the level and change of advertising intensity variables (e.g., total 
advertising intensity level and total advertising intensity change) will 
be included in the various concentration change models tested. 
Other concentration change studies have included both level and 
change variables. In particular, Rogers (1982), Ornstein and Lustgarten 
(1978) and Levy (1985) all included level and change advertising 
variables in their model. A similar argument was used by Mueller and 
Hamm (1974) to include both size and growth in their concentration change 
model. 
The various advantages large advertisers have over small advertisers 
(especially for TV) explain the mechanisms by which advertising intensity 
(especially for TV) is expected to contribute to a higher (or slower 
declining) concentration level. First, the largest of all advertisers, 
large multiproduct companies (conglomerates) have an advantage over 
smaller rivals (often single-product companies) by using cross-
subsidization. Cross-subsidization occurs when a firm uses revenues 
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earned in one of its (geographic or product) markets to subsidize 
activities (e.g., advertising) in another of its markets. Firms will use 
this tactic when the expected future gains from the increased market 
shares resulting from cross-subsidization exceed the short run cost of 
the cross-subsidization. 
There is case study evidence demonstrating that large conglomerate 
firms are able to use advertising in a cross-subsidizing manner, 
evidence which might be legally viewed as predatory if it were 
reflected in deep price cutting. Instead, large conglomerates may 
subsidize advertising and promotion outlays to increase their market 
shares in particular markets (Rogers, 1982, pp. 78-79). 
This can result in an increase in concentration. Two prominent examples 
of cross-subsidization through advertising are Proctor and Gamble's 
expansion into coffee and Phillip Morris into beer (covered in detail in 
Chapter I). In both cases, there was an increase in market concentration 
within a short time period. 
Also, there exists both real and pecuniary scale advantages in 
advertising. At least three authors found evidence of real scale 
advantages in advertising. Brown (1978) derived an average advertising 
cost schedule for the cigarette industry where the average cost refers to 
"amount of advertising capital required per unit of sales for any chosen 
level of sales" (p. 433). The derived cost curve was found to decrease 
sharply over a large range of sales (up to twenty to thirty billion 
cigarettes). Brown (1978, pp. 433-434) concluded that "new entrants are 
at a considerable cost disadvantage in terms of advertising that is not 
quickly overcome." 
In addition, Peles (1971) found scale advantages in the beer and 
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cigarette industries. He suggested that this is in part due to two 
advantages national sellers who advertise have over smaller regional 
producers. First, national advertisers can minimize their advertising 
waste by better matching their advertising coverage to their distribution 
area. Second, any residual effect of a national brand's advertising is 
not lost when a consumer moves from one region to another. 
Also, Porter (1976,  p. 401)  writes that "the economies of scale in 
advertising depend on the threshold level of advertising required of 
entrants to achieve parity with going firms." The effective threshold is 
probably higher for electronic (radio and TV) advertising since the 
message is not available for repeated readings (as printed advertising 
is). The effective threshold is probably higher yet for network TV 
advertising since it is highly indivisible with respect to geographic 
boundaries and market size (Porter, 1976,  p. 401) .  
The pecuniary scale advantages of advertising are probably greater 
than the real scale advantages. According to Blake and Blum (1965) ,  
until at least the mid-1960s,  there were substantial volume discounts in 
TV advertising. Though the formal quantity discounts ended by the late 
1960S; Scala (1973. p. 254. footnote 99) argues that other forms of price 
discrimination continued until at least into the early 1970s. For 
example, the thirty second commercial is considered 65 to 70 percent as 
effective as the one minute commercial. But until 1971, networks 
required advertisers to buy a minimum one minute commercial. This 
practice discriminated against the single product manufacturer who could 
not split their one minute commercial among two products. 
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More recently, Levmore (1978, p. 28) found that "there is every 
reason to believe that although the fixed rates and discounts have been 
formally abandoned in favor of a system in which prices are established 
through case by case bargains, these current bargained-for rates contain 
in them these very discounts." These discounts exist but are hidden as 
advertising agencies typically bargain to buy a whole package of TV 
advertising (daytime, prime time, etc.) for their clients. The advantage 
of lower TV advertising rates for larger clients is further shown when 
smaller firms, acquired by larger ones, continue to create their own 
advertising but receive lower rates because the parent company bargains 
for them. "A striking example of this is the Pepperidge Farm Co., which 
insists that it received better rates when it increased its advertising 
budget and then deliberately had Campbell Soup's advertising agency place 
its purchase of television time (after Campbell acquired Pepperidge) in 
order to get more muscle" (Levmore, 1978, p. 114). And, in his 
interviews, Levmore (1978, p. 114) found that advertising personnel from 
small and large firms, the networks and advertising agencies all believed 
that large advertisers enjoy rate advantages. 
There also exist pecuniary scale advantages for spot TV advertising. 
Porter (1976, p. 403) found that by examining only the actual rate 
structure for spot TV, quantity discounts exist. In addition. Porter 
(1976, p. 403) states that TV network rates for advertising equal 10 
percent to 70 percent of the sum of the Individual spot rates, in terms 
of reaching a given number of viewers. Hence, regional producers who use 
regional (spot) TV advertising to compete with national advertisers 
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(using network TV) are still at a disadvantage. One example is reported 
by Mueller (1979, p. 5), who found the following on a cost per thousand 
viewers basis: "In 1977-78, for every $1.00 spent by a national brewer 
on major sports event, a regional brewer had to spend $1.63 on local spot 
sports or $1.72 on prime spots." 
Another kind of pecuniary scale advantage is the favorable editorial 
treatment large advertisers sometimes receive. This is most common for 
newspapers and magazines. Norris (1984, p. 81) reports of one example; 
It is common knowledge in the trade and was reported by CBS 
News that at least one magazine selects its "Car of the Year" on the 
basis of the amount of advertising space purchased. This is 
probably not known by most of the magazine's readers. The selection 
is then advertised in other media to the unsuspecting general 
public. It is not difficult to imagine that many consumers are 
influenced by what they consider an objective evaluation by experts. 
In sum, there appears to be a consensus that scale advantages in 
advertising do exist. Comanor and Wilson (1979) wrote a survey article 
on advertising and competition. In conclusion of their review of the 
scale advantages in advertising (both real and pecuniary), they wrote 
that (p. 470) 
Taken together, these results suggest that economies of scale in 
advertising are generally present, which provides an important 
advantage to large sellers and large advertisers.... These 
economies may be an important factor leading to the anticompetitive 
implication of heavy advertising expenditures. 
Another advantage for large advertisers results from the fact that 
the absolute cost of some advertising (especially TV) is so great that it 
creates a barrier to entry. For example, in 1976, the cost of sponsoring 
a half-hour program on network TV in prime time cost $50,000 per show 
(Porter, 1976, p. 402). And, the argument that repetition must occur for 
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the effectiveness of electronic advertising would further increase the 
minimum absolute cost of running effective TV commercials. 
There are also a number of restrictive practices that favor larger 
advertisers. One is that larger TV advertisers often receive more 
favorable time slots (Scala, 1973). For example, a prime time 
advertising of a sports event is of much greater value to a brewery than 
other prime time. Also, much of the prime time space available is 
limited to sale in package deals available only to large advertisers 
(Levmore, 1978). In addition, all this is exacerbated by network rules 
that prevent competing products from being advertised too closely 
together. Rogers (1982, p. 70) states, "Those rules ensure buyers of 
advertising time that their advertisement will not be positioned too 
close together. It is not difficult to understand why only large 
advertisers are awarded such sponsorships, for they are very important 
sources of revenue to the network and certain favors and advantages are 
expected." 
A second restrictive practice results from TV networks refusing to 
give two or more companies, who wish to act as a joint buyer of time, the 
same treatment as large corporation receives» According to a Senate 
hearing (U.S. Senate, 1966), smaller companies with seasonal products who 
have tried to buy time together for a year long period (in order to 
receive rate discounts) have been turned down simply because such 
companies do not have single ownership. 
Blair (1972, p. 317) points out a third restrictive practice—the 
ban on subcontracting purchased time. This clearly hurts the smaller 
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and/or single product firms. Meanwhile, conglomerates need not worry 
about buying time and then not being able to use it since they each have 
many different products to advertise. 
In addition to the above advantages of large advertisers, there 
exists a number of advertising characteristics that also favor larger 
advertisers. Unlike other forms of advertising media, TV advertising 
supply cannot vary with demand. This makes it easier for larger firms to 
dominate prime time because they are the favorite and most important 
customers of the TV networks. For example, of all the commercials on the 
TV networks during March 1966, 19.9 percent went to the top five 
advertisers (Blair, 1972, p. 314). And, as stated earlier in this 
chapter, TV advertising (especially for network TV) has been recently 
increasing in cost faster than other media advertising. This is in part 
due to the fixed supply of TV advertising but indicates that TV 
advertising is thought to be the most important (and effective) of all 
types of media advertising by the advertisers. Also associated with the 
fixed supply of TV advertising is shelf space in the stores. The more 
successful advertisers usually get better shelf space. It has been long 
known that a product needs space as an indispensible prerequisite for 
survival. Blair (1972, p. 313) sums it up, "The preemption by large 
firms of the medium whose supply is fixed and which in addition has the 
greater pulling power, should make higher concentration almost a 
certainty." 
Another advertising characteristic that favors larger advertisers is 
their diversification. A multiproduct firm stands less chance of wasting 
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purchased advertising. For example, if one advertised product is not 
responding well in sales, they can switch another product(s) into its 
spot. Or, if it has seasonal products (sleds and skateboards), it can 
advertise each during the appropriate season in the same advertising 
spot. Also, a diversified firm may get an advertising spillover effect 
from brand or firm loyalty. For example, a firm who advertises stereo 
turntables may get a positive effect on its sales of stereo speakers. In 
many markets, this is referred to as "institutional advertising" 
(Levmore, 1978, p. 104). 
A third advertising characteristic that favors larger firms is the 
ability to pool advertising risks more effectively than smaller firms. 
First, there always is a general risk that an advertising campaign may 
fail (no matter how much money is spent on prior research, pretesting, 
and production of the advertisement). The most classic example is Ford's 
Edsel in the 1950s. But, recent examples include R. J. Reynolds' Now 
cigarettes. Proctor and Gamble's Wondra hand cream, and Cadbury 
Schweppes' Rondo soft drink (Rogers, 1982, p. 93). However, larger firms 
can better survive these setbacks because they have other profitable 
products and usually will have success advertising other products» 
Second, a more specific risk is audience size, which also favors 
larger advertisers. Rogers (1982, p. 73) points out that risk of 
audience size greatly favors large firms. For example, "large firms will 
often buy time on different channels at the same time of day because 
total audience size is less variable than the audience size of each 
channel. A once popular show may lose popularity as the year progresses. 
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and the viewers will tune into other shows that are on at the same time." 
The last advertising advantage of larger firms covered in this 
chapter is a result of the advertising agency. Advertising agencies 
handle all sales of TV network commercials for a commission based on a 
percent of the media's gross charges (similar to travel agents in the 
travel industry). Because of these commissions coupled with the fact 
that advertising agencies will not handle clients with competing 
products, the large advertising agencies seek the larger advertisers and 
exclude the smaller ones. Levmore (1978, p. 68) states, 
As a rule, agencies seek large clients and concentrate on not losing 
those large clients to competing agencies. This "rule," which 
stresses the concern of agencies for large clients, follows quite 
directly from the industry practice which precludes an agency from 
representing competing products. A small account, then, may 
interfere with the acquisition of a larger, more profitable, 
client. 
Hence, the smaller advertisers are excluded from the large advertising 
agencies who not only have the most expertise in making commercials, but 
also have the most bargaining power with the networks for securing better 
time slots and discounts for their clients. 
In sum, there are a number of large firm advantages in advertising 
(especially for TV network advertising). First, multi-product firms 
(conglomerates) may use advertising in a cross-subsidizing manner. 
Second, these exists various real and pecuniary scale advantages. Third, 
some forms of advertising cost so much (especially network TV) that it 
creates an absolute cost barrier to entry. Fourth, large firms benefit 
from a number of restrictive practices in advertising. Fifth, there 
exists a number of advertising characteristics that favor larger firms. 
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Finally, larger firms are the favorite customers of advertising agencies 
and receive preferential treatment. Because of these large firm 
advantages (plus the persuasive nature of national advertising), it is 
expected that both the level and change of advertising intensity 
(especially for network TV) will increase concentration for some 
industries or slow the decrease in concentration for other industries. 
Hence, positive coefficients for the advertising intensity variables are 
expected. (As pointed out in Chapter I, the advertising data used in 
this study are dominated by manufacturers, e.g., national advertising.) 
Omitted Variables 
There are two potentially relevant independent variables not 
included in the above model: change in economies of scale and 
conglomerate mergers. However, the model does include the independent 
variables generally considered most relevant by others, as revealed by 
the literature review chapter. 
Probably the most important determinant of concentration change 
omitted is change in economies of scale (e.g., change in minimum 
efficient scale of plant or firm operation). Bain (1956) found that 
plant size was the most important source of firm economies, though 
Scherer's (1975) analysis of multiplant economies of several industries 
has cast some doubt on Bain's finding. Both firm and plant economies of 
scale have been tried in concentration change models. 
If economies of scale increase, it is expected that concentration 
would increase, ceteris paribus. Of the ten articles reviewed in Chapter 
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II, only Wright (1978) and Ornstein and Lustgarten (1978) included some 
type of change in firm economies of scale variable (which was positive 
and significant in both studies). Mueller and Rogers (1980) had included 
a change of plant economies of scale variable in their original draft, 
but omitted it in the final journal article because a referee thought it 
had serious shortcomings. 
The shortcoming of using a scale of economies variable is due to the 
fact that there are presently no data available to construct adequate 
proxies for an industry-wide study. This is why it is not included in 
this study. Wright (1978), Ornstein and Lustgarten (1978), and the 
earlier draft of Mueller and Rogers (1980) all used the only type of data 
available to construct an economies of scale variable—"surrogate 
measures," or crude proxies based on the distribution of various average 
firm or plant sizes. This measure assumes that small firms or small 
plants are sub-optimal. 
But these various measures do not necessarily reflect optimal firm 
or plant size. There are two problems in using surrogate measures for 
optimal plant size. First, firms will often expand plants (rather than 
establish a new one) because it is convenient, there is room to add on, 
or because of political pressure. For example, in 1982, the George A. 
Hormel and Co. had to choose between adding on the existing plant in 
Austin, Minnesota, in 1982 (1,800 new jobs) or adding on a smaller plant 
(600 new jobs) in Austin and build two new plants (600 new jobs each) in 
Mankato, Minnesota, and Waverly, Iowa. Hormel chose to add all new 
plant facilities in Austin in response to the local union and city 
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officials (Willette, 1986). A similar example was the recent Oscar-Meyer 
meat packing expansion in Madison, Wisconsin. 
Second, estimates of economies of scale must be derived 
independently of observed changes in firms' size distributions, since 
this is the major influence on concentration change. However, Marcus 
(1969a, p. 118, footnote 2) points out that using change in mid-output 
plant size (a surrogate measure) to explain concentration change is 
inappropriate because the two are not independent. He writes. 
This variable (change in mid-output plant size) may not however be 
independent of changes in firm size. Consider, for example, the not 
unlikely situation where constant returns to scale prevail past some 
minimum size. In such a case, large firms will employ, on average, 
larger plants if for no other reason than their size permits the 
utilization of larger plants. Smaller firms, following the same 
reasoning, will employ on average smaller plants since their size 
limits them to a lower maximum plant size. Observed changes in mid­
point output plant size will reflect in such a case the firm's 
growth rather than explain it. 
Similar problems exist in using surrogate measures for optimal firm size. 
In particular, these also will not be independent of changes in firms' 
size distribution, the major influence on concentration change, 
A second omitted independent variable is conglomerate mergers, which 
was not used in any of the ten articles of the literature review (Chapter 
II). However, four other studies (Markham, 1973; FTC, 1972; Goldberg, 
1974; Adams and Heimforth, 1986) tested for the effect of conglomerate 
mergers on concentration change. Conglomerate mergers were hypothesized 
to increase concentration, ceteris paribus, because the merged firms may 
engage in anticompetitive practices as reciprocity or cross-
subsidization. Edwards (1955, pp. 334-335) summarizes well the 
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advantages the conglomerate firm has over smaller rivals: 
In encounters with small enterprises it ^conglomerate firmu can buy 
scarce materials and attractive sites, inventions, and facilities; 
preempt the services of the most expensive technicians and 
executives; and acquire reserves of materials for the future. It 
can absorb losses that would consume the entire capital of a smaller 
rival...moment by moment the big company can outbid, outspend or 
out-lose the small one; and from a series of such momentary 
advantages it derives an advantage in attaining its large aggregate 
results. 
In all four studies, no evidence was found that conglomerate mergers 
increased concentration in the markets of the acquired firms. Hence, 
conglomerate mergers will not be used in this study. However, it is 
interesting to note that Adams and Heimforth (1986, p. 152) concluded 
that "substantial indirect evidence is found from descriptive statistics 
and regression analyses that conglomerate mergers are associated with a 
lessening of competition in the market of the acquired firm." 
This concludes the economic rationale for the inclusion of each 
independent variable to be tested in the concentration change model. The 
next chapter discusses how the available data were used to construct the 
empirical measures of the variables. Then, Chapter V will present the 
empirical results. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE SAMPLE AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
The population used in this study is the 4-digit SIC manufacturing 
industries (as explained in Chapter 1). The actual sample used is a 
subset of the population because some industries must be eliminated for 
various reasons. After describing the sample, the construction of each 
variable is explained. 
The Sample 
Out of the population of 450 4-digit SIC industries, the basic 
sample used consists of 269 industries. Hence, some industries were 
dropped because they were not appropriate for the study. Below, these 
reasons are given. 
First, industries whose definitions were changed since 1963 were 
excluded. The U.S. Census Bureau periodically redefines manufacturing 
industries to more closely reflect changing patterns of production and 
consumption. In these revisions, some industries are absorbed into 
others, some new industries are identified, and some industries have 
products added to or deleted from their definitions. 
Ornstein (1977) suggested that these comparable-data samples used in 
concentration change models are biased because they tend to include the 
slowest growing and least technological dynamic industries and exclude 
the faster growing and more technological dynamic industries. However, 
other authors argued that these samples are not biased in representing 
the population. Mueller and Hamm (1974) stated that some industry 
definitional changes resulted in a downward bias while others resulted in 
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an upward bias. Also, they add that some industries are excluded from a 
sample because of disclosure reasons. Because this occurs only in highly 
concentrated industries, it results in a downward bias. Then, they 
tested for the overall bias (of using a sample less than the population 
in a concentration change model). They compared their 166 industry 
sample for 1947-1970 to their 292 industry sample for 1958-1970. (The 
latter sample represented 74% of all value added by manufacturers in 
1970). They concluded that "these comparisons suggest that the 166 
industry sample is quite representative both as to trend and level of 
industry concentration" (p. 512). 
Furthermore, Caves and Porter (1980, p. 3) pointed out that "If the 
sample excludes new and fast growing industries, it also excludes 
declining sectors that have been consolidated with other industries." 
Hence, the definitional changes do not appear to cause the sample to be 
bxased. 
Also, the last major revision in the SIC industry definitions took 
place in 1963. Consequently, fewer industries had to be omitted from 
this analysis due to such changes than were excluded from many previous 
studies» Out of the population of 450 industries, 181 are excluded for 
various reasons, including 104 for definitional changes between 1963 and 
1982. Therefore, roughly 23 percent of the industries are excluded due 
to definitional changes. This is small relative to some past 
concentration change studies (as Mueller and Rogers, 1980, where their 
sample size was 167 industries). 
Also, the "not elsewhere classified" (NEC) industries were 
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determined to be not appropriate for this study. These deleted NEC 
industries number 59. Each is a "catch-all" industry for miscellaneous 
products that do not fit into the other and better defined industries. 
Hence, the NEC industries do not even come close to reasonably 
representing a true economic market and were consequently deleted. 
In addition, 8 industries are excluded because the U.S. Census 
suppresses some concentration ratios to prevent disclosure of firms 
operating in that industry. Naturally, this occurs in the most highly 
concentrated industries. These industries include the makers of 
cigarettes, cellulosic man-made fibers, primary lead, primary aluminum, 
typewriters, telephone apparatus, sewing machines and dolls. 
Also, a small number of industries were excluded from the sample 
because of various institutional characteristics. One industry was 2021 
(butter), omitted because of a change in the way cooperatives were 
handled. Before 1972, the census did not apparently consolidate the 
records of the various member plants. Thus, the 1967 CR4 for butter was 
14 but leaped to 37 in 1972. Meanwhile, Land O'Lakes (a large 
cooperative) had a market share that exceeded 14 in 1957. 
Also, SIC 2875 (nitrogenous or phosphatic fertilizers, mixing only) 
is omitted, because the final product cannot be distinguished from SIC 
2873 (nitrogenous fertilizers) or SIC 2874 (phosphatic fertilizers). The 
only difference is that in 2875 fertilizer is produced from purchased 
materials, whereas in 2873 and 2874 fertilizer is produced from materials 
produced in the same establishment. Consequently, industry 2875 is of 
little use in a concentration change model of 1967 to 1982. In addition. 
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industries 2873 and 2874 have been omitted because of definition changes 
in 1972. 
SIC 2992 (refining oil and greases from purchased materials) was 
also omitted. Similarly to the above case, if the oil is instead refined 
from materials produced in the same establishment, then the oil product 
goes into industry 2911 (petroleum refining). In 1977, the value-of-
shipments from 2992 was 1.8 percent of that in 2911. Since 2911 greatly 
dominates the refining industry, 2911 is included in the sample, while 
2992 is deleted. 
Lastly, industries 3911 (precious jewelry) and 3961 (costume 
jewelry) were both omitted due to problems of correctly assigning LNA 
advertising data to either industries. As explained later in this 
chapter, the LNA advertising data were created by assigning each product 
advertised to a certain 4-digit SIC industry. However, it was impossible 
to assign LNA jewelry advertising data to either 3911 or 3969. After 
talking with a local jewelry dealer, I learned that most jewelry 
companies produce both in 3911 and 3969. The big profit margins are in 
producing low priced jewelry (3911) and costume jewelry (3969). These 
two types of jewelry are often identical except often a semi-precious 
stone (costing usually $3 to $5) is added to costume jewelry (3969), 
which makes it into precious jewelry (3911). Hence, it was not possible 
to accurately assign the LNA jewelry advertising data to either 3911 or 
3969. Also, the concentration trends for both industries since 1963 have 
moved in opposite directions. Because advertising intensity is the major 
independent variable in this study, 3911 and 3969 were omitted from the 
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sample. 
Variable Construction 
Concentration ratio change (ACR) 
The dependent variable (ACR) is measured simply by the concentration 
ratio of the ending year of analysis minus the concentration ratio of the 
beginning year of analysis. Concentration ratios for the top 4 firms in 
each manufacturing industry are taken from Census of Manufactures, 
Industry Statistics, volume II. 
Initial concentration ratio (ICR) 
ICR is the concentration ratio in the beginning period of analysis. 
It also comes from the Census of Manufactures, Industry Statistics, 
volume II. 
Industry size (S) 
The size of each industry is measured by the natural logarithm of 
the initial year's value-of-shipments (VOS)c Scherer (1979) and Mueller 
and Rogers (1980; 1984) both used the logarithm of VOS because the 
distribution of VOS is highly skewed, and use of the logarithm results in 
a more linear distribution. The VOS comes from the Census of 
Manufactures, Industry Statistics, volume II. 
Industry growth rates (G) 
Unlike ACR and ICR, the measurement of growth is not as simple. 
Growth could potentially be measured by changes in the quantity of 
shipments (Q) or by changes in the value-added or value-of-shipments 
82 
(which is price times quantity (P.Q)). Because quantity data are not 
available at the 4-digit SIC level, changes in the value-added or value-
of-shipments will be used. But, this should not be a problem. Rogers 
(1982, p. 182) was able to use both Q and P.Q as measures of growth 
because his food and tobacco sample was at the 5-digit SIC level. He 
found that "there exists a strong positive association between the two 
measures (simple correlation coefficient is .82), which suggests the two 
measures do move together." 
It should also be noted that since there is a price effect in using 
the change in value-added or value-of-shipments to measure growth, these 
measures tend to increase in periods of inflation. Consequently, two 
steps are taken. First, change in value-added will be used instead of 
change in value-of-shipments because this way a product's increase in 
value-of-shipments due to increasing input prices will not be included in 
the growth measure. Second, the value-added will be divided by the 
producer price index (price indexes are not available for individual 4-
digit industries for 1963-1982). Hence, growth will be measured as: 
VA(ending year)/??I(ending year) 
VA(initial year)/PPI(initial year) 
where VA equals value added and PPI equals producer price index for all 
commodities. The VA comes from the Census of Manufactures, Industry 
Statistics, volume II, and the PPI comes from U.S. Department of Labor. 
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Research and development dummy variable (RD) 
RD is a dummy variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) for all 4-
digit industries that are part of a broader (2-digit) industry group that 
has a research intensity of 1% or more. These industry groups are 
comprised of the following; 
28 (Chemicals and allied products); 
30 (Rubber and plastic products); 
32 (Stone, clay, glass and concrete products); 
34 (Fabricated metal products); 
35 (Machinery, except electrical); 
36 (Electrical and electronic machinery and equipment); 
37 (Transportation equipment); and 
38 (Measuring and controlling instruments; photographic and medical 
goods; watches). 
The original source was the National Science Foundation. For this study, 
I collected these data from Mukhopadhyay (1985, p. 144). 
Convenience good dummy variable (CONV) 
CONV is a dummy variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) for all 
4-digit industries classified by myself to be manufacturing convenience 
type goods. As discussed in Chapter III, convenience goods have a 
relatively small unit price, are repeatedly purchased and are sold in 
retail outlets where local density is high but sales assistance is very 
low. Examples of convenience outlets are supermarkets, gasoline stations 
(which in the last 10 years are increasingly combined with small 
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"convenience" grocery stores), and liquor stores. Based on this 
definition plus referencing Porter's classification of 42 4-digit 
convenience good industries (Porter, 1974, p. 428, Table 1), I was able 
to classify 38 industries as convenience good industries. 
Consumer good dummy variable (CONS) 
CONS is a dummy variable that has a value of one when an industry is 
primarily producing consumer goods and zero otherwise. The 1972 Input-
Output tables for the U.S. economy (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1979, 
table 1) were used to classify the type of product produced for most SIC 
industries in the sample. Industries for which sales to consumers 
accounted for 50% or more of total sales were categorized as consumer 
good industries. However, due to differences between I-O industry 
classifications and the SIC system, some industries were classified by 
SIC definition. Of the sample of 269 industries, 88 were consumer good 
industries and 181 were producer good industries. 
Advertising intensity 
There currently exist four different sources of advertising 
expenditure data that are available for a U.S. manufacturing industry 
study: (1) Parker's data set compiled at the FTC; (2) the Internal 
Revenue Service; (3) the Input-Output tables; and (4) the Leading 
National Advertisers Inc. The first three have serious shortcomings, 
discussed below. Consequently, the advertising expenditure data used in 
this study come from the Leading National Advertisers, Inc. (LNA). 
Robert Parker's (1967) advertising data set was compiled at the FTC 
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for the years 1947, 1954, 1958 and 1963. Parker used a discrete 
advertising variable: 4-digit SIC industries were classified into either 
producer good industries or consumer good industries with low, medium and 
high degrees of product differentiation. 
However, Parker's data were heavily criticized. First, the degree 
of product differentiation was based on the advertising intensity of the 
top few firms in each industry, taken from various media trade journals. 
As Ornstein and Lustgarten (1978, p. 230) pointed out, since most large 
firms are diversified, their advertising to sales ratios may have little 
relationship to a particular 4-digit SIC industry. Second, the consumer 
good industries with an A/S less than one percent were classified as low 
product differentiation, while industries with a high A/S were classified 
as high product differentiation. But, what constituted a "high ratio" 
was nowhere stated explicitly. Also, Parker adopted the Federal Reserve 
Board's classification of industries into producer and consumer goods. 
This caused some goods to be misclassified into producer or consumer good 
industries. Ornstein and Lustgarten (1978, p. 229) discovered that at 
least 12 goods in Parker's 1963 sample of consumer goods should have been 
classified as producer goods. This misclassification was determined by 
using Input-Output tables to classify industries as a producer good if 
the industry shipped over 50 percent of its output to other producers. 
For example, flavorings and syrups (61 percent shipped to producers) and 
watch cases (94 percent shipped to producers) were misclassified as 
consumer goods. Lastly, the three categories of product differentiation 
came from a continuous measure of advertising intensity. Hence, the 
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cut-off points for the discrete variables were somewhat arbitrary. 
The Internal Revenue Service data are also plagued with many 
problems (Rogers, 1982, p. 106). One problem is that these data are for 
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 3-digit level, which is too 
broad. Also, the data come from the corporation reports, which tend to 
overstate cost because advertising is tax deductible. And perhaps most 
important, a corporation is assigned to a single 1RS category unless the 
corporation reports by divisions or subsidiaries. As companies become 
more diversified, the data have less meaning. For example, when Phillip 
Morris acquired Miller Brewing Company in 1970, all of Miller's 
advertising was assigned to the tobacco industry. 
The Input-Output (10) advertising data are available for most 4-
diglt industries and include what the LNA data include (spot and network 
TV, network radio, outdoor, magazine and newspaper supplements) plus 
"talent and production costs, signs and advertising displays, art work, 
postage and printing" (Ornsteln and Lustgarten, 1978, p. 231). 
Ornsteln and Lustgarten (1978, pp. 230-231) were the first to use 10 
data, "in order to eliminate incompatibility in industry aggregation 
between advertising data and concentration ratios." However, upon closer 
examination, this incompatibility in the industry aggregation between 
advertising data and concentration ratios is not eliminated with the 10 
data. The problem is due to the value-added allocation rule that the 
Department of Commerce uses to save time and money. Under this rule, if 
a LNA product class (of which there are 243) contained two 4-dlgit SIC 
industries, and one SIC industry had twice the value added as the other. 
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it would be allocated twice the amount of advertising. 
To demonstrate how this leads to inaccurate 10 data, Rogers (1982, 
p. 113) shows that for 1972, the 10 data give chewing gum $9.5 million in 
total advertising based on the value-added allocation rule, while Rogers' 
LNA data give chewing gum $35.7 million. To show how important this is 
in my LNA data set, in 1982 only 42 of the 202 LNA product classes (that 
I aggregated) matched up as perfect fits with the 4-digit SIC industries. 
So, 160 of the LNA product classes had more than one SIC industry code 
assigned to their products, and some had up to 44 different SIC 
industries assigned to their products. In these cases, it is easy to see 
how the 10 data using their value-added allocation rule would provide 
inaccurate estimates of advertising expenditures for many 4-digit 
industries. 
A second drawback is that 10 data are not available for all 4-digit 
SIC industries, since there is not a one-to-one correspondence between 
the SIC system and the 10 tables. For example, in Ornstein and 
Lustgarten's (1978, p. 231) sample of 4-digit SIC industries for 1963 and 
1967, the 10 tables were able to supply advertising data for only 80 
percent of the industries (and only 60 percent of the industries for 
their 1947 sample of industries). 
In contrast, the LNA data do eliminate the incompatibility of 
industry aggregation between advertising data and the 4-digit SIC 
industries. This is because the advertising expenditures of the 
individual products (rather than product groups) are assigned to 4-digit 
industries. The major drawback is that this task of assigning each 
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individual product's advertising to a specific 4-digit industry is time 
consuming. 
Another advantage of the LA advertising data set is that since it is 
compiled by assigning each individual product's advertising one at a 
time, it is possible to include only those advertisements that relate 
directly to product differentiation. Hence, industry-wide demand 
shifters were excluded from the LNA data. For example, the American 
Dairy Association advertisements encouraging milk consumption were 
excluded while advertisements by firms or cooperatives for their specific 
brand of milk were included (e.g., Borden's milk). 
The LNA data are disaggregated into six basic media—network and 
spot TV, network radio, outdoor, magazine and newspaper supplements. 
These data are obtained as follows. The Broadcaster Advertisers Reports, 
Inc. (BAR) monitors every broadcast minute during the year for ABC, CBS, 
and NBC networks. From these tapes, they compute the network radio and 
TV advertising. Likewise, for spot TV, BAR monitors 278 TV stations in 
the top 75 markets. Advertising expenditures for 120 leading magazines 
plus the newspaper supplements of Family Weekly, N.Y. Times Magazine and 
Parade are summarized by the Publishers Information Bureau. Outdoor 
advertising (in markets over 100,000 population) is compiled by the 
Institute of Outdoor Advertising. Then, each individual product is 
assigned its various advertising totals and grouped into one of the LNA 
243 product classes (LNA, 1982). Hence, LNA data book contains the 
measured advertising expenditures for the 6 above media for over roughly 
17,000 manufactured products. 
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There are a number of reasons why LNA advertising data represent 
mainly national advertising. First, the LNA advertising data reports the 
name of the advertiser along with each product advertised. By working 
through some 17,000 products compiled, it was easy to notice that in the 
vast majority of the cases, the product was advertised by the 
manufacturer, not a retailer. Second, national advertising is done in 
the type of media reported by LNA—where persuasion rather than 
information is common and only large advertisers can afford to purchase 
these ads. This is consistent with the LNA media—network TV and radio, 
spot TV in the top 75 U.S. markets, the top 120 magazines and outdoor 
advertising in cities of population greater than 100,000. In contrast, 
retail advertising tends to be more in the type of media as newspapers 
(especially classified ads), some spot radio, and the yellow pages. 
Lastly, LNA reports advertisements only of $100 or more, which would 
eliminate some retail-type advertising. 
I compiled the 1982 LNA advertising set as follows. I assigned a 4-
digit SIC industry to roughly 12,000 nonfood products on manufacturing. 
Some products were assigned easily while others required a call to the 
Census Bureau (SIC classification office) in Washington B.C. or 
calls/trips to local merchants to be able to assign the SIC code. When 
this was done, I sorted the products (on the computer) by the SIC 
industry and then added by the SIC industry to arrive at a clean, 
accurate data set. Dr. Rogers did the same for some 5,000 food products 
to complete the 1982 data set. Also, the 1967 LNA data set was compiled 
in a similar fashion by Robert Bailey of the FTC for the 6 media included 
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in the 1982 LNA data set plus for spot radio. 
The 1982 and 1967 LNA media categories are comparable except for 
newspaper. Bailey's 1967 data are more inclusive, covering both 
newspaper and newspaper supplement advertising, while the 1982 data 
include only the newspaper supplement advertising. Unfortunately, the 
two cannot be separated in Bailey's data. Consequently, the total 
advertising intensity measures used in this study will include TV 
(network and spot), network radio, magazine and outdoor advertising data. 
Excluding the newspaper advertising is most important for calculating the 
change in total advertising intensity. But, this exclusion has a small 
effect on total advertising intensity since newspaper supplement 
advertising accounted for 2% of the total LNA advertising for 1982 in my 
data set. 
It should be noted that 985 out of some 17,000 products assigned to 
4-digit SIC industries (less than 6%) were joint products whose 
descriptions fit into two or more different 4-digit SIC industries. For 
example, the product(s) advertised as Stanley tools in the LNA data book 
could possibly be classified into SIC 3423 (hand and edge tools) or SIC 
3546 (power driven hand tools). For these joint products, their 
advertising was allocated to each industry they could possibly belong to, 
in proportion to the amount each industry advertises. Since industry 
3546 advertises four times the amount of industry 3423, for the Stanley 
tools, 80 percent of the advertising went to 3546 and 20 percent to 3423. 
In sum, because the LNA advertising data are aggregated by assigning 
each individual LNA product to a SIC industry and then, summing by the 
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SIC industries, the LNA advertising data sets better represent the amount 
of advertising expenditure by each SIC industry than any other 
advertising data available. In addition, it is more flexible than other 
advertising sources since any combinations of the 6 measured media can be 
used. For example, I will use, among other combinations for the 
advertising intensity variable, total advertising intensity (the 5 media, 
excluding newspaper supplements) and network TV advertising intensity. 
Lastly, it should be noted that any criticism of the LNA. data also 
applies to the 10 advertising data since the 10 data are in large part 
obtained from the LNA advertising books. 
The advertising variables used in the actual regression analysis 
will be advertising intensity, levels and change. Thus, the numerator 
(advertising expenditures) comes from the LNA data set, described above, 
and the denominator (value-of-shipments) comes from the Census of 
Manufactures, Industry Statistics, volume II. 
Two more details about the advertising data will be covered before 
going to the empirical results in Chapter 5. First, since the early 
1970s, two 4-digit industries no longer use TV advertising. Industry 
2111 (cigarettes) was banned by law from the use of TV advertising in 
1971 while industry 2085 (distilled liquors) voluntarily agreed not to 
advertise on TV or radio. Because this strongly affects the main 
independent variables, advertising intensity, these two industries will 
be dropped from the sample for the analysis. (The cigarettes industry 
was already dropped from the sample due to disclosure problems.) 
Second, for three pairs of industries, I used the combined 
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advertising intensity for each industry because in all cases these 
industries produce identical products. For example, 2011 is meat packing 
with animals killed in the plant while 2013 is meat packing with 
purchased animals (killed elsewhere). Since the products of 2011 and 
2013 are identical, I assigned all meat packing advertising to both 2011 
and 2013 and divided this by the value-of-shipments of 2011 plus 2013 to 
arrive at an advertising intensity figure to be used for both 2011 and 
2013. A similar situation exists for flour (2041, 2045) and sugar (2062, 
2063). 
In summary, the LNA data are the most accurate source of advertising 
for studying the effect of national advertising on competition in the 
U.S. manufacturing sector. As Rogers (1982, p. 114) states, the data 
problem is too important to overlook; 
There are disagreements between the Input-Output and LNA data. 
These disagreements exist even for directly comparable media and, at 
times, the differences are substantial. Economists are often guilty 
of being over eager to use data that appear appropriate without 
first thoroughly examining the data quality. The profession seems 
more interested in debating model specification and other 
econometric questions. However, the data problem is as serious, if 
not more so, as the problems that now receive so much attention 
(e.g., simultaneity). 
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CHAPTER V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The previous four chapters have laid the groundwork for the 
empirical results reported below. Some descriptive statistics of 
advertising intensity and concentration change are first discussed, 
followed by the regression results of the concentration change model. 
Descriptive Statistics of Advertising Intensity 
It is instructive to first examine the percentage of the 1967 and 
1982 LNA data on total advertising that comes from each type of LNA 
measured medium. As discussed in Chapter IV, the total advertising 
intensity variable (TOTAL) is comprised of the advertising intensities 
from network TV (NTV), spot TV (STV), network radio (NRAD), magazine 
(MAG), and outdoor (OUT). Also, because of their high correlation and 
common property of being electrical media, NTV, STV and NRAD are also 
grouped into electrical media (ELEC), while OUT and MAG are grouped as 
OM. As discussed in Chapter IV, newspaper advertising intensity was 
dropped for the analysis because the 1967 and 1982 newspaper advertising 
data are not comparable. 
Table V.1 shows the different LNA advertising intensities as a 
percent of TOTAL. NTV grew from 37% of TOTAL in 1967 to 53% in 1982, and 
in both years is the single most important component of TOTAL. This is 
not surprising since network TV is hypothesized to be the most powerful 
type of national advertising. The importance of NTV is shown by the fact 
that unit cost for network TV advertising has risen faster than for any 
other medium between 1969-1976 (Levmore, 1978, p. 13). STV is the second 
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Table V.l. Different LNA advertising intensities as a percent of LNA 
total advertising intensity^ 
1967 1982 
NTV 37% 53% 
STV 31% 25% 
NRAD 2% 2% 
ELEC 70% 80% 
MAG 28% 20% 
OUT 2% 0% 
OM 30% 20% 
^For ail industries in the sample, n=269. 
largest component of TOTAL in both 1967 and 1982 but fell from 31% of 
TOTAL in 1967 to 25% in 1982. NRAD stayed at 2% from 1967 to 1982, and 
the combined category, ELEC, clearly dominates TOTAL, accounting for 70% 
of TOTAL in 1967 and 80% in 1982. Lastly, OM (dominated by MAG) fell 
from 30% in 1967 to 20% in 1982. Hence, NTV and ELEC (the main component 
of ELEC is NTV) dominate the LNA advertising data, and grew in importance 
between 1967 and 1982. 
Similar information to Table V.l is in Table V.2, except the actual 
LNA advertising intensities are reported in percentage» From 1967 to 
1982, TOTAL decreased slightly, from .60 to .59. NTV had a significant 
(at 0.10 level, two-tailed test) increase of .09, while MAG (and OM) had 
significant decreases. 
Table V.3 reports the simple correlation coefficients of the five 
different LNA media advertising intensities for 1967 and 1982 to see how 
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Table V.2. LNA advertising intensities (advertising expenditures as a 
percent of value-of-shipments) 
1967 1982 Change 
T-statistics 
(2-tailed 
tests) 
TOTAL .60 .59 -.01 -0.15 
NTV .22 .31 .09 1.89* 
STV .19 .15 -.04 -1.31 
NRAD .01 .01 .00 1.39 
ELEC .42 .47 .05 0.79 
MAG .17 .12 -.05 -3.03*** 
OUT .01 .00 -.01 -0.55 
OM .18 .12 —.06 -3.08*** 
^For all industries in the sample, n=269. 
The t-tests are for significant changes between 1967 and 1982 
advertising intensities. 
*Designates the 0.10 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
strongly any two are related. Since ELEC dominates TOTAL and NTV and STV 
dominate ELEC, it is not surprising that TOTAL is highly correlated to 
NTVi STV and ELEC for 1967 and 1982. And. for both years, the three 
electronic media (NTV, STV, and NRAD) have fairly high correlations among 
themselves (.60 to .84). Consequently, the three are highly related and 
one alternative measure of advertising intensity is ELEC. NTV, STV, NRAD 
(and, therefore, ELEC) all have relative low correlations with MAG and 
OUT for both years (.04-.55), indicating MAG and OUT (or OM) are not 
closely related to ELEC. Therefore, based on these correlations and the 
national type advertising characteristics of electronic media, the main 
advertising intensity variables used on this study are TOTAL, ELEC and 
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Table V.3. Correlation coefficients of the different LNA media 
advertising intensity variables, for 1967 and 1982^ 
NTV STV NRAD ELEC MAG OUT OM 
1967 
TOTAL 0.90 0.87 0.75 0.96 0.64 0.22 0.64 
NTV 1.00 0.71 0.65 0.93 0.41 0.08 0.41 
STV 1.00 0.82 0.92 0.34 0.26 0.35 
NRAD 1.00 0.80 0.28 0.04 0.27 
ELEC 1.00 0.41 0.17 0.41 
MAG 1.00 0.18 0.99 
OUT 1.00 0.23 
1982 
TOTAL 0.97 0.92 0.67 0.98 0.67 0.30 0.68 
NTV 1.00 0.84 0.71 0.99 0.51 0.22 0.51 
STV 1.00 0.60 0.92 0.55 0.34 0.57 
NRAD 1.00 0.73 0.17 0.04 0.17 
ELEC 1.00 0.53 0.26 0.54 
MAG 1.00 0.25 0.99 
OUT 1.00 0.34 
^For all industries in the sample, n=269. 
NTV. OM will also be tried in a regression equation, but a weak result 
is expected since it is a small percent of TOTAL and a weaker form of 
national advertising. 
The last table of interest in this section on advertising intensity 
data is Table V.4, the simple correlation coefficients for the various 
advertising intensity variables to be used in the concentration change 
model. First, it should be noted that the correlations between the 
initial year's advertising intensity (1967) and the average of 1967 and 
1982 advertising intensity for all variables is very high (.96 for TOTAL, 
Table V.4. Correlation coefficients for the various advertising intensity variables to be used 
in the concentration change model®» 
DTOTAL TOTAL67 ANTV DNTV NTV67 AELEC DELEC ELEC67 AOM DOM 0M67 
ATOTLA -.14 .96 .96 .34 .81 .98 .04 .89 .71 -.60 .72 
DTOTAL 1.00 -.40 -.24 .80 -.59 -.21 .95 -.51 .13 .03 .10 
TOTAL67 1.00 .95 .10 .90 .96 -.21 .96 .62 -.56 .64 
ANTV 1.00 .22 .90 .97 -.09 .93 .55 -.48 .56 
DNTV 1.00 -.22 .31 .86 0.00 .34 -.29 .34 
NTV67 1.00 .84 -.47 .93 .40 -.35 .41 
AELEC 1.00 -.06 .95 .54 -.50 .56 
DELEC 1.00 -.38 .33 -.27 .34 
ELEC67 1.00 .39 -.38 .41 
AOM 1.00 -.69 .98 
DOM 1.00 -.82 
^For all industries in the sample, n=269. 
before a variable means average, e.g. ATOTAL = Average advertising intensity for 1967 
and 1982. D before a variable means change, e.g. DTOTAL = Advertising intensity for 1982 -
Advertising intensity for 1967. After a variable, 67 means advertising intensity for 1967. 
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.90 for NTV, .95 for ELEC and .98 for OM). This indicates that similar 
regression results can be obtained from using either one. In past 
concentration change models with advertising intensity level as an 
independent variable, Ornstein and Lustgarten (1978) and Asch (1979) used 
initial advertising intensity, while Scherer (1979) used either mid-year 
or initial advertising intensity and Rogers (1982) used various years and 
averages of various years of advertising intensity. But both Ornstein 
and Lustgarten (1978, p. 230) and Rogers (1982, p. 118) point out that 
one year's data may not be an accurate representation of advertising 
intensity throughout the period, and that an average of two or more years 
of data is desirable. Consequently, most equations will be estimated 
using an average of 1967 and 1982 advertising intensity, though a few 
will be estimated for the 1967-1982 period with 1967 advertising 
intensity. However, as pointed out above, this distinction should not be 
critical for my study because of the very high correlations between the 
1967 advertising intensity data and the average advertising intensity 
data. 
Second, from Table V.4, it should be noted that the change and the 
average level of advertising intensity variables have very low 
correlations (-.14 for TOTAL, .22 for NTV, and -.06 for ELEC. Only OM 
has a relatively high correlation, -.69). In Chapter III, the rationale 
was given to why it is appropriate to have both level and change 
advertising intensity variables in a concentration change model. 
Multicollinearity between these two variables was a problem for Rogers' 
(1982) data set, but should not be a problem in this study due to the low 
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correlations between level and change advertising intensity variables. 
Lastly, in reference to Table V.4, it should be pointed out that 
average levels of TOTAL, ELEC and NTV are all highly correlated (.96-
.98), as are the changes in TOTAL, ELEC and NTV (.80-.95). Therefore, it 
is expected that all three variables in the model (for level and change 
advertising intensity) will perform similarly, with the NTV having 
stronger coefficients as hypothesized in Chapter III. 
Descriptive Statistics of Concentration Change 
Table V.5a shows the average levels and changes of 4-firm 
concentration ratios (CR4) for all industries and consumer good and 
producer good industries. The average CR4 for the full sample (n=269) 
exhibited very little change between 1963 and 1982, increasing by 0.8 
percentage points. Most of the increase occurred between 1963 and 1972 
(0.7 increase) and very little change occurred since 1972. Hence, the 
average level of CR4 of 38.7 in 1963 and 39.5 in 1982 gives the 
impression of little change in the market structures and extent of 
competition in American manufacturing industries. 
However, as was found by Mueller and Hamm, "the calm surface of 
average CR's conceals substantial undercurrents of change. Most 
importantly, consumer and producer good industries experience sharply 
contrasting patterns" (1974, p. 513). Whereas average CR4 in producer 
good industries have decreased some (-1.8) from 1963 to 1982, the 
consumer good industries have experienced a persistent and substantial 
upward trend. For the consumer good industry group, concentration 
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Table V.5a. Average levels and changes of CR4 for all industries and 
consumer good and producer good industries 
All 
industries 
in the 
sample 
Consumer 
good 
industries 
Producer 
good 
industries 
T-statistics 
and levels 
of signifi­
cance ( 2-
tailed tests)' 
n=269 
Average Level: 
1963 38.7 
1967 39.0 
1972 39.4 
1977 39.4 
1982 39.5 
n=88 
37.0 
38.3 
40.6 
40.9 
42.9 
n=181 
39.6 
39.3 
38.8 
38.7 
37.8 
0.94 
0.36 
-0.64 
-0.83 
-1.89* 
Average Change: 
1963-82 0.8 
1967-82 0.5 
1963-72 0.7 
1972-82 0.1 
1963-67 0.3 
1967-72 0.4 
1972-77 0.0 
1977-82 0.1 
5.9 
4.6 
3.6 
2.3 
1.3 
2.3 
0.3 
2.0 
-1.8 
-1.5 
-0.8 
-1 .0  
-0.3 
-0.5 
-0.1 
-0.9 
-5.71*** 
-4.89*** 
-5.06*** 
-3.35*** 
-2.97*** 
-3.79*** 
-0.72 
-4.06*** 
The t-tests are for significant differences between the consumer 
good and the producer good industries. 
*Designates the 0,10 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0,01 level of significance-
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increased 1.3 for 1963-1967 and 2.3 for 1967-1972. The increase slowed 
down to 0.3 for 1972-1977, but increased by 2.0 points for 1977-1982. 
Similar differential patterns in average concentration change between 
consumer good and producer good industries have been noted by (in 
addition to Mueller and Hamm, 1974) Scherer (1979), Caves and Porter 
(1980), and Mueller and Rogers (1980, 1984). 
It is interesting to note that for 1963-1982, 1967-1982 and all 
subperiods except 1972-1977, che t-statistics to test for differences in 
the change in CR4 between consumer good and producer good industries are 
significant at the 1% level (for 2-tailed tests). These significant 
differences can be attributed to differences between consumer and 
producer goods industries in the extent of advertising and other product 
differentiation barriers to entry. In the regression analysis section, a 
consumer good dummy variable and various advertising intensity variables 
will be included as independent variables to further explore this effect 
on concentration change. 
Table V.5b presents all industries and consumer good and producer 
good industries that had an increase, decrease, or no change in average 
concentration. For all industries, it is found that roughly the same 
number (127) experienced increases in CR4 as experienced decreases (130); 
12 industries had no concentration change. 
For the industries with an increase in concentration, their average 
CR4 increased 8.5 points, from below the entire sample average in 1967 to 
above the entire sample average in 1982. Conversely, for the industries 
with a decrease in concentration, their average CR4 decreased 7.3 points. 
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Table V.5b. Industries with an increase, decrease, or no change in CR4 
to accompany Table V.5a 
T-statistics 
All Consumer Producer and levels 
industries good good of signifi­
in the industries industries cance (2-
sample tailed tests)® 
n=269 Ti 00
 
00
 
n=181 
Industries with an 
Increase in Concen­
tration, 1967-82 n=127 n=53 n=74 
Average level, 1967 35.0 35.9 34.4 -0.40 
Average level, 1982 43.5 46.7 41.2 -1.38 
Average change. 
1967-82 8.5 10.8 6.8 -3.11*** 
Industries with a 
Decrease in Concen­
tration, 1967-82 n=130 n=32 n=98 
Average level, 1967 43.2 41.3 43.9 0.64 
Average level, 1982 35.9 35.9 36.0 0.01 
Average change, 
1967-82 -7.3 -5.4 -7.9 -2.41** 
Industries with No 
Change in Concen­
tration, 1967-82 n=12 n=3 n=9 
Average level, 
1967 and 1982 34.8 50.3 29.6 -1.26 
^The t-tests are for significant differences between the consumer 
and the producer good industries. 
**Designates the 0.05 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
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from above the entire sample average in 1967 to below the entire sample 
average in 1982. For the 12 industries with no concentration change, 
their average remained at 34.8, below the entire sample average for 1967 
(and 1982). 
As might be expected for the consumer good industries, more 
increased in average CR4 (53) than decreased (32), while for the producer 
good industries, more decreased (98) than increased (74). Comparing the 
consumer good and producer good industries that experienced increases, 
the consumer goods industries started at a somewhat higher 1967 average 
CR4 and increased 10.8 points, while the producer good industries 
increased 6.8. This difference in the increase was significant at the 1% 
level (2-tailed test). Comparing the consumer good and producer good 
industries that had decreases, the producer good industries started at a 
higher 1967 average CR4 but decreased 7.9 points, while the consumer good 
industries decreased 5.4 points. This difference in the decrease was 
significant at the 5% level (2-tailed test). Also, for the 3 consumer 
good industries with no concentration change, their average CR4 remained 
at 50.3, while for the 9 producer good industries with no concentration 
change, the average CR4 remained at 29.6. 
Table V.6 reports average levels and changes in CR4 for low (L), 
medium (M) and high (H) advertising intensity level categories. (This 
table is analogous to Table V.5a.) ATOTAL stands for the average LNA 
total advertising intensity levels of 1967 and 1982. Industries were 
classified as H if ATOTAL was >2%, M if 2% > ATOTAL > .25%, and L if 
ATOTAL was <.25. 
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Table V.6. Average levels and changes in CR4 according to LNA total 
advertising-to-sales ratio category (average of 1967 and 
1982), for all industries 
T-statistics and levels of 
High Medium Low significance (2-tailed tests)^ 
(ATOTAL (2%> (ATOTAL 
:>2%) ATOTAL <0.25%) 
>0.25%) L/M L/H M/H 
n=27 n=46 n=196 
Average Level: 
1963 54.2 43.0 35.6 -2.21** -4.37*** -2.22** 
1967 54.4 43.8 35.7 -2.48** -4.58*** -2.16** 
1972 56.2 44.6 35.9 —2.68*** -5.00*** -2.33** 
1977 57.6 44.3 35.8 —2 « 65*** -5.46*** -2.72*** 
1982 59.3 45.2 35.4 -3.06*** -6.01*** -2.75*** 
Average Change: 
1963-82 5.1 2.2 -0.2 -1.31 -2.34** -1.05 
1967-82 4.9 1.4 -0.3 -1.08 —2.49*** -1.31 
1963-72 2.0 1.6 0.3 -1.12 -1.20 -0.27 
1972-82 3.1 0.6 -0.5 -0.83 -2.19** -1.25 
1963-67 0.2 0.8 0.1 -0.88 -0.14 0.49 
1967-72 1.8 0.8 0.2 -0.70 -1.30 -0.73 
1972-77 1.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.20 -1.48 -1.26 
1977-82 1.7 0.9 -0.4 -1.33 -1.67* -0.60 
^The t-tests are for significant differences between industries with 
different advertising-to-sales ratios (e.g., between low and medium 
advertising intensity and low and high advertising intensity and medium 
and high advertising intensity). 
^Designates the 0.10 level of significance. 
**Designates the 0.05 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
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Upon examining the average level of CR4, L industries had the 
lowest CR4 (35.4 in 1982), followed by the M industries (45.2 in 1982), 
and H had the highest CR4 (59.3 in 1982). The differences between these 
average CR4s for all years between all 3 industry combinations (e.g. 
L/M, L/H, M/H) are significant at the 1% or 5% levels, for 2-tailed 
tests. 
The pattern of average CR4 change between L, M and H is similar to 
what was found with respect to the consumer good and producer good 
industries. For 1963-1982, the H industries increased 5.1 points, while 
the M industries increased 2.2 points and the L industries decreased 0.2 
points. These average CR4 changes were significantly different at the 1% 
or 5% levels between H and L for 1963-1982, 1967-1982, and 1972-1982. 
Since the H industries already had an average CR4 of 59.3 in 1982, future 
increases in these industries associated with advertising intensity may 
be less as this average CR4 becomes closer to 100, the upper limit on 
concentration ratios. 
Table V.7 reports H, M, and L industries that had an increase, 
decrease, or no change in average concentration. (This table is 
analogous to Table V.5b.) For industries with an increase in 
concentration, the H industries started out in 1967 at the highest 
average CR4 and increased the most (11.3 points). The M industries' 
average 1967 CR4 was second highest and increased second most (9.1 
points). Similarly, the L industries had the lowest average 1967 CR4 and 
the lowest increase (7.8 points). When testing for differences in means, 
the L versus M and L versus H 1967 and 1982 average levels of CR4 were 
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Table V.7. Industries with an increase, decrease, or no change in CR4 
to accompany Table V.6a 
T-statistics and levels of 
High Medium Low significance (2-tailed tests)^ 
(ATOTAL (2%> (ATOTAL 
ATOTAL 
>0.25%) 
<0.25%) 
L/M L/H M/H 
n=27 n=46 n=196 
Industries with 
an Increase in 
Concentration, 
1967-82 n=17 n=22 n=88 
Average level, 
1967 48.9 42.5 30.5 -2.68*** -3.67*** -0.93 
Average level. 
1982 60.2 51.6 38.3 —2.7 6*** -3.97*** -1.21 
Average change. 
1967-82 11.3 9.1 7.8 -0.85 -1.74* -0.77 
Industries with 
a Decrease in 
Concentration, 
1967-82 n=9 n=21 n=100 
Average level, 
1967 66.2 42.0 41.5 -0.11 -3.69*** -3.57*** 
Average level, 
1982 59.2 35.4 34.0 -0.33 -4.11*** -3.49*** 
Average change. 
1967-82 -7.0 -6.6 -7.5 -0.72 -0.25 0.21 
Industries with 
No Change in 
Concentration. 
1967-82 n=l n=3 n=8 
Average level. 
1967 and 
1982 43.0 66.3 21.9 
^The t-tests are for significant differences between industries with 
different advertising-to-sales ratios (e.g. between low and medium 
advertising intensity and low and high advertising intensity and medium 
and high advertising intensity). 
*Designates the 0.10 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
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significant at the 1% level (but not the average changes of CR4). 
For industries with a decrease in concentration, the H industries 
started out with the highest average 1967 CR4 (66.2), followed by the M 
industries (42.0) and the L industries (41.5). But all 3 categories 
decreased by roughly the same amount (-6.6 to -7.5). When testing for 
differences in means, the L versus H and the M versus H 1967 and 1982 
average levels of CR4 were significant at the 1% level (but no average 
changes of CR4 were significant). 
As for the industries with no concentration change from 1967-1982, 
average CR4 was 43.0 for the H industries, 66.3 for the M industries and 
21.S for Che L industries. However, the H and M categories have too few 
industries (1 and 3, respectively) to have much meaning. In the 
regression analysis section, various advertising variables will be used 
as independent variables to further explore their effects on 
concentration change. 
Regression Results 
The regression results reported here focus first on the 1967-1982 
period because this coincides with the LNA advertising data, which are 
for 1967 and 1982. Later, some basic regression results are reported for 
1963-1982 and for several subperiods. In order for the results to be 
more comparable between different periods, the basic sample of 269 
industries is used in regressions throughout this study. First, the 
basic model is summarized below. 
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The basic model 
ACR = bg + b^ICR + b^S + b^G + b^RD + byCONV 
+ bgCONS + byAdvertising Intensity + e 
where: 
ACR: the 4-finn concentration ratio of the ending year of analysis 
minus the concentration ratio of the beginning year of 
analysis. 
ICR: the 4-firm concentration ratio of the beginning year of 
analysis. 
S: the natural logarithm of the initial year's value-of-
shipments. 
G: the period's ending value-added divided by its initial value 
added, where the value-added figures are adjusted for 
inflation by the producer price index. 
RD: a dummy variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) for all 
industries who belong to a 2-digit group that has a research-
to-sales ratio of 1% or more. 
CONV: a dummy variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) for all 
industries classified as convenience goods. 
CONS: a dummy variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) for all 
industries classified as consumer goods. 
Advertising Intensity: advertising-to-sales ratio measured as a 
percent, in the following ways: 
TOTAL: total available LNA advertising intensity. 
NTV: advertising intensity from network TV. 
ELEC: advertising intensity from network and spot TV plus 
network radio. 
OM: advertising intensity from outdoor and magazines, 
e: error term. 
Note that for the various advertising intensity variables, an A 
before a variable means the average of 1982 and 1967 and a D before a 
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variable means the difference between 1982 and 1967, while a 67 (82) 
after a variable means advertising intensity for 1967 (1982). For 
example, T0TAL67 means TOTAL for 1967. Thus, ATOTAL = (TOTAL82 + 
TOTAL67)/2 and DTOTAL = TOTAL82 - TOTAL67. Also, a 2 superscript on a 
2 
variable means that the variable is squared (e.g. ATOTAL = ATOTAL x 
ATOTAL). 
Lastly, the expected signs of the coefficients of the independent 
variables are (as discussed in Chapter IV): 
b < 0 
bg < 0 
b_ uncertain 
b, uncertain 
b! > 0 
bu > 0 
b* > 0 
Correlation coefficients of variables for 1967-1982 
Table V.8 presents the simple correlation coefficients for the 
variables used in the 1967-1982 concentration change model. In the 
first row are the correlations between the dependent variable 
(concentration change) and an array of independent variables. ICR, 
S, G and RD all show a negative relationship, while GONV, CONS, and 
all advertising intensities except DOM show a positive relationship. 
This is in accordance with the expected signs of the independent 
variable coefficients. The only exception is the negative, but 
small correlation between concentration change and DOM. But 
this is not surprising since OM is a small percentage of TOTAL and 
is hypothesized to have a weaker effect than other LNA media on 
Table V.8. Correlation coefficients for the variables used in the 1967-1982 concentration change 
model^ 
ICR S 67 G8267 RD CONV CONS ATOTAL DTOTAL ANTV DNTV AELEC DELEC AOM DOM 
ACR4 -.22 -.14 -.18 -.34 .11 .29 .08 .12 .05 .15 .08 .12 .07 -.02 
ICR 1.00 -.13 .06 .25 .08 -.02 .27 .00 .27 .12 .26 .04 .20 -.15 
S67 1.00 .02 .03 .26 .03 .04 -.13 .08 -.08 .08 -.12 -.08 -.02 
G8267 1.00 .14 .19 .01 .14 -.02 .11 .07 .13 .05 .12 -.22 
RD 1.00 -.24 -.33 -.02 .03 .00 .00 -.04 .04 .03 -.03 
CONV 1.00 .47 .50 -.27 .48 .02 .53 -.18 .21 -.26 
CONS 1.00 .44 .02 .38 .15 .40 .07 .42 -.19 
ATOTAL 1.00 -.14 .96 .34 .98 .04 .71 -.60 
DTOTAL 1.00 -.24 .80 -.21 .95 .13 .03 
ANTV 1.00 .22 .97 -.09 .55 -.48 
DNTV 1.00 .31 .85 .34 -.29 
AELEC 1.00 .06 .54 -.50 
DELEC 1.00 .33 -.27 
ACM 1.00 -.69 
^For all industries in the sample, n = 269. 
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concentration change. 
ICR, S and G all have relatively low correlation coefficients among 
themselves and other independent variables, implying that 
multicollinearity among ICR, S and G and with other independent variables 
should not be a problem. In particular, the correlation between S and G 
is only .02. In past concentration change models, the possible 
multicollinearity between S and G has been a concern (Rogers, 1982, p. 
129). 
RD has very low correlations with the other independent variables 
except for CONV and CONS, which are still relatively low (-.24 and -.33, 
respectively). Thus, multicollinearity should also not be a problem for 
RD. 
As discussed in the previous section, the correlations between the 
level and changes of advertising are very small, indicating that both the 
level and change form of advertising intensity variables can be used 
together without multicollinearity problems. 
Lastly, with respect to Table V.8, it should be noted that there 
does exist a multicollinearity problem between CONV, CONS and levels of 
advertising intensities (e»g. ATOTAL, AELEC, and ANTV)» Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld (1981, p. 89) state that "multicollinearity is likely to be a 
problem if the simple correlation between two variables is larger than 
the correlation of either or both variables with the dependent variable." 
This Is the case here. The correlation between CONV and CONS equals .47, 
while the correlation is .11 between ACR and CONV and .29 between ACR and 
CONS. Similar correlations exist between CONV, ATOTAL (or AELEC or ANTV) 
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and ACR and between CONS, ATOTAL (or AELEC or ANTV) and ACR. This 
multicollinearity problem is of no surprise since the convenience good 
industries are a subset of the consumer good industries, and it is the 
consumer good industries that do the vast majority of the advertising. 
Hence, regressions will be reported using advertising intensity with and 
without CONV or CONS. 
CONS is designed to detect some non-advertising created product 
differentiation effects on concentration change, but it also detects the 
advertising created product differentiation effects on concentration 
change (e.g., the source of the multicollinearity problem). In his 
study, Scherer (1979, p. 192, footnote 3) found "considerable 
collinearity between the two variables." Therefore, positive and 
significant coefficients of advertising intensity levels with a consumer 
dummy variable included would yield stronger evidence to advertising 
intensity levels increasing concentration. However, a positive and 
significant coefficient for advertising intensity levels that becomes 
insignificant with CONS added could be due to multicollinearity and does 
not necessarily invalidate advertising intensity levels as a significant 
variablec 
Regression results for 1967-1982 
The findings of the multiple regression analyses are in general 
agreement with the descriptive statistics on concentration change and the 
simple correlations presented in Table V.8. The first four regresions 
are reported in Table V.9. 
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Table V.9. Regression results for 1967-1982. The dependent variable is 
ACR (4-firm), with various specifications ' 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 
Constant 19.69 15.84 17.05 16.81 
ICR -.09 
(-3.23)*** 
-.09 
(-3.12)*** 
-.09 
(-3.23)*** 
-.09 
(-3.13)*** 
S -1.82 
(-3.31)*** 
-1.50 
(-2.93***) 
—1.66 
(-3.06)*** 
-1.35 
(-2.56)*** 
G -2.51 
(-2.77)*** 
-2.19 
(-2.52)** 
-2.38 
(-2.66)*** 
-2.20 
(-2.42)** 
RD -4.49 
(-3.63)*** 
-3.87 
(-3.17)*** 
-3.65 
(-2.93)*** 
-5.40 
(-4.59)*** 
CONV 4.60 
(2.45)*** 
1.81 
(.89) 
CONS 4.84 
(3.92)*** 
4.32 
(3.17)*** 
AOM 2.71 
(1.41)* 
DOM -.40 
(-.12) 
R2 
.19 .22 .22 .18 
^T-ratios are in parentheses® 
Significance levels (all but RD and G) are 1-tailed tests. 
*Designates the 0.10 level of significance. 
**Designates the 0.05 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
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In equations 1-4, the ICR coefficients are consistently their 
hypothesized sign (-.09 in equations 1-4) and significant at the 1% 
level. Hence, ICR is found to have a negative influence on concentration 
change. Also, S, as expected, was negative (-1.35 to -1.82 in equations 
1-4) and significant at the 1% level. Consequently, it appears that 
industry size, ceteris paribus, leads to a decrease in concentration as 
larger size allows for the existence of more optimal-sized firms. While 
no sign was predicted for the coefficients of G and RD, both are negative 
and significant at the 1% level in the first 4 regressions (except in 
equation 4 where G is significant at the 5% level). Hence, for this 
sample, G (-2.19 to -2.51 in equations 1-4) appears to have a negative 
effect on concentration change as growth increases entry of the number of 
firms in the industry and/or growth of small firms in industries is 
greater than it is for larger firms. And RD (-3.65 to -5.40 in equations 
1-4) appears to have a deconcentrating effect as research and development 
spending facilitates entry if there is easy imitation and/or because 
smaller firms may make more efficient use of their R&D funds. 
In fact, in the remaining regression equations for 1967-1982 and 
1963-1982 (see Tables V»9-V.14), ICR, S, G and RD all remain negative and 
significant at the 1% level. And the values of their coefficients remain 
consistent within the ranges of their coefficients in Table V.9. Hence, 
these four variables prove to be consistent and very significant 
determinants of concentration change. (As pointed out in Table V.8, the 
simple correlations among ICR, S, G and RD and with other independent 
variables are small, implying that the significant relationships between 
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these variables and concentration change are not hidden because of 
multicollinearity problems.) The rest of the regression analysis for 
1967-1982 and 1963-1982 focuses on the positive determinants of 
concentration change, CONV, CONS and advertising intensity. 
As discussed in reference to Table V.8, there is considerable 
multicollinearity between CONV, CONS and the various advertising 
intensity level variables. Consequently, Tables V.9-V.13 report 
regression results for 1967-1982 with ICR, S, G and RD included in all 
equations but alternative specifications for the CONV, CONS and 
advertising intensity variables. 
Equation 1 in Table V.9 shows that CONV (used without CONS or any 
advertising intensity variables) has a positive coefficient that is 
significant at the 1% level. Thus, this finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis (as discussed in Chapter III), that advertising is more 
effective in increasing concentration in the convenience goods 
industries. Equation 2 in Table V.9 shows that CONS (without CONV or 
advertising intensity variables included) also has a positive and very 
significant effect on concentration change, implying a product 
differentiation barrier to entry exists in consumer good industries. In 
equation 3, CONV and CONS are used together without any advertising 
intensity variables. The CONS coefficient dominates and remains strong 
(4.32) and significant at the 1% level, as CONV becomes insignificant. 
But, this is not unexpected because of the multicollinearity problems 
between CONV and CONS. Lastly, in Table V.9 equation 4 reports the 
results of using AOM and DOM (outdoor and magazine advertising). AOM is 
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positive but significant only at the 10% level, while DOM is highly 
insignificant. This weak result was expected because OM is a small 
percentage of total advertising intensity and also is not as 
characteristic of national advertising as is electric advertising. OM 
was tried for completeness, but because of the weak results, even without 
CONV and CONS included in the regression equation, OM will be dropped 
from the rest of the regression analysis. The remainder of the analysis 
will focus on TOTAL, ELEC and NTV. 
Table V.IO reports the regression results for TOTAL, ELEC and NTV, 
with the average advertising intensity level variables in both linear and 
quadratic form. CONV and CONS are excluded in Tables V.IO and V.ll, but 
either CONV or CONS is included with the advertising intensity level 
variables in Table V.12 and both CONV and CONS are included with the 
advertising intensity level variables in Table V.13. 
For Table V.IO, TOTAL is included in equations 1 and 2, ELEC in 
equations 3 and 4, and NTV in equations 5 and 6, where the first of each 
set of equations reports average advertising intensity levels in linear 
form and the second reports average advertising intensity levels in 
quadratic form. The linear and quadratic equations are presented side-
by-side for easy comparison. The reasoning for testing a quadratic 
function is that in some industries (as in moderately high oligopoly), 
firms may advertise beyond the optimal amount (see Chapter II). Also, 
each equation includes the average level (e.g., ATOTAL) and the change 
(e.g., DTOTAL) of advertising intensity. (For this rationale, see 
Chapter III.) Multicollinearity between the level and change advertising 
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Table V.IO. Regression results for 1967-1982. The dependent variable is 
ACR (4-firm). Average advertising intensity level variables 
in linear and quadratic form are used, excluding CONV, 
CONS®' 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Constant 17.33 17.82 17.79 
ICR -.10 -.12 -.10 
(-3.56)*** (-3.95)*** (-3.56)*^* 
S -1.38 -1.47 -1.43 
(-2.65)*** (-2.84)*** (-2.75)*** 
RD 
ATOTAL 
-2.32 
(-2.63)*** 
-5.16 
(-4.42)*** 
1 . 1 2  
(3.07)*** 
AT0TAL2 
DTOTAL 1.37 
(2.27)** 
AELEC 
AELEC2 
DEIiEC 
-2.46 
(-2.81)*** 
-4.71 
(-4.02)*** 
2.96 
(3.39)*** 
- .20 
(-2.32)** 
1.15 
(1.91)** 
-2.40 
(-2.72)*** 
-5.13 
(-4.39)*** 
1.20 
r9.7Q^A** 
1.39 
(2.39)*** 
ANTV2 
DNTV 
.21 .23 .21 
^T-ratios are in parentheses. 
Significance levels (all but 
**Designates the 0.05 level of 
***Designates the 0.01 level of 
RD and G) are 1-tailed tests. 
significance. 
significance. 
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Table V.IO. (Continued) 
Variable Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 
Constant 
ICR 
RD 
18.65 
- .11  
(-3.83)*** 
-1.58 
(-3.02)*** 
-2.56 
(-2.92)*** 
-4.83 
(-4.13)*** 
17.70 
- .10 
(-3.53)*** 
-1.42 
(-2.73)*** 
-2.32 
(-2.62)*** 
-5.17 
(-4.44)*** 
18.26 
- .11  
(-3.93)*** 
-1.51 
(-2.91)*** 
-2.38 
(-2.73)*** 
-4.82 
(-4.14)*** 
ATOTAL 
AT0TAL2 
DTOTAL 
AELEC 
AELEC2 
3.28 
(3.12)*** 
-.25 
(-2.16)** 
ANTV 
ANTV2 
i.V? 
(1.84)** 
1.27 
(1.76)** 
2.11 
(2.69)*** 
4.95 
(2.77)*** 
-.72 
(-2.25)** 
1.60 
(1.97)** 
. 22  . 21  . 22  
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variables should not be a problem, due to the low simple correlations 
between them (see Table V.8). 
The results of Table V.IO show very strong support that both level 
and change of advertising intensity have a positive effect on 
concentration change. In equation 1, the coefficient of ATOTAL is 1.12 
(significant at the 1% level), and DTOTAL is 1.37 (significant at the 5% 
level). The quadratic form in equation 2 increases substantially the 
ATOTAL coefficient (from 1.12 to 2.96) and raises the t-statistic a 
little but somewhat lowers the coefficient and t-statistic for DTOTAL. 
2 
The quadratic ATOTAL coefficient (ATOTAL ) equals -.20 and is significant 
2 
at the 5% level. Therefore, in equation 2, ATOTAL and ATOTAL together 
have a positive effect on concentration change that increases at a 
decreasing rate until ATOTAL = 7.4%. (This is derived by taking the 
partial derivative of ACR with respect to ATOTAL.) After ATOTAL 
surpasses 7.4%, ATOTAL still has a positive effect on concentration 
change, but at a decreasing rate until ATOTAL = 14.8%. Since no 
industries in the sample have an ATOTAL > 14.8%, and only 4 industries 
(out of 269) have an ATOTAL > 7.4%, these coefficients are reasonable. 
Because the quadratic equation fits well, it appears that ATOTAL 
2 increases concentration, but at a decreasing rate. (The R also is .02 
higher in equation 2 than in equation 1.) Equations 3 and 4 for ELEC and 
5 and 6 for NTV are analogous to equations 1 and 2 for TOTAL in Table 
V.IO. Likewise, for ELEC and NTV, the average level variables (linear 
and quadratic) and difference variables are all positive and significant, 
mainly at the 1% level (a couple at the 5% level). For both DELEC and 
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DNTV, their coefficients decrease some and they lose significance from 
the 1% to the 5% level in moving to the quadratic form. But ANTV 
increases in significance (5% to 1% level) in moving to the quadratic 
form. Overall, in comparison, the linear and quadratic specifications 
both work well, although the quadratic appears to have a better fit 
2 (slightly higher R ) and is more interesting. The quadratic function 
also seems to more realistically explain how advertising intensity levels 
affect concentration change (e.g., increasing concentration, but at a 
decreasing rate for the relevant levels of advertising intensity in the 
data set). 
Lastly, with respect to Table V.10, it is interesting to compare the 
size of the coefficients for TOTAL, ELEC and NTV. In the linear 
specified equations (1, 3, 5), NTV has larger coefficients than TOTAL and 
ELEC for both average level and change. NTV also has a higher t-
statistic than TOTAL and ELEC for the change variables, while TOTAL and 
ELEC have higher t-statistics than NTV for the average level variables. 
The TOTAL and ELEC coefficients and t-statistics are very similar. 
Hence, as hypothesized, it appears that NTV has a stronger effect on 
concentration change than TOTAL or ELEC. And, in linear form for TOTAL, 
ELEC and NTV, the change variable coefficients are larger than the level 
variable coefficients. Also in linear form, the t-statistic is larger 
for the change variable than the average level variable for NTV, but 
larger for the average level variable than the change variable for TOTAL 
and ELEC. 
Table V.ll reports regression equations for TOTAL, ELEC and NTV in 
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Table V.ll. Regression results for 1967-1982. The dependent variable is 
ACR (4-firm); 1967 advertising intensity level variables in 
quadratic form are used, excluding CONV, CONS^' 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Constant 17.63 18.49 17.98 
ICR -.11 -.11 -.11 
(-3.82)*** (-3.76)*** (-3.75)*** 
S -1.43 -1.56 -1.47 
(-2.76)*** (-2.98)*** (-2.83)*** 
G -2.46 -2.51 -2.30 
(-2.80)*** (-2.86)*** (-2.63)*** 
RD -4.81 -4.83 -4.94 
(—4.09)*** (—4.12)*** (-4.22)*** 
TOTAL67 2.45 
2 (3.07)*** 
TOTAL67 —.13 
(-1.88)** 
DTOTAL 1.72 
(2.62)*** 
ELEC67 3.09 
0 (2.94)*** 
ELEC67 -.20 
(-1.96)** 
DELEC 1.90 
(3.03)*** 
NTV67 3.80 
(2=10)** 
NTV67^ -.45 
(-1.52)* 
DNTV 2.62 
0 (3.27)*** 
.22 .22 .22 
^T-ratios are in parentheses. 
Significance levels (all but RD and G) are 1-tailed tests. 
*Designates the 0.10 level of significance. 
**Designates the 0.05 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
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quadratic form using 1967 advertising intensity for the level variables. 
Arguments for using either 1967 or an average of 1967 and 1982 for 
advertising intensity levels are presented earlier in this chapter. The 
1967 levels are used here for completeness but yield similar results to 
those corresponding equations in Table V.IO. This is expected because of 
the high correlations between ATOTÂL and TOTAL67, and AELEC and ELEC67 
and ANTV and NTV67 (see Table V.8). 
Table V.12 shows how the regression results of Table V.IO will 
change when either CONV or CONS are added. As discussed earlier in 
reference to Table V.8 (the correlation matrix), positive and significant 
advertising intensity level coefficients with CONV or CONS added would 
yield stronger evidence that advertising intensity levels have a positive 
effect on concentration charge. However, a positive and significant 
coefficient for advertising intensity levels that becomes insignificant 
with CONV or CONS added could be due to multlcollinearity and does not 
necessarily invalidate advertising intensity level as a significant 
determinant of concentration change. 
The first 3 equations report TOTAL, ELEC and NTV in quadratic form 
with CONV included» The advertising intensity level variables dominate 
CONV, as CONV becomes mainly insignificant. However, the change and 
levels forms of TOTAL, ELEC and NTV remain significant at the 5% or 1% 
levels. Again, NTV has larger coefficients for change and level than do 
TOTAL and ELEC. 
Equations 4-6 report TOTAL, ELEC, and NTV In quadratic form with 
CONS Included. In equations 4 and 5, both CONS and TOTAL (or ELEC) in 
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Table V.12. Regression results for 1967-1982. The dependent variable is 
ACR (4-firm). Average advertising intensity level variables 
in linear and quadratic form are used, including CONV or 
CONS*' 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Constant 
ICR 
S 
G 
RD 
CONV 
CONS 
ATOTAL 
ATOTAL^ 
DTOTAL 
AELEC 
18.88 
- . 1 2  
(—3.96)*** 
-1.64 
(-3.05)*** 
-2.65 
(-2.98)*** 
-4.33 
(-3.55)*** 
2.59 
(1.15) 
2.41 
(2.43)*** 
-.17 
(-1.81)** 
1.34 
(2.14)** 
AELEC 
ANTV 
ANTV 
DNTV 
2 
.2: 
19.47 19.47 
- . 1 1  
(-3.84)*** 
-1.71 
(-3.17)*** 
-2.74 
(-3.06)*** 
-4.48 
(-3.68)*** 
2.35 
(1 .00)  
- . 1 2  
(-3.97)*** 
-1.71 
(-3.17)*** 
-2.65 
(-2.97)*** 
-4.32 
(-3.54)*** 
2.90 
(1.34)* 
2.61  
(2.10)** 
- .20 
( -1 .61 )*  
1.25 
(2.04)** 
.23 
3.82 
(1.94)** 
—.60 
(-1.81)** 
1.80 
(2.19)** 
.23 
^T-ratios are in parentheses. 
Significance levels (all but RD and G) are 1-tailed tests. 
*Designates the 0.10 level of significance. 
**Designates the 0.05 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
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Table V.12. (Continued) 
Variable Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 
Constant 16.55 17.09 16.67 
ICR -.11 -.10 -.11 
(—3.60)*** (-3.59)*** (-3.63)*** 
S -1.47 -1.54 -1.49 
(-2.85)*** (-2.97)*** (-2.91)*** 
G -2.40 -2.50 -2.39 
(-2.75)*** (-2.87)*** (-2.78)*** 
RD -4.04 -4.04 -3.91 
(-3.32)*** (-3.32)*** (-3.23)*** 
CONV 
CONS 2.97 3.19 3.47 
(1.95)** (2.21)** (2.46)*** 
ATOTAL 1.85 
2 (1.78)** 
ATOTAL -.12 
(-1.31)* 
DTOTAL 1.08 
(1.80)** 
AELEC 2.02 
2 (1.70)** 
AELEC -.15 
(-1.24) 
DELEC 1.02 
(1.74)** 
ANTV 2.82 
(1-43)* 
ANTV -.45 
(-1.34)* 
DNTV 1.62 
(2.02)** 
R^ .24 .24 .24 
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Table V.12. (Continued) 
Variable Equation 7 Equation 8 Equation 9 
Constant 
ICR 
RD 
CONV 
CONS 
ATOTAL 
DTOTAL 
AELEC 
DELEC 
ANTV 
DNTV 
15.95 
-.10 
(-3.38)*** 
-1.42 
(-2.76)*** 
-2.31 
(-2.65)*** 
-4.08 
(-3.35)*** 
3.80 
(2.74)*** 
.60 
(1.47)* 
1.71 
(1.96)** 
16.31 
-.10 
(-3.43)*** 
—1.46 
(-2.83)*** 
-2.40 
(-2.77)*** 
-4.03 
(-3.31)*** 
3.83 
(2.84)*** 
ï66 
(1,42)* 
1.17 
(2.02)** 
16.08 
- .10 
(-3.41)*** 
-1.44 
(-2.81)*** 
-2.35 
(-2.72)*** 
-3.94 
(-3.25)*** 
4.09 
(3.06)*** 
.38 
(.50) 
1.91 
(2.46)*** 
.23 .23 .24 
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both level and change forms are positive and remain significant at the 5% 
level. In equation 6, CONS remains significant at the 1% level while the 
significance of the coefficient of ANTV drops to the 10% level and DNTV 
remains significant at the 5% level. Therefore, both the level and 
change forms of advertising intensity (except for ANTV) remain very 
significant even with CONS included as another independent variable. 
This provides stronger evidence that advertising intensity (level and 
change) has led to higher concentration in the 1967-1982 period for U.S. 
manufacturing industries. 
Equations 7-9 report TOTAL, ELEC and NTV in linear form with CONS 
included. Because the linear model does not fit the data as well as the 
quadratic model, and also due to the multicollinearity between 
advertising intensity level and CONS, the advertising intensity level 
variables are dominated by the CONS, as CONS remains significant at the 
1% level in equations 7-9, but ATOTAL and AELEC fall to the 10% level of 
significance and ANTV is not significant at all. But, DTOTAL, DELEC, and 
DNTV are all significant at the 1% or 5% levels. 
Table V. 13 reports TOTAL, ELEC, and NTV in quadratic form with both 
CONV and CONS included. As expected, the t-statistics for CONV, CONS and 
advertising intensity level are weakened because of multicollinearity 
between CONV, CONS and advertising intensity level. CONV is 
insignificant but CONS is still significant at the 5% level. ATOTAL and 
AELEC fall in significance to the 10% level while ANTV is not significant 
at all. However, because of the low multicollinearity between CONV, CONS 
and the advertising intensity level variables with the 
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Table V.13. Regression results for 1967-1982. The dependent variable is 
ACR (4-firm). Average advertising intensity level variables 
in quadratic form are used, including CONV and CONS 
together*' 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Constant 17.63 17.63 17.50 
ICR -.10 -.10 —. 10 
(-3.62)*** (-3.60)*** (-3.66)*** 
S -1.59 -1.62 -1.61 
(-2.95)*** (-3.01)*** • (-3.00)*** 
G -2.54 —2.60 -2.55 
(-2.85)*** (-2.92)*** (-2,87)*** 
RD -3.83 -3.88 -3.70 
(-3.07)*** (-3.11)*** (-2.97)*** 
CONV 1.79 1.32 1.67 
(.77) (.55) (.75) 
CONS 2.73 3.01 3.19 
(1.76)** (2.04)** (2.18)** 
ATOTAL 1.57 
2 (1.42)* 
ATOTAL -.11 
(-1.09) 
DTOTAL 1.22 
(1.94)** -
AELEC 1.71 
0 (1.30)* 
AELEC -.13 
(-1.01) 
DELEC 1.11 
(1.82)** 
ANTV 2.34 
(1.13) 
ANTV -.40 
(-1.18) 
DNTV 1.74 
9 
(2.12)** 
R"^ 
CM 
.24 .24 
^T-ratios are in parentheses. 
Significance levels (all but RD and G) are 1-tailed tests. 
*Designates the 0.10 level of significance. 
**Designates the 0.05 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
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advertising intensity change variables, DTOTAL, DELEC, and DNTV all 
remained significant at the 5% level. 
In sum, for the 1967-1982 period, DTOTAL, DELEC and DNTV are always 
positive and significant at the 1% or 5% level, regardless of the model 
or specification. CONV, CONS, ATOTAL, AELEC and ANTV are all positive 
and highly significant by themselves. But probably due to 
multicollinearity, these t-statistics are weakened when used together. 
Yet, when ATOTAL, AELEC or ANTV are used with CONS in a quadratic form, 
ATOTAL and AELEC remain significant at the 5% level (ANTV drops to the 
10% level). Consequently, these results show that both the change and 
level advertising intensity- variables have a significant positive effect 
on concentration change, with the NTV coefficients usually being higher. 
Thus, it appears that network TV advertising is the medium with the 
strongest effect on concentration change. 
Regression results for 1963-1982 
Nine regression equations for 1963-1982 are presented in Table V,14, 
Equations 1-3 report the average TOTAL, ELEC and NTV levels in quadratic 
form without CONV or CONS. As before, the coefficients of the ATOTAL, 
AELEC and ANTV variables are significant, and the t-statistics are quite 
high for both the average level and average level squared terms. The 
2 
coefficients are also quite large, especially for NTV (ANTV = 6.23, ANTV 
= -.91). Hence, the level of advertising intensity has a positive effect 
on concentration change for 1963-1982, as was found for the 1967-1982 
period. 
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Table V.14. Regression results for 1963-1982. The dependent variable, ts 
ACR (4-firm). Average advertising intensity level variables 
in quadratic form are used, including CONS in equations 4, 
5 and 6*' 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Constant 21.15 22.17 21.55 
ICR —. 16 -.15 —. 16 
(-5.30)*** (-5.10)*** (-5.22)*** 
S -1.74 -1.88 -1.75 
(-3.06)*** (-3.26)*** (-3.06)*** 
G -2.09 -2.14 -2.05 
(-3=49)*** (-3,56)*** (-3,41)*** 
RD -4.80 -5.00 -5.02 
(-3.78)*** (-3.94)*** (-3.96)*** 
ATOTAL 3.78 
2 (4.09)*** 
ATOTAL —.28 
(-3.07)*** 
DTOTAL .70 
(1.08) 
AELEC 4.07 
9 (3.63)*** 
AELEC -.33 
(-2.70)*** 
DELEC .55 
(.86) 
AÎJTV 6.23 
0 (3.27)*** 
ANTV -.91 
(-2.65)*** 
DNTV 1.01 
f \ 1 £.\ 
0 \ .  i  .  xu/  
R^ to
 
.27 .26 
^T-ratios are in parentheses. 
^Significance levels (all but RD and G) are 1-tailed tests. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
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Table V.14. (Continued) 
Variable Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 
Constant 
ICR 
S 
G 
RD 
CONS 
ATOTAL 
ATOTAL^ 
DTOTAL 
AELEC 
AELEC^ 
DELEC 
ANTV 
ANTV^ 
DNTV 
2 
19.37 
14 
(-4.76)*** 
-1.75 
(-3.10)*** 
-2.01 
(-3.38)*** 
-3.93 
(-3.01)*** 
4.09 
(2.51)*** 
2.25 
(2.05)** 
-.18 
(-1.77)** 
.60 
(.93) 
19.88 
-. 14 
(-4.70)*** 
-1.84 
(-3.23)*** 
-2.05 
(-3.43)*** 
-3.95 
(-3.02)*** 
4.47 
(2.88)*** 
2.28 
(1 .81)** 
- .20  
(-1.50)* 
.45 
(.70) 
19.32 
-.14 
(-4.75)*** 
-1.74 
(-3.09)*** 
-2.00 
(-3.38)*** 
-3.86 
(-2.96)*** 
4.70 
(3.10)*** 
.29 = 29 
3.30 
(1.57)* 
-.54 
(=1.51)* 
1.02 
(1.19) 
.29 
*Designates the 0.10 level of significance. 
**Designates the 0.05 level of significance. 
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Table V.14. (Continued) 
Variable Equation 7 Equation 8 Equation 9 
Constant 
ICR 
RD 
ATOTAL 
DTOTAL 
AELEC 
DELEC 
ANTV 
DNTV 
R: 
20.68 
-.15 
(-4.82)*** 
-1.61 
(-2,80)*** 
-2.03 
(-3.33)*** 
-5.39 
(-4.23)*** 
1.20 
(3.07)*** 
1.01  
(1.55)* 
21.16 
-.15 
(-4.80)*** 
-1.68 
(-2.90)*** 
-2.06 
(-3.39)*** 
-5.35 
(-4.19)*** 
1.31 
(2.84)*** 
.95 
(1.52)* 
21.00 
-. 14 
(-4.78)*** 
-1.65 
(-2.85)*** 
-2.03 
(-3.33)*** 
-5.43 
(-4.27)*** 
1 . 6 1  
(2.07)** 
.25 .24 
1.65 
.25 
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However, the difference variables (DTOTAL, DELEC, DNTV) all fail to 
be significant in equations 1-9. (In all the equations for 1967-1982 
presented earlier, DTOTAL, DELEC and DNTV were always significant at the 
1% or the 5% level.) The reason for this difference in findings is not 
clear. The simple correlation coefficients for 1963-1982 (similar to 
Table V.8 for 1967-1982) were checked, but nothing that could explain 
this change was detected. However, two points can be stated. First, the 
change variables are for 1967-1982 (due to the available data) and thus 
do not coincide with the concentration change period, 1963-1982. Second, 
periods that begin in 1963 seem to be atypical periods of concentration 
change. In fact, the poor results from Input Output advertising 
intensity data used in several of the earlier concentration change 
studies (Ornstein and Lustgarten, 1978; Asch, 1979; Scherer, 1979; Levy, 
1985) occur for periods starting in 1963. When Mueller and Rogers (1984) 
divided the concentration change period that they tested into 2 
subperiods, 1947-1963 and 1963-1977, the 1963-1977 results were weaker. 
However, with 3 subperiods (1947-1958, 1958-1967, and 1967-1977), the 
1958-1967 and 1967-1977 periods had similar results. Mueller and Rogers 
(1984, p. 11) state 2 possible reasons for 1963 being an atypical year: 
Again we see the weakest results are from periods that begin in 
1963. Perhaps either a very short-run equilibrium between 
advertising and concentration change was reached around 1963 or, 
alternatively, the period has a few too many unpredicted 
concentration changes that prevent the results from reaching 
conventional significance levels. In any event, the significant 
concentrating effect of advertising continued beyond 1963 with the 
1967-77 period displaying values with equal magnitude to that for 
the 1958-67 period. 
Equations 4-6 in Table V.14 report the average TOTAL, ELEC, and NTV 
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levels in quadratic form with CONS included. CONS is consistently 
positive and significant at the 1% level. DTOTAL, DELEC and DNTV all 
2 
remain insignificant. ATOTAL, ATOTAL and AELEC are all significant at 
the 5% level and AELEC^, ANTV and ANTV^ all are significant at the 10% 
level. Thus, even with the multicollinearity present due to including 
CONS with advertising intensity level variables, the average advertising 
intensity levels remain somewhat significant. 
For completeness, equations 7-9 in Table V.14 report the average 
TOTAL, ELEC and NTV levels in linear form, excluding CONS. Here, ATOTAL 
and AELEC are significant at the 1% level and ANTV is significant at the 
5% level, while DTOTAL and DELEC are significant at the 10% level and 
DNTV is significant at the 5% level. Therefore, the quadratic and linear 
models perform similarly for 1963-1982. The quadratic model yields a 
2 higher R value and slightly more significant coefficients for the 
advertising intensity level variables, but the linear model produces more 
significant coefficients for the advertising intensity change variables. 
Regression results for 1963-1972 and 1972-1982 
Results for 10- and 5-year subperiods are presented to see how the 
independent variables (especially the advertising intensity variables) 
vary between and among subperiods. Because the results of TOTAL and ELEC 
have been similar for 1967-1982 and 1963-1982, only TOTAL and NTV will be 
reported for subperiod analysis. And, the advertising intensity change 
variables will be dropped because the available data (change of 1967 to 
1982) do not correspond to any of the subperiods. Also, concentration 
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changes slowly; hence, the independent variables (as the determinates of 
concentration change) will tend to have smaller coefficients and t-
statistics. Because of this, coupled with the multicollinearity between 
CONV, CONS and advertising intensity levels, CONV and CONS will be 
excluded in the subperiod analysis. 
Mueller and Rogers (1984, p. 9) give the following caution about 
examining such short periods: 
Since structural change is seldom rapid, we hesitate to examine 
such short periods of time. The results are likely to be unstable 
and lacking much explanatory power. However, with this caution in 
mind we proceeded in hopes that the results would help us trace the 
adjustment process (if any) over the longer time period. 
In Table V.15, equations 1-4 report average and 1967 advertising 
intensity levels in quadratic form for 1963—1972 and equations 5 and 6 
report average advertising intensity levels in quadratic form for 1972-
1982. In all 6 equations, ICR and RD remain negative and significant at 
the 1% level. RD continues to be highly significant and has relatively 
large coefficients (-2.66 to -2.99). S also remains consistently 
negative at the 1% or 5% level for 1963-1972 and at the 1% level in 1972-
1982. 6 remains negative but is insignificarit. 
The significance of the advertising intensity variables varies. In 
2 
equation 1, ATOTAL and ATOTAL are significant at the 1% level, while 
2 
TOTAL67 and TOTAL67 in equation 3 are significant at only the 10% level. 
This is somewhat surprising since the correlation between ATOTAL and 
TOTAL67 is .96. Similarly for network TV, ANTV in equation 2 has 
stronger results than NTV67 in equation 4, where the NTV67 coefficient is 
insignificant. Hence, the average advertising intensity level data show 
[ 
I 
I 
! 
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Table V.15. Regression results for 1963-1972 and 1972-1982. The 
dependent variable Is ACR (4-firm). Average and 1967 
advertising intensity variables in quadratic form are used, 
excluding CONV and CONS^' 
1963-1972 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 
Constant 
ICR 
S 
G 
RD 
ATOTAL 
ATOTAL^ 
T0TAL67 
TOTAL67^ 
ANTV 
ANTV^ 
NTV67 
? 
10.97 
-.08 
(-3.83)*** 
-.92 
(-2.42)*** 
-.70 
(-.77) 
-2.66 
(-3.07)*** 
1.85 
(2.97)*** 
-.17 
(-2.78)*** 
10.94 
-.07 
(-3.58)*** 
-.90 
(-2.32)** 
—.64 
(-.69) 
-2.89 
(-3.32)*** 
2.06 
(1.68)** 
-.32 
(-1,41)* 
10.83 
-.07 
(-3.54)*** 
-.90 
(-2.32)** 
-.63 
(- .68) 
-2.86 
(-3.26)*** 
.92 
(1.59)* 
-.07 
(-1.31)* 
10.79 
-.07 
(-3.45)*** 
-.90 
(-2.32)** 
—.51 
(-.55) 
-2.99 
(-3.44)*** 
.15 .13 .13 
1.48 
( 1 . 1 2 )  
- .18  
(-.83) 
.13 
fT-ratios are in parentheses. 
Significance levels (all but RD and G) are 1-tailed tests. 
*Designates the 0.10 level of significance. 
**Designates the 0.05 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
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Table V.15. (Continued) 
Variable Equation 5 
1972-1982 
Equation ô 
Constant 
ICR 
RD 
ATOTAL 
ATOTAL^ 
TOTAL67 
TOTAL67' 
ANTV 
2 
ANTV 
12.29 
-.09 
(-3.57)*** 
-1.07 
(-2.57)*** 
-1.49 
( -1 .26)  
-2.73 
(-2.83)*** 
2 .10  
(2.87)*** 
-.14 
(-1.95)** 
12.41 
-.09 
(-3.66)*** 
-1.09 
(-2.62)*** 
-1.34 
(-1.14) 
-2.81 
(-2.94)*** 
4:95 
(3.53)*** 
-.72 
(-2.80)*** 
NTV67 
r2 
.13 .14 
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better results than the 1967 advertising intensity level for 1963-1972. 
But for 1967-1982 (see Tables V.10 and V.11), the two variables did 
perform similarly. The reason for the difference in results for these 
two variables for 1963-1972 is not clear. 
Both ATOTAL and ANTV are highly significant in 1972-1982. In 
comparison, ATOTAL has similar results in 1963-1972, while ANTV has 
stronger results in 1972-1982. This is not surprising since network TV 
advertising probably is the strongest form of national advertising, has 
more advantages than any other medium for large advertisers, and this 
increasing importance of network TV advertising is reflected by the fact 
that its prices have increased recently more than the prices of other 
advertising media (Levmore, 1978, p. 13). 
Regression results for 5-year subperiods of 1963-1982 
Tables V.16-V.18 report the 5-year subperiod results. Since a 5-
year period is a relatively short time span for industry structural 
change to occur, it is anticipated that the results in general will be 
weaker than those found when longer periods are examined. 
Table V.16 reports the 1963-1967 results. ICR, S, G and RD all 
remain negative, but only ICR is significant (at the 1% level). As with 
the 1963-1972 period, the ATOTAL variable is quite significant and 
stronger than TOTAL67. Also, TOTAL (average or 1967) is more significant 
than NTV. 
Table V.17 reports the 1967-1972 results. Here, S and RD are both 
negative and significant at the 1% level, while ICR is negative 
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Table V.16. Regression results for 1963-1967. The dependent variable is 
ACR (4-firm). Average and 1967 advertising intensity 
variables in quadratic form are used, excluding CONV and 
CONS®' 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 
Constant 5.32 5.50 5.42 5.62 
ICR —.06 -.06 —.06 —.06 
(-4.27)*** (-4.14)*** (-4.22)*** (-4.26)*** 
S -.23 -.22 -.23 -.25 
(-.92) (-.88) (-.91) (-1.01) 
G -1.33 -1.42 -1.36 -1.36 
(-1.32) (-1.40) (-1.35) (-1.35) 
RD -.19 -.28 -.23 -.28 
(-.34) (-.50) (-.41) (-.50) 
ATOTAL .94 
2 (2.34)*** 
ATOTAL -.09 
(-2.20)** 
T0TAL67 .62 
2 (1.69)** 
T0TAL67 -.04 
(-1.34)* 
ANTV 1.11 
2 (1.41)* 
ANTV -.16 
(-1.12) 
NTV67 1.33 
2 (1.57)* 
NTV67 -.15 
(-1.10) 
,2 
.09 = 08 .09 .09 
®T-ratios are in parentheses. 
Significance levels (all but RD and G) are 1-tailed tests. 
*Designates the 0.10 level of significance. 
**Designates the 0.05 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
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Table V.17, Regression results for 1967-1972. The dependent variable 
is ACR (4-firm). Average and 1967 advertising intensity 
variables in quadratic form are used, excluding CONV and 
CONS*' 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 
Constant 6.03 5.88 5.72 5.60 
ICR -.03 -.03 -.03 -.02 
(-1.72)** (-1.55)* (-1.42)* (-1.33)* 
S -.78 -.76 -.75 -.74 
(-2.48)*** (-2.42)*** (-2.38)*** (-2.34)*** 
G 1.15 1.27 1.31 1.38 
(1.00) (1.11) (1.14) (1.21) 
RD -2.36 -2.48 -2.52 -2.56 
(-3.33)*** (-3.51)*** (-3.53)*** (-3.62)*** 
ATOTAL .87 
2 (1.63)* 
ATOTAL -.08 
(-1.54)* 
TOTAL67 .24 
0 (.50) 
TOTAL67 -.02 
(-.43) 
ANTV .91 
2 (.89) 
ANTV -.15 
(-.78) 
NTV67 ,21 
? (.19) 
NTV67 -.03 
(-.19) 
R2 
.10 .09 .09 .09 
^T-ratios are in parentheses. 
Significance levels (all but RD and G) are 1-tailed tests. 
*Designates the 0.10 level of significance. 
**Besignates the 0.05 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
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but not as significant as for 1963-1967. G becomes positive but 
insignificant. And, the advertising intensity level variables are all 
insignificant (except ATOTAL, which is significant only at the 10% 
level). This could lend support to Scherer's idea (1980, p. 116) that 
"the concentration increasing impact of intense advertising appears to 
have ceased and perhaps reversed by the early to mid 1960s, perhaps 
coinciding with both consumers' and advertisers' increased maturity in 
relating to television as a medium of information and persuasion." 
However, Table V.18 shows that for both ATOTAL and ANTV, the 
coefficients and level of significant increase for 1972-1977 and even 
more for 1977-1982. In particular for 1977-1982, both ATOTAL, ATOTAL^ 
2 
and ANTV, ANTV are highly significant, with the network TV intensity 
level showing larger coefficients than total advertising level (ANTV = 
2 
3.09 and ANTV = -.52) and strong t-statistics (near 3.0 for both). 
If any pattern can be concluded from advertising intensity levels 
affecting concentration changes in the 5-year periods from 1963 to 1982, 
it is that advertising intensity has not ceased to have an impact on 
increasing concentration, as Scherer hypothesized. Instead, the effects 
of advertising intensity levels (especially for NTV) seem to be 
increasingly important in each successive 5-year period since 1967. 
However, one might expect this effect to slow down some time in future 
periods after 1982, if the average 4-firm concentration in manufacturing 
for consumer goods reaches the point of very high concentration. The 
average 4-firm concentration in this study's sample for consumer goods 
was 42.9 in 1982, but 59.3 for industries with ATOTAL greater than or 
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Table V.18. Regression results for 1972-1977 and 1977-1982. The 
dependent variable is ACR (4-firm). Average advertising 
intensity variables in quadratic form are used, excluding 
CONV and CONS^' 
Variable 
1972-1977 
Equation 1 Equation 2 
1977-1982 
Equation 3 Equation 4 
Constant 7.73 7.84 3.27 3.28 
ICR -.05 -.05 -.04 -.04 
(-2.73)*** (-2.83)*** (-2.14)** (-2.19)** 
S -.81 -.83 -.31 -.31 
(-2.78)*** (-2.85)*** (-1.08) (-1.07) 
G -.29 -.18 .88 .93 
(-.23) (-.14) (.60) (.64) 
RD -1.25 -1.27 -1.70 -1.72 
(-1.85)* (-1.90)** (-2.43)** (-2.49)** 
ATOTAL .67 1.30 
2 (1.33)* (2.37)*** 
ATOTAL -.03 -.10 
(-.63) (-1.91)** 
TOTAL67 
T0TÂL67' 
ANTV 
ANTV^ 
NTV67 
NTV67 
r2 
1.69 
(1.73)** 
- .18  
(-1.1 
3.09 
(2.94)*** 
-.52 
(-2,74)*** 
.08 .uo 
yT-ratios are in parentheses. 
Significance levels (all but RD and G) are 1-tailed tests. 
*Designates the 0.10 level of significance. 
**Designates the 0.05 level of significance. 
***Designates the 0.01 level of significance. 
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equal to 2%. Hence, there is still room for advertising intensity to 
continue to effect increased concentration in the near future, but not as 
much room that there was in the 1963-1982 period. 
Lastly, with respect to Table V.18, ICR remains negative and quite 
significant for 1972-1977 and 1977-1982. S remains negative and 
significant at the 1% level for 1972-1977 but insignificant for 1977-
1982. RD also remains negative, at the 10% level of significance, for 
1972-1977 and at the 5% level of significance for 1977-1982. G is 
negative for 1972-1977 and positive for 1977-1982, but insignificant. 
In sum, for ICR, S, G and RD for the 5-year subperiods, all 
coefficients were always negative (except for G for 1967-1972 and 1977-
1982). ICR was always significant, either at the 1% or 5% level except 
for being significant at the 10% level in 3 equations for 1967-1972. S 
was significant at the 1% level for 1967-1972 and 1972-1977. But S was 
insignificant for 1963-1967, and 1977-1982. RD was insignificant for 
1963-1967, and significant at 10%, 5% or 1% levels thereafter. And G was 
never significant. Overall, the ICR, S, and RD results in 5-year 
analysis are consistent with the larger period analysis. But because 
structural change (which is reflected in concentration change) occurs 
slowly, the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics are in general 
smaller, as expected. Only G was consistently insignificant for the 5-
2 year results. Also, the R statistics in the 5-year periods are roughly 
one-third of what they are in the 1967-1982 period. This implies that 
the effects of the independent variables on concentration change are 
stronger in the longer periods, as expected. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter I of this dissertation contained a brief introduction to the 
two opposing theoretical views of how advertising affects competition. 
However, it was pointed out that this controversy can, in part, be 
resolved by separating advertising into two types, retail and national. 
Retail advertising tends to contain a high degree of Information and, 
therefore, is likely to be competitive, while national advertising tends 
to contain a high degree of persuasion and, therefore, is more likely to 
be anticompetitive. Case studies of both retail and national advertising 
were presented, followed by an overview of this dissertation. To test 
the anticompetitive effects of national advertising for a broad segment 
of American Industries, a concentration change regression model was 
proposed with advertising intensities (levels and changes) as the main 
independent variables. 
Chapter II contained a review of the relevant literature. Each of 
ten previous studies used one of three different sources of advertising 
intensity data in a concentration change model. The findings of these 
studies were Summarized. 
Chapter III presented the economic rationale for the inclusion of 
each independent variable in the regressions used in this study. Besides 
levels and changes of advertising intensity, the independent variables 
Included the initial concentration ratio, size, growth and three dummy 
variables for industries with significant research and development, 
convenience good industries and consumer good industries. 
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Chapter IV discussed the sample of industries used in this study and 
how each variable was constructed and the source of the data for each 
variable. LNA advertising data (consisting mainly of national 
advertising) were used to construct the advertising intensity variables. 
This time-consuming process was discussed in some detail along with the 
advantages of LNA data over other sources of advertising data used in 
previous studies. 
Chapter V reported the empirical results. First, some descriptive 
statistics for the LNA advertising intensity variables were presented. 
It was noted that network TV advertising intensity is the largest and 
fastest-growing component of total advertising intensity, increasing from 
37% in 1967 to 53% in 1982. Also, the simple correlations among the 
various different LNA advertising intensities were presented and 
discussed. 
Second, some descriptive statistics for concentration change were 
presented. For the 269 industries in the sample, the average 4-firm 
concentration ratio (CR4) exhibited little change between 1963 and 1982, 
increasing by 0.8 percentage points. However, when the industries were 
categorized as consumer good or producer good industries, the producer 
good industries showed a concentration decrease (1.8 points), while the 
consumer good industries experienced an increase (5.9 points). The 
difference in these trends was attributed to differences in advertising 
and other product differentiation barriers to entry. 
When the sample was classified into categories having high (H), 
medium (M) and low (L) levels of advertising intensity, a similar pattern 
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was found. The average CR4 among the H industries increased 5.1 points, 
compared to an increase of 2.2 points for the M industries and a decrease 
of 0.2 points for the L industries. 
Third, the regression results were presented. The main period 
focused upon was 1967-1982. The 1963-1982 period and subperiods were 
examined more briefly. These regression results were in general 
agreement with the descriptive statistics on concentration change. A. 
brief summary and conclusion of the regression results for each 
independent variable is reported below. 
Initial Concentration Ratio (ICR) 
The ICR coefficient was negative and significant at the 1% level in 
all equations except for the 1967-1972 and 1977-1982 subperiod equations, 
for which ICR was still negative and significant at the 5% or 10% levels. 
This consistent and significant finding for ICR in concentration change 
models has been found in past research. Hence, when ICR is low, 
concentration increases are more likely than when ICR is high. 
Size (S) 
The S coefficient also was always negative and significant at the 1% 
or 5% levels, except for the 1963-1967 and 1977-1982 subperiod equations. 
Hence, it appears that industry size, ceteris paribus, has a 
deconcentrating effect, as larger size allows for the existence of more 
optimal-sized firms. In past research, Mueller and Hamm (1974), Wright 
(1978), Scherer (1979), Mueller and Rogers (1980, 1984) and Rogers (1982) 
also used size as an independent variable in a concentration change 
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model. In these previous studies, the coefficient of S has been 
consistently negative, but not always significant. 
Growth (G) 
Growth (like ICR) is one of the two independent variables most often 
used in past concentration change studies. These past results have been 
mixed (both for sign and significance of the coefficients). However, the 
expected sign of G is ambiguous since there are economic arguments that G 
can both positively and negatively affect concentration change. 
Rogers (1982) offers an explanation for these mixed results. He 
argues that growth will have a negative effect on concentration change if 
growth allows net entry of firms into an industry, ceteris paribus, 
reducing concentration. However, if little net entry takes place (due to 
barriers to entry) or net entry is included as another independent 
variable, the G coefficient will tend to be positive as large firms 
expand more efficiently than smaller firms as an industry grows. 
For this study, the G coefficient was always negative and 
significant at the 1% or 5% levels for 1963-1982 and 1967-1982. Not 
surprisingly, the results were mixed for the subperiod analyses. 
Therefore, in the longer periods of this study, it appears that G does 
have a negative effect on concentration change as G allows for net entry 
of firms into an industry and/or existing smaller firms grow more rapidly 
than existing large firms. 
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Research and Development Dummy Variable (RD) 
The RD coefficient was found to be consistently negative and 
significant at the 1% level except for the 5-year subperiod equations. 
This is in agreement with the findings of Mukhopadhyay (1985). Thus, it 
appears that RD has a negative effect on concentration change. 
Convenience Good Dummy Variable (CONV) 
CONV was used by Porter (1974) as an independent variable in a 
profit rate model, tested for a cross-section of industries. However, 
this study was the first to use CONV in a concentration change model. 
The expected CONV coefficient was positive because advertising is 
hypothesized to be more effective at product differentiation and image 
building for convenience type consumer goods. 
The findings of this study are consistent with this hypothesis. The 
CONV coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level when CONS 
and advertising intensity levels are excluded. But CONV becomes 
insignificant when CONS or advertising intensity levels are included» 
probably due to multicollinearity. 
Consumer Good Dummy Variable (CONS) 
CONS was included in some equations for 1963—1982 and 1967-1982. 
When advertising intensity levels were excluded, the CONS coefficients 
were positive and significant at the 1% level. The t-statistics fell 
some when advertising intensity levels were included (due to 
multicollinearity), but CONS remained significant at the 1% or 5% levels. 
As in past research, CONS has a strong positive and significant effect on 
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concentration change. This is attributed to the product differentiation 
barrier to entry of consumer good industries (in which advertising plays 
an important role in creating this product differentiation). 
Advertising Intensity (Levels and Changes) 
LNA data were used to construct the advertising intensity variables 
(levels and changes). It was hypothesized that the advertising intensity 
variables constructed from these data would have positive effects on 
concentration change because: (1) LNA data are heavily represented by 
national advertising; (2) there exist various real and pecuniary scale 
advantages in advertising; (3) some forms of advertising cost so much 
(especially network TV) that it creates an absolute cost barrier to 
entry; (4) large firms benefit by a number of restrictive practices in 
advertising; (5) there exist a number of advertising characteristics that 
favor larger firms; and (6) larger firms are the favorite customers of 
advertising agencies and receive preferential treatment. Furthermore, 
since these factors apply especially well to network TV; the network TV 
advertising intensity coefficients (levels and changes) were expected to 
be larger than those for other types of advertising intensities. 
The regression results support the above hypotheses; it appears that 
advertising intensity (levels and changes) does have a positive and 
significant effect on concentration change for the period 1967-1982. For 
1967-1982J total, electronic and network TV advertising intensities 
(levels and changes) were always positive (except for the squared term of 
the quadratic form, which was always negative as expected) and generally 
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significant at the 1% or 5% levels. Five basic points can be concluded 
from the advertising intensity results. 
First, the advertising intensity level and change variables had very 
low simple correlation coefficients, implying that the two do not move 
together and that both could be used together as independent variables in 
an equation without multicollinearity problems. 
Second, the regression results for the quadratic form of advertising 
intensity levels did fit the data well, implying that advertising 
intensity levels increase concentration, but at a decreasing rate. The 
reasoning for testing a quadratic function is that in some industries (as 
moderately high oligopoly), firms may advertise beyond the optimal 
amount. 
Third, it was hypothesized that network TV advertising intensities 
(levels and changes) would have stronger effects on concentration change 
than other types of advertising intensities. This hypothesis was 
supported by the findings. Network TV advertising intensity (both level 
and changes) generally had larger coefficients than their total or 
electric advertising intensity counterparts. As for the significance, 
network TV advertising intensity change usually had larger t-s£atistics 
than total and electric advertising intensity changes, while total and 
electric advertising intensity levels usually had larger t-statistics 
than network TV advertising intensity level. 
Fourth, the total and electronic advertising intensity level 
coefficients remained positive and significant (usually at the 5% level) 
even when a consumer dummy variable (CONS) was included in the equation. 
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CONS was included to capture some non-advertising created product 
differentiation effects on concentration change. However, due to 
multicollinearity between CONS and the advertising intensity variables, 
when the two are used together, the level of significance was reduced for 
both variables. Nevertheless, these positive and significant 
coefficients of the total and electronic advertising intensity levels 
with CONS included yield stronger evidence that advertising intensity 
levels increase concentration. 
Fifth, from the subperiod analyses (especially the 5-year periods), 
if any pattern can be concluded from the advertising intensity levels and 
their effect on concentration change, it is that advertising intensity 
has not ceased to have an impact on increasing concentration, as Scherer 
(1980) hypothesized. Instead, the effects of advertising intensity 
levels (especially for network TV) on concentration change seem to be 
getting increasingly larger in each successive 5-year period since 1967. 
151 
REFERENCES 
Adams, Jean W., and Keith Heimforth. "Conglomerate Mergers and 
Competition: Evidence from 1967 to 1977." The Antitrust Bulletin 
31 (Spring 1986): 133-153. 
Asch, Peter. "The Role of Advertising in Changing Concentration, 1963-
1972." Southern Economic Journal 46, No. 1 (July 1979): 288-297. 
Bain, Joe S. Barriers to New Competition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1956. 
Benham, Lee. "The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses." 
Journal of Law and Economics 15 (October 1972): 337-352. 
Blair, John M. Economic Concentration. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 
Jovanovich, 1972. 
Blake, Harland, and John A. Blum. "Network Television Rate Practices: 
Case Study in the Failure of Social Control of Price 
Discrimination." Yale Law Journal 74, No. 8 (July 1965): 1339-1401 
Brown, Randall S. "Estimating Advantages to Large-Scale Advertising." 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 60 (August 1978): 428-437. 
Brozen, Yale. "The Antitrust Task Force Déconcentration Recommendation. 
The Journal of Law and Economics 13, No. 1 (October 1970): 279-292. 
Brozen, Yale. "Concentration and Structural and Market Disequilibria." 
Antitrust Bulletin 6 (Summer 1971): 241-248. 
Caves, Richard E., and Michael E. Porter. "The Dynamics of Changing 
Seller Concentration." The Journal of Industrial Economics 29 
(September 1980): 1-15. 
Comanor, William S= An untitled cossent in Issues in Advertising. The 
Economics of Persuasion, pp. 276-279. Edited by David G. Tuerck. 
Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1978. 
Comanor, William S., and Thomas A. Wilson. "The Effect of Advertising 
Competition: A Survey." Journal of Economic Literature 17 (July 
1979): 453-476. 
Connor, John, Richard Rogers, Bruce Marion, and Willard Mueller. The 
Food Manufacturing Industries. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 
1985. 
152 
Copeland, M. T. "Relation to Consumers' Buying Habits to Marketing 
Methods." Harvard Business Review 1 (April 1923): 282-290. 
Curry, B., and K. D. George. "Industrial Concentration; A Survey." The 
Journal of Industrial Economics 31 (March 1983): 203-255. 
Edwards, Corwin D. "Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power." In 
Business, Concentration, and Price Policy, pp. 334-335. Edited by 
George Stigler. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. 
Farris, Paul L. "Market Growth and Concentration Change in U.S. 
Manufacturing Industries." The Antitrust Bulletin 18, No. 2 (Summer 
1973): 291-305. 
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics. Economic Report on 
Conglomerate Merger Performance; An Empirical Analysis of Nine 
Corporations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Nov. 1972. 
Gaskins, Darius. "Dynamic Limit Pricing. Optimal Pricing Under Threat 
of Entry." Journal of Economic Theory 3 (September 1971); 306-322. 
Goldberg, Lawrence G. "Conglomerate Mergers and Concentration Ratios." 
Review of Economics and Statistics 53 (August 1974): 303-309. 
Holton, R. H. "The Distinction between Convenience Goods, Shopping 
Goods, and Speciality Goods." Journal of Marketing 23 (July 1958). 
Kaldor, Nicholas. "The Economic Aspects of Advertising." The Review of 
Economic Studies 18 (1950); 1-27. 
Kamerschen, David R. "Market Growth and Industrial Concentration»" 
Journal of the American Statistical Association 63 (March 1968): 
228-241. 
Leading National Advertisers, Inc. 1982. LNA Multi-Media Reports, 
Class/Brand. Leading National Advertisers Inc., New York. 
Levmors, Saul. "Small Firm Disadvantages in Television Advertising." 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1978. University 
Microfilms International No. 78-1234. 
Levy, David. "Specifying the Dynamics of Industry Concentration." The 
Journal of Industrial Economics 34 (September 1985): 55-68. 
Mann, H. M., J. A. Meaning, and J. W. Meehan, Jr. "Advertising and 
Concentration; An Empirical Investigation." The Journal of 
Industrial Studies 16 (November 1967): 34-39. 
153 
Marcus, Matltyahn. "Advertising and Changes on Concentration." Southern 
Economic Journal, 36 (October 1969a): 117-121. 
Marcus, Matityahn. "A Note on the Determinants of the Growth of Firms 
and Gibrut's Law." Canadian Journal of Economics 3 (November 
1969b): 580-589. 
Markham, Jesse W. Conglomerate Enterprise and Public Policy. Boston: 
Division of Research, Harvard Business School, 1973. 
Mueller, D. C., and J. E. Tilton. "Research and Development Costs as a 
Barrier to Entry." Canadian Journal of Economics 3 (November 1969): 
570-579. 
Mueller, Willard F. "Status and Future of Small Business." In Hearings 
Before the Select Committee on Small Business, pp. 447-495. U.S. 
Senate, March 15, 1967. 
Mueller, Willard F. "Recent Structural Change in the Beer Industry." 
Hearings on Conglomerate Mergers before the Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly, Committee on the Judiciary. U.S. Senate, 
May 12, 1978. 
Mueller, Willard F. "Competitive Significance for the Beer Industry of 
the Exclusive Advertising Rights Granted National Brewers in Major 
Network Sports Events." Submitted to the Department of Justice and 
the Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C., January 15, 1979. 
Mueller, Willard F., and Larry G. Hamm. "Trends in Industrial Market 
Concentration, 1947 to 1970." The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 56 (November 1974): 511-520. 
Mueller, Willard F., and Richard T. Rogers. "The Role of Advertising in 
Changing Concentration of Manufacturing Industries." The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 57, No. 1 (February 1980): 89-96. 
Mueller, willard F«, and Richard To Rogers: "Changes in Market 
Concentration of Manufacturing Industries, 1947-1977." Review of 
Industrial Organization 1 (Spring 1984): 1-14. 
Mukhopadhyay, Aran K. "Technological Progress and Change in Market 
Concentration in the U.S., 1963-77." Southern Economic Journal 52 
(July 1985): 141-149. 
Nader, R., and A. Cowan. "Claims Without Substance." In The Consumer 
and Corporate Accountability. Edited by R. Nader. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973. 
154 
Nelson, Phillip. "Information and Consumer Behavior." Journal of 
Political Economy 78, No. 2 (March/April 1970); 311-329. 
Nelson, Phillip. "Advertising as Information." Journal of Political 
Economy 82, No. 4 (July/August 1974): 729-754. 
Nelson, Ralph L. "Market Growth, Company Diversification and Product 
Concentration, 1947-1954." Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 55 (December 1960); 640-649. 
Nelson, Ralph L. Concentration on Manufacturing Industries in the United 
States. New Haven; Yale University Press, 1963. 
Nelson, R. R., and S. G. Winter. "The Schumpeterian Tradeoff Revisited." 
American Economic Review 72 (March 1982); 114-132. 
Norris, V. "The Economic Effects of Advertising; A Review of the 
Literature." In Current Issues in Research and Advertising, vol, 2, 
pp. 39-135. Edited by James H. Leigh and Claude R. Martin, Jr. 
Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, 
The University of Michigan, 1984. 
Ornstein, Stanley I. Industrial Concentration and Advertising Intensity. 
Washington, D.C.; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1977. 
Ornstein, Stanley I., and Steven Lustgarten. "Advertising Intensity and 
Industrial Concentration—An Empirical Inquiry, 1947-1967." In 
Issues in Advertising; The Economics of Persuasion. Edited by 
David G. Tuerck. Washington, D.C.; American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, 1978. 
Parker, R. C. Comparable Concentration Ratios for 213 Manufacturing 
Industries Classified by Producer and Consumer Goods and Degree of 
Product Differentiation, 1947, 1954, 1958, and 1963. Bureau of 
Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C., March 15, 
1967. 
Peles, Y. "Economy of Scale In Advertising Beer and Cigarettes." 
Journal of Business 44 (January 1971); 32-37. 
Pindyck, Robert S. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. Econometric Models and 
Econometric Forecasts. Second edition. New York; McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1981. 
Pollay, R., J. Zalchkowsky, and C. Fryer. "Regulation Hasn't Changed TV 
Ads Much!" Journalism Quarterly 57 (Autumn 1980); 438-46. 
155 
Porter, Michael E. "Consumer Behavior, Retailer Power and Market 
Performance in Consumer Goods Industries." The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 56 (November 1974): 419-436. 
Porter, Michael E. "Interbrand Choice Media Mix and Market Performance." 
American Economic Review 66 (May 1976); 398-406. 
Reld, L., and H,, Rotfeld. "How Informative are Ads on Children's TV 
Shows?" Journalism Quarterly 58 (Spring 1981); 108-111. 
Resnik, A., and B. Stern. "An Analysis of Information Content in 
Television Advertising." Journal of Marketing 41 (January 1977); 
50-53. 
Rogers, Richard. "Advertising and Concentration Change in Food and 
Tobacco Products, 1954 to 1972." Unpublished dissertation, Univ. of 
Wisconsin-Madison, 1982. 
Sawyer, Malcolm C. "Concentration in British Manufacturing Industry." 
Oxford Economic Papers 23 (November 1971); 352-383. 
Scala, James R. "Advertising and Shared Monopoly in Consumer Goods 
Industries." Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 9 (1973); 
241-278. 
Scherer, Frederic M. "The Causes and Consequences of Rising Industrial 
Concentration." The Journal of Law and Economics 22, No. 1 (April 
1979); 191-208. 
Scherer, Frederic M. Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance. 2nd ed. Chicago; Rand McNally and Company, 1980. 
Shepherd, William G. "Trends of Concentration in American Manufacturing 
Industries, 1947-1958." The Review of Economics and Statistics 26, 
(May 1964); 200-212. 
Shepherd, William G. The Economics of Industrial Organizatlonc 
Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Kail, Inc., 1979. 
Stigler, George J. The Theory of Price. Revised edition. New York; 
The Macmillan Company, 1952. 
Telser, Lester G. "Advertising and Cigarettes." Journal of Political 
Economy 70 (October 1962); 471-477. 
Telser, Lester G. "Advertising and Competition." The Journal of 
Political Economy 72 (December 1964); 542-544. 
156 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. 1963 Census of 
Manufactures. Vol. II. Industry Statistics. Washington, D.C. 
Government Printing Office, 1967. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. 1967 Census of 
Manufactures. Vol. II. Industry Statistics. Washington, D.C. 
Government Printing Office, 1971. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. 1972 Census of 
Manufactures. Vol. II. Industry Statistics. Washington, D.C. 
Government Printing Office, 1976. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. 1977 Census of 
Manufactures. Vol. II. Industry Statistics. Washington, D.C. 
Government Printing Office, 1981. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. 1982 Census of 
Manufactures. Vol. II. Industry Statistics. Washington, D.C. 
Government Printing Office, 1986. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The Detailed 
Input-Output Structure of the U.S. Economy; 1972. Vol. I. The Use 
and Make of Commodities by Industries, 1972. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1979. 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Committee on Small Business. "Future of 
Small Business in America." Hearings, Pt. 2, 17, and 18. May 1978. 
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 
U.S. Senate. 89th Congress. 2nd Session. Senate Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 
"Hearings on Possible Anticompetitive Effects of Sale of Network TV 
Advertising." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1966. 
Wall Street Journal. "Both General Foods and P&G Look Like Coffee War 
Victors." Wall Street Journal, October 29, 1981, p. 25. 
Weiss, Leonard W. "Factors in Changing Concentration." The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 45 (February 1963): 70-77. 
Weiss, Leonard W. "The Concentration-Profits Relationship and 
Antitrust." In Industrial Concentration; The New Learning, pp. 
184-233. Edited by Harvey J. Goldschmid, H. Michael Mann, and J. 
Fred Weston. Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1974. 
Willette, Anne. "Agonizing Choices in Austin." Pes Moines Register, 
January 19, 1986, p. 3F. 
157 
Woodside, A. "Advertisers' Willingness to Substantiate Their Claims." 
Journal of Consumer Affairs 11 (Summer 1977); 135-144. 
Wright, Neil R. "Product Differentiation, Concentration and Changes in 
Concentration." The Review of Economics and Statistics 40, No. 4 
(November 1978); 628-631. 
158 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First and foremost, I wish to thank Dr. Jean W. Adams. Her 
dedication as both a teacher and major professor went far beyond what any 
student could have reasonably expected, and her encouragement and 
guidance during my years at I.S.U. will never be forgotten. Also, I wish 
to thank Drs. Roy Hickman, Dudley Luckett, Peter Mattila, and Charles 
Meyer for serving on my committee. And, a special thanks goes to Dr. Roy 
Adams, Dr. Charles Meyer, and Dr. Robert Thomas for help and advice on 
various matters throughout my stay here. 
I am indebted to a number of people for help along the way. I thank 
Dr. Richard Rogers of the University of Massachusetts for discussion on 
various topics about my dissertation, including how to create the 
advertising data set. Elaine Cooper, Shu Huang, and Charlotte Latta key­
punched over 24,000 computer cards, with remarkable accuracy. The 
numerous computer programs written by Mike Carley and Shu Huang were 
greatly appreciated. Lastly. I owe a great deal to Carolyn Taylor for 
quick and accurate typing. 
To Joan, your friendship and love have made my last year and a half 
in Ames most enjoyable. 
Lastly, 1 want especially to acknowledge my parents, Lou and Alice. 
Their love, support and friendship have always been there. My numerous 
visits home to Wisconsin during my five years in Ames proved to be great 
and often needed get-aways from Iowa. 
